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From the editors

he region of Latin America and the Caribbean has long demonstrated
hospitality towards those fleeing conflict and persecution within the region and
further afield. Faced with newer causes of displacement, such as the violence
of organised criminal gangs and the adverse effects of climate change, Latin
American and Caribbean countries are continuing to expand and adapt their
protection laws and mechanisms in order to address these and other situations
of displacement and to meet the differing needs of affected populations.
In his Foreword to this issue, the High Commissioner for Refugees applauds
the region’s tradition of solidarity and humanitarianism, and recognises the
Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action of 2014 as “an important model of honest,
transparent and dedicated regional cooperation for the world”. Although Latin
America and the Caribbean still face significant challenges that require urgent
attention, and the number of asylum applications continues to rise, there is much
to commend in the region’s continuing commitment to provide protection, and
much to learn from its varied, often innovative approaches.
As we go to print, Mexico and a number of Caribbean countries are suffering the
devastating effects of natural disasters, and many people have been displaced.
Some of the articles in this issue discuss research findings and new tools
relevant to such situations.
We would like to thank Marco Formisano (UNHCR) and Marcia Vera Espinoza
(University of Sheffield) for their assistance as advisors on this feature theme.
We are also grateful to the following for their financial support for this issue:
CAMMINA (Central America and Mexico Migration Alliance), Entreculturas, Open
Society Foundations, Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), Swiss Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs and UNHCR. All current and recent FMR donors
are listed on page 83.
Formats and languages: The full issue and all the individual articles in this issue
are online in HTML, PDF and audio formats at www.fmreview.org/latinamericacaribbean. This issue and its accompanying digest (which provides introductions
to all articles plus QR/web links) will be available free of charge online and in
print in English, Spanish, French and Arabic.
If you would like printed copies of either the magazine or the digest, in any
language, please email us at fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk.
At www.fmreview.org/thematic-listings you will find a new FMR thematic listing
on Latin America and the Caribbean providing links to the articles in this issue
and 70+ additional articles published on this subject in previous FMRs – still well
worth reading.

Printed by:
Fine Print Services Ltd
www.fineprint.co.uk

30th anniversary: The first issue of FMR’s predecessor, the RPN Newsletter,
was published in November 1987 and so with this issue we celebrate our 30th
anniversary! We’ve taken the opportunity to refresh our cover design, and would
like to thank all those who have engaged with us over these three decades:
readers, authors, donors, advisors and colleagues. See www.fmreview.org/30thanniversary for our reflections on the past 30 years.

Images in FMR

Forthcoming issues:

In 2011 we decided that we should
whenever possible protect the
identity of people shown in FMR
by avoiding close-up images of
faces and/or, where necessary,
pixellating faces. We welcome your
feedback on our policy. For more
information on our photo policy see
www.fmreview.org/photo-policy

• FMR 57: Displacement in the Middle East (February 2018)
• FMR 58: Economies, work and displacement, with a supplementary feature on
refugee-led social protection (June 2018)
Details at www.fmreview.org/forthcoming. Join us on Facebook or Twitter or sign
up for email alerts at www.fmreview.org/request/alerts.
Marion Couldrey and Jenny Peebles
Editors, Forced Migration Review
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24-year-old Alfredo* from El Salvador works on a farm in the Valley of
Peace refugee settlement in central Belize. His mother fled El Salvador
and sought asylum in Belize with her sons after her husband was killed by
members of a criminal gang. Alfredo’s younger brothers study at a nearby
school, while the older boys work in agriculture and grow corn and beans
to put food on the table. The Valley of Peace was founded in 1982 to
provide a safe haven for refugees fleeing the region’s civil wars.
*Name changed for protection reasons • UNHCR/Daniele Volpe
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Foreword: Regional solidarity and commitment to
protection in Latin America and the Caribbean
Filippo Grandi
At a time when over 65 million people are forcibly displaced worldwide, Latin America and
the Caribbean offer examples of good practices from a region which continues to uphold a
long-standing commitment to protect those in need.
As we observe the global picture of
both protracted and newly developing
displacement situations, Latin America
and the Caribbean may look like a haven of
relative safety, spared from recent massive
displacements caused by persecution,
conflict and violence. Regrettably, and
as I personally witnessed in recent visits
to the region, this is not the case.
In Northern Central America (NCA)1,
transnational organised criminal gangs are
perpetrating appalling levels of violence;
in Venezuela, its population is affected
by social and political unrest and severe
limitations in access to basic services; and
in some areas of Colombia, certain armed
groups continue to operate with impunity,
despite the recent peace agreement. These
circumstances are driving people to relocate
within their country or to undertake
perilous journeys towards neighbouring
countries and beyond, often resorting to the
services of unscrupulous smugglers as they
move in search of safety. Asylum seekers
from Haiti and Cuba, and an increasing
number of refugees arriving from outside
the region, including from countries in
Asia and Africa, complete this picture.
The number of asylum applications
made in the Latin American and Caribbean
region is accelerating, and almost 100,000
people are currently awaiting a decision
on their asylum claim. This has been a
consistent trend in recent years, placing
a strain on asylum systems and adding
urgency to the search for appropriate
protection and solutions responses.
Aside from the personal tragedies
that many have experienced, people on
the move face a number of challenges.
These relate primarily to: the adequate

identification of their protection needs;
access to information on secure relocation
alternatives and asylum procedures; access to
adequate physical protection in shelters and
other safe spaces; effective access to asylum
or other forms of complementary protection;
access to registration; enjoyment of freedom
of movement and of alternatives to detention;
and issues related to documentation.

Continuing a tradition of protection

A profound commitment to providing
protection to those fleeing in search of safety
is embedded in the values of Latin America
and the Caribbean. There is a strong and
great tradition of openness, solidarity and
humanitarianism. History pays witness to

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi visits the La 72 ‘Home
and Refuge for Migrant People’ shelter, Mexico, 2017. www.la72.org
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many examples in this regard, including
towards refugees fleeing the Spanish Civil
War and Portuguese dictatorships of the 1930s,
the Jewish community escaping war and
genocide in Europe before and during World
War II, Palestinian refugees, those fleeing
persecution under repressive governments in
South America in the 1970s, and those affected
by civil wars in Central America in the 1980s.
This tradition continues to this day.
Concerted efforts are being made to
strengthen protection response through
improvements to asylum systems throughout
the region by reinforcing child protection
mechanisms, by fostering gender-sensitive
protection interventions and by a strong focus
on diversity. The States of Latin America
and the Caribbean have also committed
to eradicating statelessness by 2024 by
establishing fair and efficient procedures
for statelessness status determination,
adopting internal rules to guarantee the
rights of stateless persons and providing
adequate solutions to those who do not
have a nationality. The region has also
been a laboratory for innovative solutions,
such as the humanitarian visas granted to
Syrian refugees, the
adoption of alternative
protection schemes
through regional
cooperation agreements
(such as MERCOSUR
and UNASUR visas)
and the exploration
of the possibility to
relocate refugees using
protection-sensitive
migratory frameworks.
The region has also
made unprecedented
strides on responsibility
sharing and cooperation
mechanisms, drawing
on its strong tradition
of solidarity. Almost
all States in the region
have committed to
a comprehensive
approach to mixed
migratory movements

and forced displacement through the
adoption of the Brazil Declaration and
Plan of Action in 2014. This ambitious plan
aims to foster access to justice and asylum,
strengthen protection, and devise solutions
to the plight of all those in need, and will be
reviewed in late 2017. This is an important
model of honest, transparent and dedicated
regional cooperation for the world.
The States of Latin America and the
Caribbean are also collectively engaged in
responding to the worrying situation in NCA,
through a series of coordinated measures in
line with the 2016 San José Action Statement.
They are also currently establishing a
Comprehensive Regional Protection and
Solutions Framework (CRPSF) that will
deepen their interventions and make them
more sustainable, addressing the root causes
of displacement in NCA and strengthening
protection and solutions for those affected. So
far, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Mexico,
Panama and El Salvador have joined the
CRPSF initiative. The CRPSF will contribute
to the preparation of the 2018 Global Compact
on Refugees, working with UNHCR to
respond to the call made in the 2016 New
York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants
for enhanced, comprehensive and predictable
responses to large-scale displacement.
Addressing forced displacement in
the Latin America and Caribbean region
is a highly complex challenge, to which
States have responded with principled and
innovative approaches that can help inform
broader responses globally. The articles in
this issue will help provide insights into the
evolving situation there, and offer insights
into good practices that can help strengthen
protection and intensify progress towards
solutions within the region and beyond.
Filippo Grandi
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
www.unhcr.org
For more information, please contact Vicky
Tennant, Special Assistant to the High
Commissioner tennant@unhcr.org.
1. Northern Central American countries comprise El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras.
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Protection gaps in Mexico
Andrea Villasenor and Elba Coria
With Mexico a major destination – and transit – country for people displaced by violence in
the Northern Triangle of Central America, the Mexican government needs urgently to improve
its asylum systems and procedures if they are to be fit for purpose.
The Central America-Mexico-United States
migration route is one of the largest in the
world. According to UNHCR, the UN Refugee
Agency, every year some 500,000 people
pass through Mexico.1 For at least a decade,
however, there have been clear changes
in the composition and characteristics of
irregular migratory flows into Mexico,
particularly with regard to the causes of
displacement in Honduras, El Salvador
and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala.
In the 1980s, civil war and repression in
countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador
triggered displacement both internally and
abroad. Some people fled to neighbouring
countries but hundreds of thousands went
to the United States (US). With the end of

internal conflicts in the region in the 1990s,
the flow of Central American refugees came
to an end but in its place came large numbers
of economic migrants fleeing the poverty
that continued to afflict Central American
countries, especially the countries of the
Northern Triangle (NTCA)2 – El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras. Large-scale
natural disasters, such as Hurricane Mitch
in 1998 and El Salvador’s earthquake in 2001,
generated further migration to the US.
In response, Mexico established a
Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR)
in 1980, UNHCR opened an office in Mexico in
1982, and in 1990 Mexico founded a National
Commission for Human Rights. The refugee
regime was incorporated into Mexican
legislation in 1990, and
ten years later Mexico
ratified the 1951
Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees.
In 2011, Mexico passed
a Migration Law and
a Law on Refugees
and Complementary
Protection (a modified
version of which
became in 2014 the
Law on Refugees,
Complementary
Protection and Political
Asylum).
JRS Mexico

6

New migration
profiles

More recently, the
number of people
leaving Honduras and
El Salvador for purely
economic reasons
has been declining,
while the number of
The JRS Office in the city of Tapachula in Chiapas, Mexico, provides psychological
assistance to a refugee woman, who is holding a worry doll.
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people fleeing violence, organised crime and
persecution has been rising. Since 2006, an
estimated 150,000 people have been killed
in El Salvador, an average of more than 50
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants per year,
more than three times Mexico’s rate and
more than ten times the US average. In 2015,
El Salvador recorded a rate of 103 homicides
per 100,000 inhabitants, Honduras 57 and
Guatemala 30. The percentage of children
under 20 years of age among the victims of
homicide in El Salvador and Guatemala is
higher than anywhere else in the world, and
in 2015 Mexican immigration authorities
detained almost 35,000 adolescents, almost
half of whom were unaccompanied.
In the last four years, asylum applications
in Mexico increased from 1,296 in 2013 to
8,788 in 2016, of which 2,872 were granted
refugee status or asylum. These numbers are
small, however, compared with the number
of people fleeing NTCA countries who are
intercepted and detained in Mexico. From
2013 to 2016, more than 520,000 people from
NTCA countries were arrested, most of whom
(517,249) were subsequently deported by the
authorities (under the aegis of the National
Institute of Migration, INM).3 Of an estimated
51,000 unaccompanied migrant children and
adolescents with possible protection needs
arriving in Mexico from Central America
between 2013 and 2016, only 1.1% applied
for asylum and 230 (0.4%) were granted
refugee status or complementary protection.
Despite recent improvements in
recognition rates and a commitment made at
the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants
in 2016 to introduce seven concrete actions
in order to provide ‘a dignified and humane
treatment of migrants and refugees’, there
continue to be many challenges to providing
protection for refugees in Mexico. There is
an immediate need to adopt measures to
identify those in need of protection, and to
provide timely and effective access to refugee
status determination procedures including
access to justice and in particular to legal
defence. Mexico also needs to develop public
policies which will be effective in ensuring
local integration and the full guarantee
of rights for the refugee population.

www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean

Refugee identification measures

A fundamental consideration in the
formulation of public policies is the sociodemographic profile of those who seek
protection. So far, this element has had
little or no impact on the actions taken
by COMAR or INM to improve on the
provision of information on the right to
asylum, its scope and access mechanisms.
Those who flee to Mexico from El
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
commonly have low levels of schooling
and/or are socio-economically vulnerable,
yet information about asylum and how to
apply for it is still meagre and provided only
grudgingly. There may be reasons for this
but keeping back this information ignores
the fact that people who require protection
tend not to know their right to be recognised
as refugees; they are usually less educated,
and may even be illiterate, factors that hinder
their full understanding of the legal aspects
of the situation in which they find themselves.
Their relatively low socio-economic status
increases their vulnerability and their
suffering. Lack of information about their
situation is an impediment to identifying –
and addressing – their protection needs.

Access to asylum procedures

The migration policies and practices currently
implemented by Mexico are one of the main
barriers to access to asylum procedures.
Measures such as compulsory and systematic
detention of persons on the move and the
administrative speed with which enforced
repatriation is carried out, as well as the lack
of resources available to individuals wishing
to seek protection from being returned, all
interfere with the right to apply for refugee
status. In this regard, it is essential to take
measures that override the official discourse
that people are merely ‘in transit’ through
Mexico. This argument is increasingly
questionable and unsustainable. The State
must also ensure that returns do not violate
the principle of non-refoulement. Mexico
needs to instigate appropriate training,
including guidelines and implementation
manuals, in order to ensure that Mexico’s
migration and asylum practices conform
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to international standards – such as, for
example, developing and introducing
alternatives to detention for asylum seekers.

Access to justice and due process

The Law on Refugees, Complementary
Protection and Political Asylum establishes
standards of protection and procedures that
are clear and adequate. In practice, however,
there are administrative and operational
barriers that undermine the protection
guaranteed by law and the implementation
of the right to fair and efficient proceedings
– such as, for example, through limiting
access to legal assistance for those individuals
detained in immigration detention centres.
Such barriers obstruct and limit the right to
protection as a refugee, which in turn can
call into question a State’s commitment to
providing effective protection for refugees.
In addition to addressing the
shortcomings that currently obstruct
recognition of refugee status, Mexico must

October 2017

also introduce effective mechanisms of
inter-institutional coordination with the
National Institute of Migration to facilitate
the process of regularisation once people
are recognised as refugees. And, finally,
Mexico will need to establish comprehensive
programmes to ensure that all members of
the refugee population have access to rights
such as health and education and to promote
their social and economic integration.
Andrea Villasenor
subdireccionsjrmex@sjrlac.org
Project Director, Jesuit Refugee Service Mexico
http://en.jrs.net
Elba Coria elba.coria@ibero.mx
Director, Alaíde Foppa Legal Clinic, Universidad
Iberoamericana, Mexico
http://ibero.mx/derecho @AfClinica
1. UNHCR Fact Sheet. February 2017
http://bit.ly/UNHCR-Mexico-Feb2017
2. Also now referred to as Northern Central America.
3. Source: Ministry of the Interior - Migration Policy Unit

Silencing criticism in Mexico
Ximena Suárez and Daniel Zapico
Journalists and human rights defenders in Mexico are being attacked in an attempt to
silence their criticism. Many are forced to flee or risk being assassinated. The consequences
are both personal and of wider social significance.
In the context of the widespread violence
associated with organised crime in Mexico,
human rights defenders and journalists often
become specific targets. Since the year 2000,
at least 125 journalists have been killed in
Mexico and another 21 have gone missing.
Meanwhile, from December 2012 to July
2017 at least 106 human rights defenders
have been killed and 81 disappeared.1
And, although data is hard to obtain,
276 attacks against the press have been
reported in 2017, 23% more than in 2016.2
Denouncing human rights violations,
publicising the corruption of local authorities
or simply providing information on what is
happening in certain areas of the country
are sufficient grounds for individuals to

be threatened, assaulted, assassinated or
disappeared. With the authorities unwilling
or unable to crack down on criminal gangs
and turning a blind eye to agressions
committed by government officials, it falls
to journalists and human rights defenders
to expose murders, disappearances or
other criminal acts. To prevent them from
doing this, criminal groups force some
journalists to collaborate with them or face
being victims of aggression themselves. In
popular parlance, the offer is ‘silver or lead’.
This context is often aggravated by
the open hostility of different authorities
towards journalists and human rights
defenders, which reduces or eliminates
the possibility of seeking protection or
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support. In addition, impunity is almost
absolute. There were only three convictions
for attacks on journalists between 2010 and
2016 – just 0.15% of all cases investigated
by the Office of the Special Prosecutor for
Crimes against Freedom of Expression.

The displacement of defenders and
journalists

Many journalists and human rights defenders
opt for silence, abandoning their human
rights work, while others – when the risk
becomes unbearable – are forced to move
to other parts of the country or to other
countries. For those who decide to seek
refuge in other countries, however, there are
additional barriers to protection. Journalist
Martín Méndez Pineda, for example, travelled
to El Paso, Texas, and applied for asylum in
the United States but after spending four
months in a detention centre – which he
described as “hell” – during which he was
twice denied release on parole, he decided to
return to Mexico even though he was aware
of the danger to which he was returning.
Sometimes the authorities themselves
use relocation as a way to offer protection
to an individual at risk. The Mechanism for
the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
and Journalists, created in 2012 by the
Mexican government and which is currently
protecting 538 people (342 human rights
defenders and 196 journalists), includes
among the protection measures available
to it the temporary relocation of the person
who has been threatened or attacked.3
Although relocation may in certain cases
be an urgent measure in order to provide
security, it should not be forgotten, however,
that this is only being offered because of the
government’s inability to ensure not only the
right to reside where one wants but the right
to freedom of expression – and the right of
(and need for) society to be kept informed,
as well as the right to defend human rights.

Consequences of displacement

The impacts of displacement on journalists
and human rights defenders are multiple. For
example, the experience of being uprooted
and the loss of social relations – a common

www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean

phenomenon in cases of forced displacement
– is particularly pronounced for journalists
and defenders as they often flee alone, leaving
their family behind. Uncertainty about their
possible return makes integration in their new
location particularly difficult. And they often
feel guilt about putting their families at risk
or creating economic difficulties for them.
There are also wider social implications
of the silencing or displacement of journalists
and human rights defenders. Many of the
states in Mexico where recent attacks have
occurred experience serious problems with
violence, the presence of organised criminal
groups (including cases of collusion between
criminal groups and authorities), forced
disappearances, internal displacement,
land dispossession and other human
rights violations. Journalists and human
rights defenders attacked in recent months
had spoken out and reported on many of
these issues. Moreover, these states have a
history of violence against journalists and
human rights defenders (which has not been
investigated or punished). Even in such
hostile and dangerous contexts, journalists
and defenders carry out important work to
document, denounce and bring to light news
and events of relevance to the safeguarding
of Mexico’s population, the prevention of
other human rights violations, including
displacement, and the protection of rights.4
Ximena Suárez xsuarez@wola.org
Associate for Mexico, Washington Office on Latin
America (WOLA) www.wola.org
Daniel Zapico dzapico@ohchr.org
Human rights lawyer, currently with the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) Mexico www.hchr.org.mx
1. Red Nacional de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos
“Todos los Derechos para Todas y Todos” (Red TDT) (2017) La
Esperanza no se agota http://bit.ly/RedTDT-Esperanza-2017
2. Article 19 (2017) Primer semestre de 2017: 1.5 agresiones
diarias contra periodistas en México.
https://articulo19.org/informesemestral2017/
3. Espacio OSC (2015) Segundo diagnóstico sobre la implementación
del Mecanismo de Protección para Personas Defensoras de Derechos
Humanos y Periodistas http://bit.ly/EspaceOSC-2015
4. See WOLA ‘Statement on Violence against Journalists and
Human Rights Defenders in Mexico’, 7th September 2017
http://bit.ly/WOLA-07092017
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La 72: an oasis along the migration routes in Mexico
Alejandro Olayo-Méndez
Locally run shelters along the migration routes in Mexico provide sorely needed respite and
support. In the face of violence, stricter migration policies and daily obstacles, those working
at the La 72 shelter strive to respect people’s sense of dignity while caring for their safety.
Central America2 – El Salvador, Guatemala
and Honduras – seek recognition as refugees
in Mexico. In recent years, the main routes
used by migrants and asylum seekers have
seen an increase in violence, risks and
financial costs to the users, as a result of
stricter immigration
policies, an increase in
border control (both
in Mexico and the US)
and a rise in criminal
activity along migration
routes. The increase
in criminal activity is
partly due to an overlap
of the migration routes
with the ones used
by drug traffickers
and criminal gangs.
Along the
routes, a network
of humanitarian
aid organisations
managed by local
non-governmental
organisations (many
of them faith-based)
has emerged to assist,
help and advocate for
migrants. By the end
of 2016, there were about 85 organisations
offering food, shelter, first aid and instruction
both in human rights and in practical matters
of health and safety. La 72 is one of them.
Alejandro Olayo-Méndez

It was Saturday and they were dancing the
night away. A group of young men used
plastic buckets for an improvised drumming
session. It was not until 3:40 in the morning
that everything finally went quiet. By 8:30
am, normal life resumed when a well-known

La 72 shelter.

voice broke through the silence. “Friends,
get up. We need to clean up.” This was
Fray Aurelio, one of the Franciscan friars
working at the shelter. A new day was
beginning at La 72 – ‘Home and Refuge for
Migrant People’ – in southern Mexico.1
While Mexico has long been known as
an emigration country, it has more recently
become an important transit country for
people leaving Central America for the
United States (US), and also a new destination
country. An increasing number of people
fleeing violence in the Northern Triangle of

Creating a humanitarian space

La 72 is located in the small town of
Tenosique in the state of Tabasco in Mexico,
58 kilometres from the Mexican border with
Guatemala. Migrants and asylum seekers
arrive at this town hoping to jump on a freight
train as part of their attempt to reach the US.
While not all the migrants who pass through
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the town use the services at La 72, between
120 and 140 migrants stay at the shelter
every day. While most come from Honduras,
there are also people from Guatemala and
El Salvador, and occasionally some from
South American or African countries.
People often arrive by foot but if they
have money and are able to avoid border
patrols they arrive by public transportation.
Many are robbed by the criminal gangs that
operate within those 58 kilometres between
the border and Tenosique. At times, the
violence reaches levels of extraordinary
brutality – women gang-raped while the men
in the group are held hostage at gunpoint or
threatened with machetes. With government
border control checkpoints installed along
the main roads, irregular migrants are
forced to use more dangerous roads.
Like many other shelters in Mexico, La
72 sprang from the local community which
was aiding migrants in distress long before
they established a formal non-governmental
organisation (NGO). Early in the 1990s, the
Franciscan Friars provided what food and
shelter they could at the local church. In
2010, 72 migrants were massacred in San
Fernando, Tamaulipas, in northern Mexico.
This event triggered the decision to move
to a new facility that could provide better
services for the migrants, with the name of
the new facility commemorating the 72 killed.
Initially, the shelter provided support mostly
to economic migrants but, as the profiles of
those passing through the shelter changed,
support was extended to asylum seekers.
The goal was to create a ‘humanitarian
space’ that could provide not only shelter and
sanctuary (Mexican migration law prohibits
authorities and police from conducting
raids or inspections in places providing
humanitarian aid) but also a place where
migrants could feel dignified and supported.
First and foremost, migrants are human
beings who deserve respect and support in
the face of an unjust and violent system that
forces them to leave their home countries.
“These places are like an oasis along the road.
Without them our journey would be almost
unbearable.” (Honduran migrant)

www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean

Initially, the shelter had a small staff
and facilities were basic. By the beginning
of 2016, the shelter had a staff of eight and
an array of volunteers from local areas as
well as from other parts of Mexico, Europe
and other developed countries. Médecins
Sans Frontières, Asylum Access, the Red
Cross, the UN Refugee Agency and various
Mexican NGOs provide targeted services
at the shelter for both economic migrants
and asylum seekers. Now the shelter also
has a project for unaccompanied minors
and a programme for LGBTIQ3 people, and
provides legal counsel and representation
for those seeking asylum. The shelter’s
facilities have also expanded, providing
separate facilities for unaccompanied
minors, women and LGBTIQ people.
The shelter has an ‘open door’ policy
because it does not want to resemble a
detention centre or prison. At La 72, migrants
can come and go freely. Some migrants rest
at the shelter while others go to town either
to find jobs or to beg, so as to gather money
to continue their journeys. The migrants’
presence creates enormous tensions in the
local community. While some local people
support the shelter generously, others blame
it for social problems such as robbery,
harassment and sexual abuse. Handling
the tensions with the community as well as
with local, federal and migration authorities
has never been easy. New challenges always
emerge. One such challenge is to keep
advocating for migrants and refugees while
giving voice to their needs and circumstances.
Another is to continue working with
local community and authorities to foster
hospitality and respect for human rights.
At La 72 every Saturday night is a party
but every day is a battle to support those
migrants and refugees who seek justice, safety
and the opportunity for a dignified life.
Alejandro Olayo-Méndez, SJ
alejandro.olayomendez@campion.ox.ac.uk
Jesuit Catholic priest, currently studying for a
DPhil in International Development, University of
Oxford www.ox.ac.uk
1. www.la72.org
2. Also now referred to as Northern Central America.
3. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Intersex and Queer/Questioning
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Mexico’s Michoacán state: mixed migration flows and
transnational links
Xóchitl Bada and Andreas E Feldmann
Against a backdrop of unremitting violence in Mexico, traditional migration patterns in the
North American corridor are being reconfigured.

Ruben Figueroa/Movimiento Migrante Mesoamerica

The long-established stream of migrants
trying to reach the United States (US) in order
to improve their economic security has been
broadened by thousands of forcibly displaced
persons fleeing violence and insecurity in
Mexico.1 Rigid distinctions between voluntary
and forced migration are becoming blurred
as people threatened by violence, lack of
economic prospects and/or environmental
degradation leave their homelands to protect
their fundamental rights. UNHCR, the UN
Refugee Agency, has reported a significant
rise in asylum petitions by Mexican nationals
in the US, from 3,669 in 2000 to 14,643 in 2016,
despite low acceptance rates in the US.2
A critical question for the understanding
of contemporary configurations of movement
in Mexico concerns how violence is
influencing people’s decisions to move and
how they are selecting their destinations.
In addition to seeking shelter within
Mexico or applying for asylum abroad, vast
and long-established migration networks
offer a third possibility to those affected
by violence: crossing into the US, with or
without documentation. In order to study

Migrants in transit, Mexico.

this transnational movement, we explored
the case of the Mexican state of Michoacán.

Violence and displacement in Michoacán

Michoacán has been severely impacted by
narcotics-related violence, with the rise of
several prominent criminal organisations.
Enabled by their vast wealth and coercive
capacity, drug cartels have permeated the
economy, and the country’s rather weak
government is incapable of stopping the
process. Michoacán has also witnessed the
rapid expansion of self-defence militias
that emerged as a reaction to organised
crime. Thousands of Michoacanos (people
from Michoacán) have been forced to
flee to makeshift camps on the outskirts
of towns and cities, while the State –
undermined by powerful non-state actors
– has been unable and/or unwilling to
provide assistance and protection to these
internally displaced people (IDPs).
Michoacán faces the additional challenge
of attempting to assist and reintegrate
thousands of migrants who return from
the US because of unemployment or who
are deported from the US due to criminal
convictions or lack of documentation. Under
the current presidential administration, the
US Department of Homeland Security has
successfully implemented a policy based
on fear tactics to encourage thousands
of undocumented immigrants to return
voluntarily rather than risk mandatory
custodial sentences if caught by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement. These returnees
sometimes attempt to settle in larger cities in
Michoacán where they have social networks,
in search of better employment opportunities.
Others return to their home towns to live with
relatives, where they frequently face scarce
employment opportunities, an absence of
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integration policies, and violent conditions,
prompting the need to move yet again.3

Choosing a destination

Michoacán has a long tradition of
international migration. The presence of
Michoacanos in the US dates back to the early
20th century when thousands of men migrated
north to work in agriculture. In the 1960s
women and children joined this migration
flow. The presence of these migrants was
instrumental in creating a transnational
community with robust economic, cultural
and political ties, and there is a constant
stream of movement between Michoacán and
several cities in the US, including Chicago,
Dallas and Los Angeles. In 2014, the state of
Michoacán received US$2.2 billion in family
remittances, the largest amount received by
any Mexican state. This represents 10% of
the state’s annual gross domestic product
(GDP) and is twice the value of state exports.
Politically, Michoacán identifies itself as a
bi-national state. The governor of Michoacán
and other authorities regularly travel to
the US in order to maintain and deepen
their ties with the Michoacán diaspora. For
their part, Michoacanos in the US return
often to Michoacán and actively engage
in lobbying and interaction with regional
authorities and communities concerning
the migratory status and living conditions
for Mexicans in the US. The state organises
every year a bi-national migration forum
(Foro Binacional del Migrante) at which
regional authorities and a plethora of
organisations from Mexico and the US
come together to discuss problems and
challenges including governmental help
to returnees, support for job creation,
health and education programmes, the
development of infrastructure projects,
and measures to enhance migrants’
security. These issues are relevant to both
economic migrants and forced migrants.
The unlikelihood of receiving assistance
and protection in Mexico, the fear of being
targeted even when they move internally,
the existence of long-standing transnational
networks and the prospect of finding better
opportunities in the north all seem to inform
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the decision to seek protection by crossing
the Mexico-US border, despite migrants’
lack of documentation. In order to study this
phenomenon, we conducted interviews and
surveys with authorities, representatives
of civil society, academics and migrants.4
As we learned in visits to Michoacán and
interviews with migrants in Chicago, people
leave their communities as discreetly as
possible, trying to avoid detection by violent
actors, and relying on existing networks
– social capital – for their protection.
Those fortunate enough to have relatives
and close friends in the US often receive
critical support (money, visa sponsorship,
information, shelter) that allows them to
travel and reach the US and, once there,
find a job and adjust to their new lives.
While conditions in the US for Mexican
migrants – both economic migrants
and asylum seekers – have deteriorated
significantly since the 2008 economic crisis
and the recent policies implemented by
the current Trump administration, our
interviewees pointed out that many of
those who fear for their lives in Mexico
prefer to face uncertainty and danger in
the US rather than stay put in Michoacán.
A long-standing culture of migration plays
a huge role in facilitating this movement
because for many Michoacanos migrating
is an integral part of their upbringing.
Current circumstances pose enormous
challenges to information gathering,
rendering the task of tracing migrants’
journeys difficult. Not only are fleeing
migrants reluctant to speak but government
officials in Mexico and the US are similarly
reluctant, all fearing being targeted by
narcotics-related criminal organisations.
The difficulty of obtaining information is
exacerbated because Mexican authorities
cannot be seen to provide information
that confirms the scale of the exodus of
their citizens to the US, as doing so would
signify capitulation to drug cartels.
Federal and Michoacán state authorities,
including the Federal Executive Commission
of Victim Services and the Migrant Affairs
Secretariat in Michoacán, recognise forced
migration as a problem but lack a thorough
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awareness of its dimensions and transnational
connections, and lack the policies needed to
coordinate assistance to those affected. Even
in the current context of violence in Mexico,
there are almost no government programmes
in place to assist and protect IDPs.5 Civil
society has also been slow to react. Similarly,
migrant civil society representatives in
Michoacán can only offer scant evidence
documenting those who have migrated north,
with their ability to investigate impeded by
lack of resources and fear of retaliation.
Given the predicament faced by
thousands of uprooted Michoacanos, it is
incumbent upon the Mexican authorities, both
at the Federal and State level, to implement
concrete measures to assist and protect this
population, especially the most vulnerable.
At the very least, measures should include:
opening shelters where victims could
receive vital aid and medical assistance
and be protected from harm; strengthening
existing mechanisms to report human rights
violations and other crimes; developing a
national register of displaced people; and,
as far as possible, devising mechanisms to
help victims to return to their communities
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and to promote other durable solutions. The
international community, for its part, should
provide financial and technical support to
increase the capacity of the Mexican state to
confront this mounting humanitarian crisis.
Xóchitl Bada xbada@uic.edu
Associate Professor
Andreas E Feldmann feldmana@uic.edu
Associate Professor
Latin American and Latino Studies Program,
University of Illinois at Chicago www.uic.edu
The authors thank Cristina Correa for assistance
in preparing this article.
1. Albuja L (2014) ‘Criminal violence and displacement in Mexico’,
Forced Migration Review issue 45 www.fmreview.org/crisis/albuja
2. UNHCR Population Statistics 2017
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers
3. Personal interview with a staff member of the Migrant Affairs
Secretariat in Michoacán. Morelia, December 2016.
4. This information was complemented by secondary sources
including governmental, intergovernmental and NGO reports,
asylum seeker affidavits and academic works.
5. Rubio Diaz-Leal L (2016) ‘Internal displacement in Mexico: a
debate on concepts, statistics and State responsibility’ in Cantor
D J and Rodriguez-Serna N (Eds) The New Refugees: Crime and
Displacement in Latin America, London: Institute of Latin American
Studies.

Criminal violence in Honduras as a driver of
displacement
Suzanna Nelson-Pollard
The impact of violence is felt daily in the Northern Triangle of Central America and is a major
driver of displacement, yet its very nature obstructs identification of and access to those
in need of protection. Honduras is now a case-study in the CRRF process, presenting an
opportunity to learn from what is done, and not done, in one of the affected countries in this
region.
With homicide levels in the region on a
par with some of the world’s worst armed
conflicts,1 gangs and criminal groups
represent the new face of organised violence
in Latin America. For many people, having
a close family member or friend who has
experienced kidnapping, mugging, robbery,
extortion, sexual violence or murder is
commonplace, and in some countries
the scale and severity of the violence are

broadly comparable with the insurgencybased conflicts of earlier decades.
Increasing efforts are being made by
some States, international agencies and
non-governmental actors to respond to
the violations perpetrated by gangs and
criminal groups, yet displaced people are
still not getting the protection they need.
A first step in dismantling barriers to
accessing protection is to secure increased
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global recognition of violence and
persecution as the primary drivers of forced
displacement in the Northern Triangle of
Central America (NTCA)2. The next step is
for states to improve their ability to reach
displaced communities and to identify
those with specific protection needs.
An encouraging development in the push
for increased recognition of the situation came
in early 2017 when Honduras announced that
it would be one of the case-study countries
for the Comprehensive Refugee Response
Framework (CRRF), a process led by UNHCR
to provide inputs into the Global Compact on
Refugees. A number of countries in the region
then also announced their intention to be
case-study countries, enabling collaboration
for a regional response to displacement in
the Northern Triangle. The participation
of the NTCA region in the CRRF process
provides the opportunity to address a context
with different circumstances and needs
from those of traditional refugee situations.
With gang-related violence increasing as a
driver of displacement globally, there are
far-reaching implications for other regions
in what is done, and not done, in Honduras.
The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
(CRRF) is the name given to the first of two
Annexes to the New York Declaration for Refugees
and Migrants adopted in September 2016. The
CRRF promotes a sustainable approach linking
humanitarian action with development assistance
in situations involving large-scale movements of
refugees, and focuses on a number of actions
and best practices in four areas: reception and
admission measures; support for immediate and
ongoing needs; support for host countries; and
enhanced opportunities for durable solutions.
A number of countries have agreed to be casestudies for the CRRF; the lessons drawn from these
countries’ experiences will inform the preparation of
the Global Compact on Refugees in time for the UN
General Assembly in 2018.3

Accessing IDPs

Honduras is the only country in the
NTCA which has publicly recognised the
phenomenon of internal displacement, and
is now working to adopt national legislation
on preventing internal displacement and
protecting and assisting IDPs, the first of
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its kind in the region. However, across the
region, States, international agencies and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are
only now starting to grasp the full extent of
internal displacement in the region. Unlike
more visible situations of displacement
such as from the Syrian conflict, people
fleeing criminal violence often try to remain
unnoticed. Access to data is improving, with
surveys having been conducted in Honduras
and El Salvador but these only partially
cover the situation. A study from 2014 found
174,000 IDPs in Honduras but it only covered
20 out of 290 municipalities.4 Based on this
study, the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre projected that this figure had risen
to 190,000 IDPs in 2016. The Norwegian
Refugee Council (NRC) has undertaken
its own surveys to find children who have
dropped out of school in areas affected
by extreme violence, and has consistently
found that actual numbers of people affected
are higher than government estimates.
Governments and NGOs often speak of
the ‘invisibility’ of internal displacement in
the Northern Triangle, especially as IDPs
tend to lie low to avoid being followed
by their persecutors and do not register
with the authorities due to lack of trust.
Those working directly with affected
communities, such as NRC, know that this
invisibility means that the communities
are very difficult to access. States often
have no control over zones affected by
gang violence and are unable or unwilling
to provide basic services for communities
living there. For humanitarians, negotiating
with gangs to secure access to vulnerable
displaced people is unchartered territory.
Some organisations, such as NRC, have
managed to gain some access through
careful negotiation but such access is
dependent on many factors that could
change instantaneously. In May 2017, NRC
provided humanitarian assistance for 200
people who had been newly displaced from
their homes in San Pedro Sula in Honduras
due to a rise in gang warfare; more could
have been done if the government and other
humanitarian actors had had unhindered
access to the affected population.5
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The Villa Cristiana neighbourhood of Tegucigalpa, Honduras, is controlled by the Mara 13 armed group, which does not allow children to
attend school in the adjacent neighbourhood.

Identifying protection cases

In parallel to gaining better access to
internally displaced people, States must
also improve their methods of identifying
protection needs. Governments of the
NTCA continually claim that a mere 5-10%
of all people leaving their countries do
so for reasons related to violence,6 and
that the other 90-95% of people leave for
economic reasons or to reunite with family.
In the meantime, studies carried out by UN
agencies and NGOs reveal dramatically
different figures, with between 40 and 60% of
children, adolescents and women surveyed
leaving for reasons related to violence.7
It may be that generalised violence has
become so normalised that many of the
hundreds of thousands of people displaced
across the region do not immediately identify
violence as the primary cause of their
displacement. The disparity in statistics,
however, can be partially explained by
the conditions in which protection cases
are identified and data is gathered. NTCA
government figures recording cross-border
displacement come from interviews taken
in deportee reception centres processing
people who have been sent back from the

United States and Mexico. While in recent
years the Honduran government has
significantly improved the conditions of
these reception centres, which now provide
immediate assistance and child-friendly
spaces, they remain inadequate locations
for collecting complex and personal data
on motivations for leaving the country.
Interviews are often conducted in spaces
that lack the necessary privacy for divulging
sensitive information, for example, about
abuse, violence or fears of persecution
from gangs. Government employees (who
in some cases are volunteers) conduct
the interviews but often have insufficient
training in identifying protection risks.
Decades of state violence and corruption
have eroded trust in the system, and there
is consequently little incentive to confide
in state officials when needing to seek
protection. Arguing that most people
want to leave the reception centre as soon
as possible, Honduran authorities rush
deportees through registration, medical
and psychological check-ups, and entrance
interviews, and then give them a small meal
– all in the space of an hour – before putting
deportees on a bus to the closest urban area.

FMR 56

Latin America and the Caribbean
October 2017

These circumstances are not conducive
to people reporting the often complex and
traumatic original reasons for leaving the
country, to say nothing of the human rights
abuses they may have suffered during
their flight. In many cases, returnees also
know that the capacity of the government
to provide a real solution (such as referral
pathways or resettlement opportunities)
to their case is limited, and that even
their capacity to follow up on individual
cases is scarce. With few people granted
international protection from gang violence,
displaced people may see little value in
requesting asylum upon arrival in destination
countries. In addition, do they indicate
economic reasons as their principal reason
for making the journey north in order to
demonstrate that they are willing to work and
contribute? Similarly, do they declare family
reunification as the reason for their journey
in order to show that they have a support
network in the country of destination?
In destination countries, many people
are offered the choice of either signing
their own deportation notices to be sent
back home or facing a lengthy detention
sentence while their case is processed. Both
in destination country and upon return,
it is often easier for individuals to report
that they left the country seeking economic
opportunities or family reunification, so
that the authorities will leave them alone
– and they can try the journey again.

Seizing the CRRF process

Across the NTCA there is a fundamental
lack of understanding around push and
pull factors of displacement, and the role
that violence plays in the journeys of many.
Humanitarian organisations must recognise
this gap in understanding of drivers and
the accompanying failure to identify people
in need of protection. They must also ask
themselves whether the law, policies and
programmes developed for protecting and
assisting displaced persons in conflict contexts
such as Syria or the Democratic Republic of
Congo should be applied equally to these
scenarios of criminal violence, or whether
other solutions and approaches are needed.
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The CRRF process in Honduras is an
opportunity to address these issues and,
ultimately, to protect people displaced
internally and across borders. UNHCR
and NGOs such as the Norwegian
Refugee Council are currently gathering
recommendations for action from
States, displaced people, civil society
organisations, faith groups and local
communities. In October 2017, States
from the NTCA and the wider region will
meet in Honduras to define and pledge
commitments to stronger collaboration and
protection mechanisms and decide on a
Comprehensive Regional Protection and
Solutions Framework. This process must
translate into sustainable engagement of
humanitarian and development actors,
greater responsibility sharing fostered
by States through strengthened national
protection structures, more funding for
protection, and a dramatic increase in legal
pathways for those in need. Actors across
the NTCA must identify and acknowledge
the role of violence in driving displacement,
and seize the window of opportunity to
act now and make a real difference for
people in urgent need of protection.
Suzanna Nelson-Pollard
suzanna.nelson-pollard@nrc.no
Programme Associate, Humanitarian Policy Team,
Norwegian Refugee Council – Geneva
www.nrc.no
1. See Cantor D J ‘Gang violence as a cause of forced migration
in the Northern Triangle of Central America’ in Cantor D J and
Rodríguez Serna N (Eds) (2016) The New Refugees, Crime and
Displacement in Latin America, pp27-45.
2. Also now referred to as Northern Central America.
3. www.unhcr.org/uk/comprehensive-refugee-responseframework-crrf See also article by Manisha Thomas in this issue.
4. Study by the Honduran Inter-Agency Commission for the
Protection of Persons Displaced by Violence supported by
UNHCR and the Joint IDP Profiling Service
www.internal-displacement.org/countries/honduras
5. See Forced Migration Review issue 37 (2011) ‘Armed non-state
actors and displacement’ www.fmreview.org/non-state
6. Statistics cited in discussions with Honduran authorities in
November 2016, and in public statements made by Guatemalan
officials at Global Consultations on Migration in May 2017.
7. See for example UNHCR (2014) Arrancado de Raiz
http://bit.ly/UNHCR-UprootedExecSummary-2014
Also: UNHCR (2014) Children on the Run
www.unhcr.org/uk/children-on-the-run
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Factors influencing decision making by people
fleeing Central America
Vickie Knox
Interviews with people who have fled violence in Central America reveal the influences
behind their decision making prior to and during flight.
In late 2015, I conducted interviews with
Central Americans staying at a shelter in
Ciudad Ixtepec, a town in southern Mexico,
and with Salvadorans who had been deported
from Mexico and were now at a centre for
returnees in Santa Tecla, El Salvador. All had
fled the Northern Triangle of Central America
(NTCA)1 because of criminal violence and
insecurity. The interviews reveal some of
the reasoning behind people’s decisions to
flee and give a clear picture of, firstly, why
internal flight is often not a viable option and,
secondly, how learning about the right to
asylum affects decisions taken during flight.2
Those interviewed had experienced
slightly different levels of risk, depending
on the types of threat they had experienced
and the point at which they had escaped,
and this appeared to result in different
patterns of mobility.3 Some of the incidents
they had experienced posed immediate
risk, including attempted murder, serious
physical assault and credible death threats.
Others posed an imminent risk, including
threats that a person would be killed if they
refused to or failed to do something, such
as join a gang or pay extortion. Credible
death threats or attempted murder drove
emergency flight to escape the immediate
risk, while people also left their country in
an evasive move to avoid the imminent risk
of reprisals and violence: “The gangs want
me to work with them. My family says that it
is not safe for me to be there.”4 Others made
a pre-emptive move to avoid future risk.

Why internal migrations fail or are not
attempted

The broader situation of insecurity within the
NTCA means that internal relocation within
one’s own country is not a viable option for
many people who are at risk. States’ failure

to provide protection or resettlement results
in internal relocations that are precarious
and often unsuccessful, and the absence of
an effective State presence has enabled nonState actors to usurp territorial control and
act with impunity throughout the region.
People from all three NTCA countries who
moved internally prior to leaving the country
said that they had experienced the same
problems and insecurity after their internal
relocation – and that this had resulted in
their subsequent external migration.
Those who had fled immediate risk,
such as attempted murder, reported more
threats and personal insecurity after
internal flight due to the communications
networks of the gangs: “It’s the same
everywhere, and they know where you
go. Better to leave the country.” Those at
imminent risk also expressed the futility of
their internal flight. Internal displacement
is often not sufficient because of the reach
of criminal groups and their extensive
communications networks. People’s decisions
to leave their countries were made expressly
because of the danger they ran in their
country of origin, their level of risk and
the failure of the State to protect them.
Both internal displacement and flight into
another NTCA country can also increase the
risk to an individual. If someone relocates
from one gang-controlled neighbourhood
to one controlled by a rival gang, they will
be at serious risk from both groups, even if
not affiliated to either gang or to any other.
Similarly, if they move to an area that is
neutral but requires them to cross either
gang’s territory to visit relatives or go to
work, their risk is heightened: “I moved
from one neighbourhood to another, and
going to visit my mother meant I had to
return to the first neighbourhood. I couldn’t
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just move – there were gangs, threats, the
same – especially because I moved.”
Although having social capital – networks
and relationships – in the destination location
can help when relocating internally,5 none of
the interviewees highlighted a lack of social
capital as a barrier to successful internal flight,
mentioning instead two significant barriers:
a lack of State control that has resulted in the
pervasive presence and territorial control
of gangs, and an absence of effective State
response and protection for people who
have been forced to relocate internally.
There were also some people who had
not experienced actual or threatened violence
and did not attempt internal relocation
before leaving their country but who
made a pre-emptive move abroad to avoid
extortion or because of a degrading local
security situation. One Salvadoran family
had moved before starting to pay extortion,
explaining: “I couldn’t pay, because if you
pay once, you have to pay forever – or end
up face down.” Overall, their reasoning
for their external migration was a lack of
adequate State protection in their country
of origin. Half of this group had social
relationships and networks in their intended
destination but this appeared to determine
their destination rather than influence
their decision to leave their countries.

How information about rights affects
trajectory

There was scant prior awareness among the
interviewees of the right to seek asylum or the
fact that it could apply to their circumstances.
At the migrant shelters they stay in along the
way, people moving through Mexico receive
varying amounts of information about their
rights. All people staying at the shelter where
I conducted interviews were informed during
their initial registration interview of the right
to apply for asylum. Many expressed surprise
that such protection existed and could be
applicable to them. One Salvadoran told me:
“I never knew we had a right to be safe.”
One third of all interviewees who had fled
death threats or forced recruitment decided
to claim asylum in Mexico, changing their
migration plans after being informed of this
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right during transit. For some people without
social capital and a specific destination who
were fleeing certain death, the decisionmaking process became very straightforward
and they cited just one factor: “I heard about
the right to asylum.” One interviewee made
dramatic changes to his plans after learning
of the right to seek asylum. His initial plan
was to take his 15-year-old stepson to the
United States (US) to avoid forced recruitment
and death threats, and then to return to
Honduras to look after his family. He told me:
“We arrived here in Ixtepec and they told us
about the right to asylum, which I had never
heard of before. I plan to go back to collect
my family so that I can claim asylum with
them all.” It is evident that lack of knowledge
about asylum is a barrier to protection, and
that the right to seek asylum could factor in
migration decisions if there were widespread
awareness of it in the country of origin.
Despite recognising that they could
have a valid claim for asylum, however,
some people chose instead to apply for a
humanitarian visa (available for migrants
who have been victims of or witness to
a crime while in Mexico and – in theory
at least – for asylum seekers6) either to
regularise their stay in Mexico or to facilitate
a safe journey through Mexico to the US.
For those who decided to remain in Mexico,
this decision was influenced chiefly by the
Mexican authorities’ general refusal to accept
applications for asylum and a humanitarian
visa concurrently, meaning that applicants
had to choose between one or the other. So
even when people do receive information
about international protection and their
rights, my research suggests that many
choose not to file claims in Mexico, despite
acknowledging their potential eligibility.
Those with family or friends in a specific
destination city were less likely to change
their plans while in transit, demonstrating
that social capital is also an important
factor in the decision-making process

Final reflections

The interviews indicate that incidents
resulting in immediate or imminent risk
were the catalyst for people to leave their
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homes but that structural factors – namely
the lack of State protection in the country of
origin – drove external migrations. External
flight is being driven by a powerful trio of
structural factors: the pervasive presence
of organised criminal groups throughout
the region, a lack of effective State control
leading to the usurping of territorial control
by organised criminal groups, and an
absence of State response to people who are
forced to relocate internally. Social capital
and knowledge of one’s rights may influence
decisions along the way and so determine
one’s ultimate destination but migration
controls and policies have little bearing on
decision making when push factors are
so overwhelming and flight so urgent.
Vickie Knox V.Knox@london.ac.uk
Associate Tutor, Refugee Law Initiative, and PhD
candidate, School of Advanced Study, University
of London www.sas.ac.uk
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1. Also now referred to as Northern Central America.
2. Doctoral research funded through the Arts and Humanities
Research Council.
3. While death threats affected people of all ages from 16 to 50,
the majority of those fleeing forced recruitment or involvement in
gang activities were in their teens and early twenties, and those
fleeing extortion were all in their mid-twenties and included
a family group. This suggests that certain activities adversely
affect certain demographic groups but could also indicate that
some groups are less tolerant of the same level of risk, resulting
in different patterns of mobility. For instance, family groups may
move pre-emptively even though faced with lower levels of risk
from extortion.
4. All quotations are from men from El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras, ranging in age from 19 to 46, some accompanied by
their family with minors in the group.
5. Cantor D J and Rodríguez Serna N R (Eds) (2016) The New
Refugees: Crime and Displacement in Latin America, Ch 3
6. Mexico’s Ley de Migración (2011) makes provision for a
humanitarian visa for a foreign national who has been the victim
of or witness to a crime while in Mexican territory and for asylum
seekers but the latter is not being allowed in practice; see Human
Rights Watch (2016) Closed Doors: Mexico’s Failure to Protect Central
American Refugee and Migrant Children
http://bit.ly/HRW-Mexico-2016 and Crisis Group (2016);
Easy Prey: Criminal Violence and Central American Migration,
Latin America Report No 57. http://bit.ly/ICG-EasyPrey-2016

Central American refugees: protected or put at risk
by communication technologies?
Guillermo Barros
In a world that is more interconnected than ever, many refugees cannot obtain information
or communicate when they most need to. Paradoxically, carrying a phone or connecting to
the internet can put them at risk if they do not take security measures.
For refugees and other migrants from El
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – the
Northern Triangle of Central America1 –
communication is one of their greatest
priorities during their route north. From
interviews conducted in migrant shelters
in Mexico in 2016, it was clear that many
refugees prefer to invest a significant part of
their scarce resources in maintaining contact
with their families, friends or acquaintances
who can assist them on their journey.2
Information is often prioritised even
over food or shelter. Most of those whom
we interviewed travelled with their own
mobile phone or wanted to get one. They
also increasingly use apps like Google Maps
to source information about countries they
are unfamiliar with, and they use social

networking sites, especially Facebook, and
messaging services like WhatsApp when
possible. They use Facebook primarily
to communicate with relatives and other
acquaintances who are in their countries of
origin or in the United States (US), as well as
to contact people whom they think will be
able to help them evade roadblocks and who
might be able to transfer money to them.
Only five interviewees claimed to
have planned – before starting out – a
communication strategy for their own
protection. Most said they just planned to try
to communicate when and where possible.
For some who did dedicate time and effort
to assess each context and coordinate with
their families, it was vital that their relatives
knew their exact location each day, so that
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Guillermo Barros

they would be able to launch a more effective
search for them in case of loss of contact.
According to those interviewed, their
main information needs are: reliable
data on areas of greatest insecurity (due
to the presence of armed groups); the
location of police checkpoints; the cost
of bribes they might need to pay at each
stage; the characteristics of each place or
terrain that they will cross next; and the
requirements, procedures and timescales
of requesting refuge in Mexico.

Risky communication

Travelling through Mexico with a mobile
phone can pose a threat in itself. Mexican
criminal groups often kidnap refugees
and other migrants who have relatives or
connections in the US and force them to
provide that person’s contact details – who
can then be contacted for ransom demands.
The mere act of carrying a phone can attract
the attention of criminals and lead them
to believe that the migrant has relatives
who might be susceptible to extortion.
Undocumented migrants travelling through
Mexico with a mobile phone also run the
risk of being confused with a ‘coyote’ (people
trafficker), whether they are intercepted by
criminal groups or by Mexican immigration
authorities. Criminals attacking a group
of migrants will assume that the one who
carries a phone is the one who is guiding
them to the north. In that case, criminals
may require that person to give them a
‘fee’ for allowing them to guide migrants
through the territory controlled by the
gangs. This has been the operating model of
the Los Zetas drug cartel in recent years.
From the testimonies collected, it seems
that borrowing a phone or giving it to another
migrant to make a call or send a message
can also cause problems. The risk of using
the telephone of another migrant is that
the number of the relative or other person
called is recorded in the device and can be
used for extortion purposes. Migrants can
take the precaution of deleting the number
they have called but do not always do so.
For many of those travelling through
Mexico, digital communication is seen as

Mobile phones charging at a shelter for refugees and migrants.

safer than communication by telephone in
this context of high insecurity because it
does not require carrying a mobile phone
or memorising phone numbers. However,
some distrust of social networks such as
Facebook is apparent; refugees fear that
information on their whereabouts may
appear on their profiles or in applications
that are not completely secure.

Recommendations

Communication can bring enormous risks
and yet those providing psychological
care in shelters for migrants confirm
that the ability to communicate with
family members is extremely beneficial
to refugees’ emotional health, reducing
their stress levels significantly.
According to the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
providing access to information and
technology should be of equal priority
for humanitarian assistance as providing
food, water and shelter. However, there is
no coordinated national strategy in Mexico
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to support migrants in this way; migrant
shelters have limited resources – and each
has its own communications policy, so that
migrants cannot be sure what means of
communication may be available in each
place. Apart from a free call service offered by
the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the Mexican Red Cross to migrants in
some shelters, there appear to be no initiatives
by the Mexican authorities or by international
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to
address migrants’ communication needs.
A number of recommendations emerge
from our research findings. All actors working
to protect refugees and other migrants in
transit should prioritise their secure access
to information and communication. It would
also be advisable to set up a coordination
framework between all actors working
in the field and with others who could
collaborate in certain projects as digital
volunteers – that is, online activists organised
into networks and located throughout the
world who support humanitarian crisis
response by collecting and managing data.
For their part, migrant shelters could
offer migrants regular access to means
of communication, while NGOs could
provide workshops at the shelters to
promote safe use of telephones and social
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networking sites, and could also build
websites providing practical and easily
accessible information to those in transit.
The Mexican authorities, for their part,
could promote humanitarian initiatives
in the field of communication – such as
providing free and secure telephone lines so
that refugees and other migrants can talk to
their families. They should also investigate
telephone extortion and other similar
crimes against refugees and other migrants
and their families, and facilitate refugees’
electronic access to the status of their
asylum or humanitarian visa applications.
Finally, private companies could improve
the telecommunication network in migrant
transit zones and reduce the price of the
phone cards used by refugees and migrants
to call people in their home countries.
Guillermo Barros gbarrosv@gmail.com
Former Agence France-Presse Editor-in-Chief in
Mexico; currently studying for a Master’s in
Contemporary Latin America Studies, Universidad
Complutense de Madrid www.ucm.es
1. Also now referred to as Northern Central America.
2. Fieldwork was carried out in September 2016 at migrant shelters
La 72 (southern Mexico) and Belén Posada del Migrante (northern
Mexico). The sample includes interviews with 40 refugees and
other migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, aged
between 14 and 53 years.

Unaccompanied children crossing the Darién Gap
Margaret Hunter
While there is much international attention paid to the treacherous journeys of refugees and
migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea, both the media and international aid community
have overlooked one of the deadliest migratory routes in the world: the Darién Gap.
I first became aware of the existence of the
Darién Gap when I began working in 2015
as a psychotherapist for unaccompanied
children arriving in the United States (US).
The vast majority of these children were
fleeing persecution in their countries of
origin and many had crossed into the US
from Central America. During the initial
assessment and subsequent counselling
sessions, the conversations with my

adolescent clients inevitably focused on
crossing ‘the jungle’ between Colombia
and Panama. My clients consistently
described this stretch of the voyage as the
worst part of their migration journey; the
desperation and fear that they felt in the
jungle was common to all their narratives.
At the northern border of Colombia they
discover why the world’s longest road – the
48,000-km Pan-American Highway – has a
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100-km break in it: the Darién Gap. The dense
jungle of the Darién Gap, which covers part of
Panama’s Darién Province and the northern
portion of Colombia’s Chocó Department,
separates Colombia from Panama and
prevents overland travel between South and
Central America. While development has
sprung up on the edges of the rainforest of
the Darién, the many attempts over the years
to build a traversable road have failed.
The dense 100-km stretch of rainforest,
with its rugged mountain peaks, swamplands
and many deadly species of animals, has
served as host to FARC combatants1 and
now hosts drug traffickers. It has also hosted
increasing numbers of migrants and refugees
attempting to walk across one of the world’s
most dangerous stretches of land. The total
number of people setting out to cross the
Darién Gap increased from 3,078 in 2013 to
7,278 in 2014; Cubans and Haitians make
up a large percentage, entering Colombia
by boat and continuing the rest of the
journey through the Darién Gap on foot.2

The trauma of surviving

As a therapist, I had the job of helping my
clients to express their experiences of trauma
and help them to regain a sense of safety
following their journey. Children spoke
of seeing the jungle floor strewn with the
possessions of other asylum seekers who
had grown too weak or sick to carry them;
many spoke of encountering dead bodies
along the route. Some children spoke of
witnessing death at first hand in the jungle;
they described fellow travellers who had
drowned in the river or died of poisonous
snake bites, dehydration and even an
attack by a large animal. Many described
their personal experience of robbery or
extortion by smugglers. Some smugglers
promised to lead them through the jungle,
claiming that it would only take a day, only
to abandon them with days still to walk
without food or water. As a therapist, it was
profoundly difficult to hear how ubiquitous
this trauma was among these children and
to see little evidence of aid to the area.
Many of those crossing the Darién Gap
qualify as refugees under international
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law, and are entitled to protection and
assistance. The lack of communication
between governments and non-governmental
actors and the lack of political will to
assist this invisible population can
result in such people – some of whom
are unaccompanied children – being
overlooked, with highly damaging results.
Unaccompanied children are a
particularly vulnerable population, and
for those travelling to the US from Central
America, the experience of the Darién Gap is
a formative and crucial piece of their story.
Many of the mental health symptoms that I
encountered in my client population appeared
to stem from traumatic experiences in the
jungle. It is an aspect of the contemporary
migration landscape that cannot be ignored.
Margaret Hunter mjhunter0@gmail.com
Psychotherapist, Heartland Alliance
www.heartlandalliance.org
1. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia)
2. Miraglia P (2016) ‘The Invisible Migrants of the Darién Gap:
Evolving Immigration Routes in the Americas’, Council on
Hemispheric Affairs http://bit.ly/Miraglia-Darien-2016

Write for FMR…
We are keen to maintain a balance of policy/
practice and research in the pages of FMR, and
would encourage practitioners and policymakers
to consider what particular area of their knowledge
and experience they might usefully share with FMR’s
global readership.
In each issue of FMR we publish a selection of
articles that can be on any aspect of contemporary
forced migration as well as a feature theme
presenting a range of perspectives around that
theme.
Forthcoming themes and deadlines for submissions
are listed at www.fmreview.org/forthcoming.
Email us at fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk about your idea for
an article and we will let you know if it is likely to
be of interest, and will give you advice on content,
style, etc.
Articles can be as short as 600 words, or as long as
2,500 words. You don’t have to be an experienced
writer – we are happy to work with you to develop
your piece.
For more ideas and guidance, please visit
www.fmreview.org/writing-fmr.
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Youth outreach centres in El Salvador: providing
alternatives to displacement
Benjamin J Roth
A growing number of youth are fleeing El Salvador, one of the most violent countries in the
world, and travelling unaccompanied to the US-Mexico border. Youth Outreach Centres
have been set up in El Salvador to try to improve conditions in their neighbourhoods and
encourage young people to stay.
The number of unaccompanied minors
from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
attempting to cross the United States (US)
border has increased dramatically in recent
years, growing from 2,304 in 2012 to nearly
47,000 in 2016.1 Many are leaving their homes
because of the threat of violence and fear
of gang activity in their neighbourhoods.2
Clearly US policy should respond to this
humanitarian crisis by recognising these
children’s legitimate claims to refugee
protection but international development
efforts must also continue to address incountry ‘push’ factors. The question is
how to do this effectively and efficiently.
Today in El Salvador the problems of
poverty, corruption, gang activity, violence
and drug trafficking are multi-faceted and
intertwined. Poverty and unemployment
serve as fodder for gang recruitment,
expanding gang territory and escalating crime
rates.3 Although its protracted civil war was
resolved 25 years ago, decades of instability
in El Salvador since then have resulted in
underdeveloped civil institutions and limited
international support for the resolution of
enduring economic and social problems.
Children and youth in low-income
families are highly affected by the quality of
their communities. Neighbourhood violence
and gang activity leave them vulnerable,
and youth are at heightened risk of police
abuse. Together, these circumstances and
neighbourhood conditions put youth at risk
of victimisation, gang involvement and other
hazards that undermine their sense of hope.

prevention. Strategically located in
neighbourhoods with high levels of violence,
the Centres – of which there are over 160 –
aim to create a safe space where local youth
can play, learn and develop.4 Youth come to
the Centres before or after school and receive
homework help, play games, attend periodic
workshops and engage in a range of other
activities. Although a given Centre will serve
hundreds of youth, the Centres themselves
are not large; rather, the model is based on
the idea that the Centre should function as a
second home (their motto is mi segunda casa)

Youth Outreach Centres in El Salvador
The Youth Outreach Centre model is a
community-based approach to violence

Youth Outreach Centre, El Salvador.
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for the youth they serve. Many are located in
small houses with a living room repurposed
with tables for homework help, and a small
rear patio taken over by a table-tennis table.
Each Centre has one full-time employee
– a coordinator, typically a community
member who lives down the street – who
is supported by numerous volunteers and
an advisory board comprising community
leaders and representatives from key local
institutions, particularly churches.
In 2016 we carried out an independent
assessment of the Centres through online surveys with coordinators and youth,
site visits, focus groups and interviews
with funding administrators.5

Creating a sense of belonging

Benjamin J Roth

Physical safety was a concern for youth and
coordinators in our study. Sixty-nine per
cent of youth feel very worried or somewhat
worried that someone will stop them in the
street and threaten or hurt them. A similar
percentage is worried for the safety of family
members. Given this
context, the success
of the Outreach
Centres hinges
on their ability to
provide an attractive
space where youth
can feel safe. Youth
respondents express
a strong sense of
social connection
to the Centre, and
the Centres excel at
fostering this sense of
membership, in part
because of the strong
social ties between
coordinators/
volunteers and
youth. As one young
man explained: “The
attention [I receive
there] makes me
feel like I’m special,
and it’s where they
let me say what I
think and feel.”

Most of the youth believe that at least one
adult at the Centre knows them well enough
to notice when they are struggling.
Although the Centres do not aim to
deter youth from migrating, their success
at building trust and relationships – social
capital – contributes to improving the
neighbourhood conditions which might
lead a young person to decide to stay rather
than flee.

Building leaders, creating opportunity

Leadership and self-efficacy are important
to youth development, in part because they
empower young people to take more initiative
in directing their own future. Eighty-two
per cent of respondents reported that
because of their involvement at the Centre
they are better able to handle problems and
challenges when they arise. Given the level of
community violence and gang activity in their
neighbourhoods, combined with their own
economic situation and high unemployment
rates, we would expect them to express a
negative outlook concerning their future;
instead, the majority indicate that they have
a sense of possibility and feel relatively
confident that they can shape their future.
Importantly, these young people attribute this
perspective to their involvement at the Centre.
Involvement at the Centres also has
a tangible impact on social mobility
opportunities for youth – outcomes that can
mitigate against the ‘push’ factors which
might drive them to migrate. Thirty-two per
cent said that they have found a better job
because of the Centre, and 78% reported that
the Centre has helped them get better grades
in school. For example, one youth respondent
said that her homework is easier because of
the computer skills she has learned at the
Centre. This is a significant contribution
to the life chances of these youth and,
ultimately, to the stability of their families
and neighbourhoods. While we should be
cautious about overstating the direct impact
that the Centres may have on the school
and work trajectories of youth until we
complete a more rigorous impact evaluation,
it is important to note that the influence
they have in these domains is positive.
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Intervening with those most likely to
migrate

Some of the youth at the Centres face
greater risks than others, including gang
involvement and substance use. Relative to
their lower-risk peers, we find that higherrisk youth are significantly more likely to
have plans to migrate. Centre staff often
intervene in the lives of these youth. For
example, one coordinator explained that
he has met with a local gang leader on
several occasions to advocate for young men
involved in the Centre. This required him
to travel into a part of the town that is very
violent to petition that a Centre youth be
released from his gang ties – a request that
could be met with deadly consequences for
the coordinator. Other coordinators shared
similar examples of when they intervened
in the life of an at-risk youth. Because of
the complexity of these interventions,
additional training and resources are needed
to more effectively weave prevention and
intervention into the Outreach Centre model.

Expansion and sustainability

Financial support for the Centres differs
from one community to the next but
nearly all of them receive funding from a
combination of sources. USAID provides
some financial support until the Centre is
functioning, and each Centre receives some
level of support from the local municipality.
Other community-based organisations
help to fund the Centres and serve other
important functions, including an advisory
role for Centre coordinators. Similarly, local
churches may not donate much money
but they are central to the model; as one
respondent explained, the local church
provides “moral authority that protects the
Centre” and lends it credibility in the eyes
of parents and community members.
The Centres are sustainable because they
have low overhead costs but space is often
inadequate for serving large numbers of
youth or providing wide-ranging facilities.
Demand exceeds capacity, and many youth
requested that the Centres be open at the
weekend as well as during the week.
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A viable alternative?

There is no indication that increased
border enforcement has slowed the flow of
unaccompanied minors from the Northern
Triangle6 to the US, and building a border
wall has historically proven ineffective at
deterring unlawful entry. After amending
US immigration policy and practice to
grant asylum to unaccompanied youth
who are fleeing violence, it is imperative
that policymakers improve support for
development, governance and securitisation
in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
The Youth Outreach Centres in El
Salvador are certainly not a comprehensive
solution to the complex problems of gang
activity, drug trafficking and criminal
violence in the region but our study suggests
that they represent a viable alternative to
the heavy-handed ‘iron fist’ approach –
more aggressive police tactics and longer
prison sentences – that has been tried
unsuccessfully in El Salvador in the past.
They operate with the support of the local
community in which they are embedded,
have a model that easily adapts to the needs
of a given locality, and require minimal
support to sustain. With additional resources,
and together with broader investments in
infrastructure and education, the Centres
may prove more effective at intervening in
the lives of a greater number of youth who
are most at risk of deciding that the cost of
staying exceeds the risks of migrating.
Benjamin J Roth rothbj@sc.edu
Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina
www.sc.edu
1. http://bit.ly/US-border-stats-2016
2. UNHCR (2014) Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children
Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International
Protection www.unhcr.org/uk/children-on-the-run;
Kennedy E (2014) No Childhood Here: Why Central American Children
are Fleeing Their Homes, American Immigration Council
http://bit.ly/Kennedy-2014-CAchildren
3. Shifter M (2012) Countering Criminal Violence in Central America,
Council on Foreign Relations http://bit.ly/CFR-Shifter-2012
4. The Centres are part of a wider USAID-supported crime
prevention effort in the region.
5. A total of 77 individuals participated in interviews and focus
groups.
6. Also now referred to as Northern Central America.
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Accompaniment by the Catholic Church
Ashley Feasley and Todd Scribner
The Catholic Church is developing various initiatives to assist those fleeing violence in the
Northern Triangle of Central America.
With its extensive network of religious
orders, local and diocesan organisations, and
research institutes, the Catholic Church is
one of the principal institutions engaged in
accompaniment efforts in the Northern Triangle
of Central America1. For example, local Catholic
leaders have worked with Protestant leaders to
develop lines of communication between rival
gangs in El Salvador, including the facilitation
of a recent truce between competing parties.2
Catholic Relief Services, meanwhile, provides
school re-entry opportunities, job training and
social services to boys and girls in areas of low
economic opportunity and high violence. And
a variety of Catholic welcome centres – shelters
– are located throughout the region to provide
support to migrants along their journey.3
The Catholic network faces three challenges
in particular: firstly, ensuring communication
with what is an extremely mobile population;
secondly, the need for institutional mapping
of services; and, thirdly, scaling up the
capacity of the existing network. With respect
to the first challenge, a central difficulty is
the temporary nature of the relationship.
Some migrants will remain in a shelter for
only a few hours, others for a night or two.
However long they stay, once they leave there
are few mechanisms for providing continued
support over the course of their journey.
A promising new effort to promote
continued communication with migrants
was recently launched under the oversight
of Fr Juan Luis Carbajal, a Scalabrinian
priest in Guatemala City. Fr Carbajal is
employing technology to allow advocates to
track migrants as they are in transit. Before
migrants cross the border from Guatemala
into Mexico, Fr Cabajal’s team collects a
wide range of demographic and personal
information about each migrant, uploading
it to a central database; this information will
then be accessible to shelter workers via an
app available for download by administrators

at the shelters.4 With this, they can anticipate
arrivals and needs, and also keep track of
migrants as they move from the Guatemalan
border and arrive at their next transit
point in Mexico or elsewhere. Over time,
this information could provide a wealth
of information that could be used to better
understand migration trends and practices.
It could also be put to more practical uses
including, for example, in family tracing efforts.
For assistance to be provided more
effectively, there need to be open lines of
communication between centres and a
clear understanding of where such centres
are located, who runs them, and how they
can more effectively share information.
In relation to this, the Catholic Center for
Migration Studies in New York and the
Scalabrini International Migration Network
are trying to systematise data collection from
the Scalabrini shelters across Mexico and
Central America. The problem confronting
the international community with respect to
forced migration situations is bigger than any
one institution can tackle. Ultimately, better
collaboration among Catholic service providers
and between Catholic groups and their nonCatholic religious and secular counterparts
would significantly improve efforts to
engage and protect migrant populations.
Ashley Feasley AFeasley@usccb.org
Director of Policy and Public Affairs
Todd Scribner TScribner@usccb.org
Education Outreach Coordinator
Migration and Refugee Services, US Conference of
Catholic Bishops www.justiceforimmigrants.org
1. Also now referred to as Northern Central America.
2. International Crisis Group (2017) Mafia of the Poor: Gang
Violence and Extortion in Central America http://bit.ly/ICG-Mafia-2017
3. See article by Alejandro Olayo-Méndez in this issue.
4. To date, the app has primarily been used in Guatemala but its
use is being expanded into Mexico. Testing of the app will include
ensuring the security of individuals’ personal information.
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Colombia: durable solutions for the forcibly displaced
Amaya Valcárcel and Vera Samudio
Colombia has a sophisticated body of law and a wealth of experience in the development of
policies for the forcibly displaced. However, numerous obstacles stand in the way of attaining
permanent solutions to displacement.
In late 2016 the peace agreement between
the government and FARC-EP1 was finally
signed. According to official figures, the
war has left 8,405,265 victims, 80% of whom
have been internally displaced, while 20%
have been victims of other types of abuses
such as attacks, homicides, threats or forced
disappearances.2 In addition, according to
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, about
340,000 Colombians have sought asylum
abroad.

The rights of victims

Various policies introduced in Colombia over
the last 20 years, relating to displacement,
offer examples of good practice that could
be relevant to other countries in the region.
Firstly, Law 387 of 1997 laid down for the
first time the basic principles underpinning
the State’s treatment of displaced people.
In essence, this law recognises forced
displacement as a significant and critical
problem deserving priority attention by
the State.
Secondly, Constitutional Court Judgment
T-025 of 2004 orders national and regional
entities to address the basic needs of
displaced persons and any violations of their
fundamental rights such as access to health,
work or housing. This judgment sees forced
displacement as a structural problem which
needs to be addressed in an integrated way.
For this reason, the authorities in all places
hosting displaced people – that is, not only
national-level authorities – are required
to promote strategies for addressing the
impacts of displacement. Follow-up policies
have set guidelines for both national and
local authorities relating to, for example,
the need to allocate adequate resources
for displaced populations, to recognise
the particular vulnerabilities of women,
children, adolescents and young adults

in situations of displacement, and to take
into account the impact of displacement
on indigenous peoples, people of African
descent and persons with disabilities.
Thirdly, Law 1448 of 2011 (the Victims
and Land Restitution Law) enables victims of
the armed conflict to receive assistance and
reparation. This recognises victims’ right
to access truth and justice, and establishes
concrete reparation measures including a
programme of restitution so that victims
of forced displacement and dispossession
can reclaim the lands they have lost.

Policy shortcomings

In spite of these important developments,
implementation has been fragile. The
living conditions of victims have not
improved as expected; further unrest in
certain locations is hindering provision of
assistance, rebuilding and reparation; and
the lack of funding is only too evident.
Policies have focused more on provision
of welfare, rather than on enabling people
to develop strategies for addressing
vulnerability and moving towards selfsufficiency. According to Colombia’s
Monitoring Commission3, in 2016 the
income levels of 97.6% of victims were still
below the poverty line, and thousands of
victims still do not have access to essential
medical services, good psychosocial care,
educational opportunities or a decent
home. Furthermore, by 2015, the funds
available under the reparation fund were
reduced, thereby diminishing the fund’s
capacity for supporting reparation.
With regard to Colombians abroad, the
Victims Unit has registered only 10,652 people
from 42 countries. Many more nationals
abroad are not getting access to assistance
and reparation – their right as Colombian
citizens. Many of them are not officially
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recognised as refugees and
are in an irregular situation
in their host countries.

The challenges ahead
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“I am still displaced and
suffering… My family and I are
still struggling.”4
There are a number of
concrete actions needed if
there are to be more effective
durable solutions for
Colombia’s displaced people.
Efforts must continue to
identify and protect those
who have not yet been
registered in the Colombian
Registry of Victims,
mobile registration unit in Colombia issues ID cards to IDPs so that they can access
especially in rural areas that Agovernment
aid.
are difficult to access. The
Finally, these changes will only be
authorities need to raise people’s awareness
of how to be included in the registry and how effective if they go hand-in-hand with
a change in the political culture which
to participate in Victims’ Panels (whether
is currently rooted in a system whereby
in Colombia or abroad). Local institutions
regional capitals receive greater attention
need greater capacity building and finances
at the expense of more remote areas
in order to be able to address the needs
and which currently is too reliant on
of victims. Although there is a normative
framework5 that provides for the participation corruption and patronage. A substantial
change in the understanding of the roles
of victims, their participation in the
and responsibilities of national and
consultative and decision-making processes
regional entities is essential if Colombia
has not been fully guaranteed and promoted.
is to become a country free of conflict.
The government needs to introduce
measures to dismantle paramilitaries and
Amaya Valcárcel amaya.valcarcel@jrs.net
local armed groups and to finalise a peace
International Advocacy Officer, Jesuit Refugee
6
agreement with the ELN . The ongoing
Service www.jrs.net
presence of these armed actors continues to
generate hundreds of victims daily, and poses Vera Samudio verasamudio@gmail.com
Advocacy Officer, Jesuit Refugee Service
a particular problem for the inhabitants of
the port of Buenaventura and the Department Colombia www.sjrlac.org
of Chocó in the Colombian Pacific corridor.
1. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del
At the same time, the government needs to
Pueblo)
introduce protection schemes and security
2. http://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV
guarantees for social leaders and human
3. Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la implementación de
rights defenders, who continue to be targeted. la Ley 1448 de 2011 Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras
The government also needs to
4. Testimony provided by JRS Colombia.
recognise – and legislate for – the scale
5. Article 28 and 192 of Law 1448 of 2011, Article 17, Decree 4802
of 2011, Decree 790 of 2012, Resolution 0388 of 10th May 2013, and
of forced displacement associated with
Resolution 1281 of 2016.
large-scale development projects, illicit
6. National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)
economies (including illegal mining)
and environmental impacts.
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Colombia: time to invoke the cessation clause?
Beatriz Eugenia Sánchez Mojica
After more than five decades of internal armed conflict, in November 2016 the Colombian
government signed a peace agreement with the FARC-EP. Does this mean that those
Colombians who had been forced to leave the country must now begin to return?
International refugee protection – as well as
other forms of international protection – is
designed to be temporary. The ‘cessation
clause’ included in the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, its Protocol
and other international instruments in this
area provides for four scenarios in which
international protection may come to an
end.1 One of these occurs when the country
of origin experiences a profound change of
circumstances which is significant enough
to remove the causes that prompted its
people to flee. Once those causes vanish,
host countries (and UNHCR, the UN
Refugee Agency) can declare the end of
the provision of international protection
and require the refugees to return, while
the country of origin is obliged to resume
its responsibility for their protection. The
question now arises as to whether the signing
of the peace agreement in Colombia will
entail the cessation clause being invoked
by countries that host Colombians either
as refugees or as beneficiaries of some
other type of international protection.
According to UNHCR’s interpretation,
the change of circumstances requires the
conjunction of three elements. Firstly, it
must be sufficiently profound to resolve
the causes that caused the displacement.
Secondly, it must be sustainable over time,
guaranteeing that those who return will
not be forced again to flee. And, lastly,
those who return must have effective access
to protection in the country of origin.2
These conditions are not currently present
in the Colombian case. Forced displacement
in this country has multiple causes, and
the government’s peace agreement with
one of the guerrilla forces – the FARC-EP3 –
does not necessarily resolve all the factors
that caused the displacement, nor does it
imply the full establishment of conditions

of security for the return of exiles, as vast
territories of Colombia are now controlled
by violent criminal gangs.4 Moreover, there
is still one guerrilla group active, the ELN.5

Reasons to invoke cessation

UNHCR’s interpretation, however, is not
binding in law. Host countries may choose
to ignore it and invoke cessation. In the
case of those countries hosting the largest
numbers of Colombian refugees (Venezuela,
Ecuador and Panama), there are good reasons
why this might be a strong possibility.
Venezuela, which by December 2016
was hosting nearly 173,000 Colombians, has
been experiencing a profound economic and
political crisis. The Venezuelan authorities
may therefore be tempted to get rid of a
population that consumes public resources
and is perceived as responsible for increased
insecurity. The mass expulsion of Colombians
in an irregular situation that took place in
August 2015 reflected these sentiments.
Ecuador, hosting over 101,000 Colombians,
is facing economic difficulties too; it has asked
for help from the Colombian government in
order to be able to continue offering protection
to the refugees, and has taken steps to prevent
the increase in size of this population. In 2012,
for example, Ecuador’s laws were modified
in order to restrict the concept of refugee.6
Finally, Panama, which hosts just
over 17,000 refugees, is experiencing an
economic slowdown, according to the
World Bank, and in the past has cited the
size of the burden it carries in caring for
and protecting Colombian refugees.
Additionally, it should be noted that
in the past, Ecuador and Venezuela were
particularly open to the arrival of Colombian
refugees because of the heightened
tension between them and their neighbour
Colombia. Nowadays the dynamics
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of these relationships have changed,
diminishing the political and strategic
value of taking in Colombian refugees.

Guaranteeing protection

Colombia’s Binational Commissions with
Ecuador, Costa Rica and Venezuela and its
Neighbourhood Commission with Panama
offer opportunities for the government to
negotiate agreements in order to avoid the
imminent invocation of cessation. Through
the Binational Commission with Ecuador,
agreements have already been reached
regarding the care of this population and
the implementation of a voluntary return
plan. It is essential, however, to expand
negotiations and to speed up the decisionmaking process, not only to avoid the
cessation clause being invoked but also to
reach agreements on how to ensure the wellbeing of those who, at the time, had no choice
but to leave their country or lose their lives.
Joint voluntary return plans will increasingly
be needed as Colombia’s situation stabilises
and becomes more conducive to offering
a safe return for those who wish it.
UNHCR has an important role to play in
all this. Firstly, it is UNHCR’s job to monitor
compliance with the guidelines relating to
cessation. Secondly, UNHCR can facilitate
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negotiations between the States. And, finally,
UNHCR can support voluntary return
schemes, reminding national authorities
that the population choosing to return must
be fully informed of the conditions they
will encounter in Colombia, and that their
security and rights must be fully guaranteed.
Beatriz Eugenia Sánchez Mojica
beasanchezmojica@gmail.com
Associate researcher, CIJUS-Universidad de los
Andes; professor, IE University and Pontifical
University of Comillas (Spain)
https://humanities-center.ie.edu/dt_team/851/
1. http://bit.ly/UNHCR-CessationClauseNotes-1997
2. UNHCR (2003) Guidelines on International Protection No.
3: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the ‘Ceased
Circumstances’ Clauses), HCR/GIP/03/03
www.refworld.org/docid/3e50de6b4.html
3. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del
Pueblo)
4. Sánchez B E (2016) ‘A silenced exodus: intra-urban displacement
in Medellín’ and Rojas Andrade G ‘Post-demobilisation groups
and forced displacement in Colombia : a quantitative approach’
in Cantor D & Rodríguez Serna (Eds) The New Refugees: Crime and
Displacement in Latin America, London: Institute of Latin American
Studies. (Spanish edition published 2015)
5. National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)
6. Decree 1,182 of 2012 replaced the broader notion of refugee,
which included persons fleeing situations of armed conflict and
widespread violence without demanding proof of individual
persecution, by a definition based on the original, more narrow
1951 Convention definition.

Colombia’s ex-combatant children and adolescents
Stephany Armas Contreras
Large numbers of children and adolescents recruited into the armed conflict in Colombia are
now being demobilised. Lessons from the peace process of 2003-08 could usefully inform
today’s transitional justice process, in particular with regard to reintegrating ex-combatant
minors into civilian life.
The risk of recruitment of minors by
armed groups has been a significant cause
of displacement in Colombia. In 2008, it
was estimated that between 8,000 and
13,000 children – with an average age of
13 – had been recruited by guerrilla groups
and paramilitaries.1 Faced with the risk
of their children being recruited, entire
families and communities were forced
to move, either because some members

of the family or community had already
been recruited or because they had been
threatened with recruitment. Many
minors also had to flee after deserting
armed groups, escaping persecution or
reprisals by moving to other places.

Clarification of the truth

Colombia’s transitional justice process aims
to facilitate the end of the internal armed
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A vocational training project in Santiago de Cali, Colombia, supporting ex-combatant children.

conflict and to achieve a stable and lasting
peace with guarantees of non-repetition, as
well as guaranteeing the rights of victims to
truth, justice and reparation. In the search
for reconciliation, one of the main objectives
of transitional justice is clarification of
the truth, and those children who were
combatants must contribute to this process,
both as victims and as perpetrators. Truth
is a mechanism for reparation – for the
community and wider society and also for
individuals, including child ex-combatants.
However, in Colombia’s experience
of transitional justice mechanisms, excombatant children have been seen solely as
passive victims, exempting them from any
responsibility for acts perpetrated when they
were combatants. This reductionist policy
does not allow for a proper understanding of
the socio-historical causes of the recruitment
of minors – causes which, if not addressed,
can hinder their successful reintegration
into civilian life.2 If not effectively
reintegrated, ex-combatant children may
be re-recruited or put at risk in other ways

– and may themselves put others at risk. In
addition to not contributing to the truth,
this approach has excluded child former
combatants from the country’s reconciliation
and historical memory initiatives.
Unlike in the previous peace process, a
Truth Commission has been created as part
of the ongoing peace process with FARC. This
Commission aims to clarify what happened,
contribute to the recognition of victims and to
individual and collective responsibilities, and
promote peaceful coexistence. Both victims
and perpetrators will participate in the
Truth Commission. In addition, a Thematic
Committee on Children and Adolescents
has been established which will be able
to provide a specialised approach to the
needs and rights of ex-combatant minors.

Access to justice

Access to justice is also an important
component of transitional justice processes,
and recognition of responsibility is essential.
In the particular case of child and adolescent
ex-combatants, the responsibility of those who
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forcibly recruited minors must be recognised
and addressed, as must the responsibility of
ex-combatant children who have victimised
others during their time as combatants. Both
are important in terms of the fight against
the impunity of the perpetrators of child
recruitment, and as a contribution to the
reconciliation processes.
During the demobilisation of the AUC3 in
Colombia’s previous peace process, there was
no oversight of the process of demobilising
child soldiers; those who demobilised tended
to do so informally, with little support
or planning for their reintegration into
civilian life. The commanders responsible
for the crime of child recruitment evaded
responsibility and criminal conviction. These
factors undermined the children’s ability
to participate in official demobilisation,
disarmament and reintegration
programmes, and their right to justice.
In relation to the recognition of the
responsibility of ex-child soldiers, it is
important to distinguish between moral
responsibility and criminal responsibility.
The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court states that “The Court shall
have no jurisdiction over any person who was
under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged
commission of a crime.”4 But above and
beyond criminal responsibility, it is important
that in the process of reparation for victims,
child soldiers should not be seen as passive
victims; they should also be able to recognise
their moral responsibility and to participate
in reparative activities in their communities.
The mechanisms established for the
participation of children and adolescents
should be legally recognised and appropriate,
respecting the voluntary nature of
participation, ensuring that children are able
to make informed decisions (and supported
in doing so) and providing conditions of
safety, both physical and psychosocial.

Reparation for ex-combatant minors

The process of reparation for child victims of
armed recruitment must be comprehensive.
This process should include provision for
education, livelihood projects, psychosocial
care and health care. The objective of
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reparation must be not only compensation
but also transformation of the conditions
that brought about their vulnerability to
recruitment – most frequently, conditions of
poverty, abuse and loss of family members.
In this regard, there is much to learn
from failings of the earlier demobilisation
process. For example, the 2005 Law on Justice
and Peace provided only for compensation,
and not for transformation; with no changes
made to remove the original conditions
under which recruitment occurred, there
was inevitably new recruitment – and
new displacement of children avoiding
being co-opted by armed groups.
The Constitutional Court, in its judgment
T-025 of 2004,5 had argued that the recognition
and protection of children separated from
armed groups was fundamental to avoiding
repetition, citing figures indicating that 9.7%
of children who had left an armed group
would eventually return to an armed group
and that 79.4% had received threats from
the armed group to which they belonged,
7.6% had been threatened by another nonState armed group and 1.2% by the army.
The 2005 report of the Coalition against
the involvement of boys, girls and youth
in the armed conflict in Colombia6 drew
out the following two lessons in particular
from the process of reintegration at that time:
The provision for education and work
programmes in no way met the needs and
expectations of young people.
The processes to reintegrate young people
into civilian life focused only on the
individual, with no attention to the wider
social conditions which might have led
to the stigmatisation and exclusion that
encouraged recruitment in the first place.
Some of the lessons seemed to have been
learned. In the current peace process, within
the framework of Law 1448, the Victims and
Land Restitution Law, measures are being
taken to provide a holistic package of care,
assistance and reparation to the victims of
the conflict – legal, administrative, social
and economic measures. Another example
of good practice is the launch of the Camino
Diferencial de Vida (Different Way of Life)
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programme for the reintegration of former
child soldiers; this, unlike the approach
taken before, has a solid focus on restitution
of rights, community reconciliation and
building the social fabric of society.7
Stephany Armas Contreras
armasstephany@gmail.com
International UN Volunteers Field Political Officer,
UN Special Political Mission, Colombia
https://colombia.unmissions.org/en
1. Amnesty International (2008) ‘Colombia: ‘Leave us in peace!’
Targeting civilians in the internal armed conflict – facts and
figures’ http://bit.ly/AI-Colombia-2008
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2. Anne Rethmann (2010) ‘Condenados al silencio – jóvenes
excombatientes en Colombia’, Axe XI, Symposium 40,
Independencias – Dependencias – Interdependencias, VI CEISAL
(European Council for Social Research on Latin America)
International Conference 2010,
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00503128/
3. United Self-Defenders of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia)
4. www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html
5. http://bit.ly/Brookings-Col-T-025-2004
6. http://bit.ly/COALICO-2005
7. ‘Camino diferencial de vida: Programa integral para la atención
y consolidación de los proyectos de vida de los menores de edad
que salen de las FARC-EP’ http://bit.ly/CaminoDiferencial-2017

New drivers of displacement in Colombia
Alfredo Campos García
Violence and displacement have not ended with the signing of the peace agreement in
Colombia.
The recent signing of a peace agreement
between the government of Colombia and the
country’s largest guerrilla group, FARC1, fired
hopes of finally achieving a stable and lasting
peace. However, the actions of other armed
groups pose a serious threat to achieving
this objective. This is particularly evident in
the southwestern region of Colombia, where
there is a widespread presence of illicit crops
and businesses, and armed actors such as the
demobilised FARC, ELN2 and large criminal
gangs (referred to as BACRIM, from the
Spanish bandas criminales, or more recently
as Organised Armed Groups). The whole
region constitutes a corridor for the transit
of these groups and the products which
they traffic, since it connects the mountain
range and the production or extraction
zones of southwestern Colombia with the
Pacific ports and main routes of exit.
Since the signing of the peace agreement,
other armed groups have moved in to occupy
the ground abandoned by FARC. Armed
clashes between government forces and
ELN are accompanied by serious violations
of human rights while also causing massive
displacement of entire communities, such
as that of the Wounaan ethnic group from

the Taparalito community. And the illegal
activities of criminal gangs and other
paramilitary gangs give rise to their own
social and environmental problems.
The withdrawal of FARC and subsequent
emergence of ELN in the department of Cauca
has had some perhaps surprising negative
repercussions for the local population. In the
territories it formerly occupied, FARC at least
had some authority and, for example, would
warn the civilian population where mines
had been laid. With FARC’s withdrawal, this
peculiar work of ‘guardianship’ towards the
population has ceased.
For these reasons, many internally
displaced people in southwestern Colombia
are now being forced to leave the country, for
Chile or Ecuador or even further, to North
America or Europe.
Alfredo Campos García
alfredocamposga@gmail.com
Legal expert in asylum and conflict, focusing on
the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia
and Colombia
1. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia)
2. National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)

FMR 56

Latin America and the Caribbean
October 2017

35

www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean

Land restitution in Colombia: why so few applications?
Frances Thomson
Halfway through Colombia’s official land restitution process, questions arise as to why the
number of claims is so much lower than anticipated.
The Victims and Land Restitution Law (Law
1448 of 20111) offers Colombia’s displaced
population a new route for reclaiming their
land. It has received praise and criticism
in almost equal measure, but there is one
overarching concern: the low number of
applicants. In 2012 Colombia’s Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development estimated
that 360,000 cases of either land abandonment
or land usurpation would be considered for
restitution under the new Law.2 But more than
half way through the process (the Law expires
in 2021), the number of land claimants is less
than a third of what was projected in 2012: as
of August 2017, the Land Restitution Unit had
received 106,833 applications. It seems that
the majority of people who may be eligible
for restitution have not even applied. Why?

Land Restitution under Law 1448

Under Law 1448, those who were dispossessed
in the context of the armed conflict (due to
usurpation or forced abandonment) can apply
for restitution or the legal and material return
of their land. The Law also permits families
who did not formally own their land at the
time of their displacement (but were legitimate
occupants or possessors) to receive a property
title as part of the restitution process (Article
72), and promises institutional accompaniment
and support – such as subsidies for acquiring
or rebuilding homes – for all those who
were displaced, whether they choose to
return or resettle elsewhere (Article 66).
Law 1448 offers a number of safeguards
not found in ordinary legal processes. For
example, it allows for the use of varied and
unconventional types of evidence to back
restitution applications given that applicants
have often lost relevant papers due precisely
to their forced displacement. Furthermore, the
Law presumes the absence of consent in land
transfers between the victim(s) and anyone
who has been convicted of belonging to,

collaborating with or financing illegal armed
groups. The Law also allows judges to presume
that a land transaction was not consensual
(unless evidence suggests otherwise) when
the amount actually paid or noted in the
contract was less than 50% of the ‘real value’.
The same rule applies when mass forced
displacement, grave human rights violations
or acts of generalised violence occurred in the
surrounding area and during the same time
period as the alleged incident (threat or act of
violence) that led to the usurpation or forced
abandonment. If a transaction is not proven
to be consensual, the transfer itself and any
subsequent agreements that affect the plot of
land in question can be considered invalid
(Article 77). In short, the Law inverts the
‘burden of proof’ in favour of the claimant.
The Land Restitution Unit is charged with
helping victims to document their case to
submit for judicial review or must sub-contract
a lawyer to this end. In general, the victim
does not have to pay any legal fees. Specialist
judges, who are familiar with land usurpation
issues, are responsible for the legal decision.
It is evident that the Colombian land
restitution programme, as defined by Law
1448, has many strengths, in addition to
a number of weaknesses not discussed
here. People working in other contexts
may find there is a lot to learn from the
Colombian experience, both good and bad.

Failure to attract applicants

There are numerous reasons for the lack of
applications including: lack of trust in the
authorities, especially in areas where they had/
have links with armed groups; disillusionment
with government agencies based on prior
personal experiences or those of friends and
family members; absence of awareness or
limited understanding of the Law; or difficulties
accessing the relevant institutions for various
reasons, including travel distances and costs.3
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In a meeting with people from a village
in the municipality of Pensilvania (Caldas
department), few seemed to be aware of the
support available to returnees or the fact
that restitution applies to abandoned (and
not only usurped) land. One man claimed
that the functionaries responsible “didn’t
want to take their declarations” – to which a
few neighbours nodded agreement. Another
woman said she had walked eight hours
to the municipal centre only to be turned
away because everyone was too busy.
Javier,4 a leader from another municipality,
who supports victims across the coffeegrowing region, emphasised people’s lack
of confidence in themselves and in the
government’s will or ability to respond to
their claims:

frequently dismiss community members’
denunciations. Investigations into the violence
and intimidation surrounding land restitution
processes have been, at best, half-hearted.
Following numerous threats and
attempts against his life, Javier – along
with thousands of other people – solicited
help from the National Protection Unit. He
claims the protection offered is inadequate:

“I know how to defend myself when I speak but
there are people who feel too uncomfortable, and
they don’t have a way to say: ‘Look, they took my
land, and I have this problem’ […] and there are a
lot of people who don’t believe in the State.”

Law 1448 offers multiple mechanisms
to help Colombia’s internally displaced
population rebuild their lives. However,
many displaced people who would like to
return to their lands are too scared to seek
State support, while others have returned
without institutional accompaniment due to
a lack of understanding of their rights or to
difficulties accessing the relevant institutions.
If the majority of eligible people do not even
apply for land restitution under Law 1448,
this in itself would represent a failure for
Colombia’s transitional justice process.

But perhaps the most urgent threat to
the restitution process is the attempt to
crush it using violence. At least 72 land
restitution claimants and leaders have been
murdered, and thousands more have received
threats against their lives. In some cases,
the displaced are forced to flee their homes
once again because of their involvement in
restitution processes. Representatives from
accompanying organisations and human
rights defenders, as well as state officials
involved in restitution cases, have also been
targeted. Paramilitary ‘successor groups’ are
responsible for the majority of crimes against
land claimants and restitution leaders, as is
well documented and widely acknowledged.
“In all of Caldas there is dispossession but there
is more fear than dispossession. There are many
that have told me [in response to suggestions
that they should apply for restitution]: ‘definitely
not, because my mother doesn’t want any more
problems – we already had so many problems when
they took us from the land’.” (Javier)
The police, who are supposed to provide
protection for those under threat, often
neglect their duties and government officials

“I know, I am certain, that the threats are because
of my leadership in the restitution process, because
there are a lot of very powerful people with many
interests in keeping that land. And the threats are
clear: ‘leave the victims and land restitution [issue]
alone or die’. At this moment the protection we have
is a bulletproof vest and a telephone that doesn’t
work.”

Frances Thomson
frances.thomson.lynce@gmail.com
Doctoral candidate,5 University of Sussex
www.sussex.ac.uk
1. The Victims Law (1448 of 2011) applies to all victims of the
armed conflict, regardless of whether they are reclaiming lost
land, and as such contains many elements not discussed here.
2. Restrepo Salazar J C and Bernal Morales A (2014) La cuestión
agraria: Tierra y posconflicto en Colombia, Bogotá: Penguin Random
House Grupo Editorial Colombia, pp41-47.
3. Amnesty International (2014) A land title is not enough: ensuring
sustainable land restitution in Colombia
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR23/031/2014/en/
Human Rights Watch (2013) The Risk of Returning Home: Violence
and Threats against Displaced People Reclaiming Land in Colombia
http://bit.ly/HRW-risk-2013
4. Name changed for security reasons.
5. Research funded by UK Economic and Social Research Council
and the University of Sussex Centre for Global Political Economy
(award number T83833F).
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Colombia’s displaced indigenous women
Gina Escobar Cuero
Indigenous peoples are one of the most vulnerable groups within Colombia’s internally
displaced population, and a lack of understanding of their culture and needs constitutes a
major challenge to their protection and assistance.
Of Colombia’s estimated population of more
than 49 million, 1.5% are indigenous peoples.
Under the Constitution of 1991, indigenous
peoples are entitled to own the lands where
they practise their culture. These indigenous
territories, which are usually located in
isolated parts of the country, tend to be rich
in natural resources – and therefore attractive
to different actors involved in Colombia’s
armed conflict. Over the years, increasing
numbers of indigenous peoples have been
displaced by violence or threat of violence.
Losing their territory is a major problem
for indigenous peoples. Communities are
divided and families separated. In many
cases, indigenous women end up alone
and/or as heads of household after their
partners are killed. Afraid of being found
by the perpetrators, many flee towards the
cities where they are forced to settle in slum
conditions. All of these reasons contribute
to the “…de-structuralization of entire
communities and the risk of disappearing
as distinct and different peoples.”1

The case of Zenu women

Zenu indigenous people are mainly located
in the north of Colombia. Their principal
economic activities are the production of
handicrafts and the exchange of agricultural
products with other indigenous groups.
Within the family, women are responsible
for the creation of a garden known as el
patio where vegetables, fruits, medicinal
plants and domestic animals are kept for
the use of the family. From a community’s
perspective, women help create a ‘reservoir
of biodiversity’, with some patios reported
to include as many as “…28 species of
vegetables, 30 species of fruits and more than
70 species of medicinal plants”.2 Women are
also responsible for traditional medicine
and knitting. In these ways, Zenu women

have a great impact on the survival of their
communities – and land is crucial to their role.
In displacement, the role of Zenu women
changes abruptly. In many cases they face
challenges such as lack of housing, food
security, education and employment. Since
many Zenu women have little more than
primary-level education, most employment
opportunities for them are lowly paid
and temporary, and nearly all displaced
women and families are forced to live in
rental accommodation. Lack of land to
create a patio compromises the family’s
food security, and the need for women to
work outside the home affects their ability
to take care of their children – which leaves
the children more at risk of becoming
involved in gangs. In this manner, internal
displacement drastically changes the
role of Zenu women and compromises
the survival of the whole community.

Inadequate government response

Colombia’s Law 387 of 1997 was designed to
prevent internal displacement and assist those
who had been displaced. Each of the country’s
32 departments was expected to decide its
annual budget for implementing relevant
programmes but the lack of government
oversight has led to wide variations in
implementation and hence in the assistance
provided. In the case of indigenous people,
local governments have failed to understand
and address their specific needs.
In order to access assistance, Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) need to register
with the Colombian Registry of Victims. If
successfully registered, IDPs have the right to
receive Emergency Humanitarian Aid which
aims to cover their immediate basic needs; a
second stage concerns economic and social
stability for which income generation and
housing assistance are available. Findings
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from interviews with Zenu women from
the Pasacaballos community in the city of
Cartagena indicate that the registry system
makes it difficult for indigenous women
to access aid. These difficulties proceed
from circumstances including women
having been displaced more than once and
no longer being eligible for assistance.
For those who have received aid, it has
generally been insufficient, of poor quality or
delayed. For instance, some women received
financial assistance to cover their rental costs
two years after requesting help. Another
woman was promised financial assistance
but received part of the payment in the form
of food (of poor quality), four chairs and a
set of spoons. Many years later she is still
owed 40% of the funds promised. This type

October 2017

of assistance represents a waste of resources
for the government considering that it does
not provide women with the tools they need.
Poor organisation of assistance by the
government and a lack of understanding of
the real needs of displaced indigenous women
are proving damaging both to the short-term
survival of internally displaced Zenu women
and their families and to the longer-term
survival of their community and culture.
Gina Escobar Cuero ginapescobarc@yahoo.com
Doctoral Candidate, Department of Development
Studies, University of Vienna www.univie.ac.at
1. Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia/National
Indigenous Organisation of Colombia
http://bit.ly/UASB-RAA-08-ONIC
2. Vélez G A and Valencia M (1995) ‘Comunidad Zenú del Volao:
De las cenizas del desplazamiento forzoso resurge la vida’,
Biodiversidad, sustento y culturas www.grain.org/e/803

Triggers of internal displacement in Guatemala
Sindy Hernández Bonilla
More than 20 years since the end of the civil war, Guatemala is once again experiencing an
upsurge in internal displacement. The causes are multiple, and demand attention.
The signing of peace agreements in 1996
ended 36 years of civil war between the
Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Unit.1 An estimated
200,000 people were killed during the
war, while about one million people were
internally displaced or fled the country. More
than 20 years have passed since the end of
the war but today this Central American
country is again experiencing high levels
of homicide and generalised violence, with
significant levels of new displacement.2
At the time of negotiating and approving
the Peace Accords, including the Agreement for
the Resettlement of Uprooted Populations by
Armed Conflict3, the government introduced
economic structural adjustment measures.
Although some progress has been made, there
has been little impact on economic inequalities.
For example, there has been no comprehensive
fiscal reform, so the State has few resources to
invest in education, health, social protection,
housing and job creation. The indigenous
population continues to be denied their rights

and access to the justice system. And in terms
of compensation, lack of state resources means
that few families who were victims of war
have received comprehensive compensation.
All this, combined with the uneven
implementation of the peace agreement’s
provisions, has led to a deepening of inequality
and poverty in the country and to greater State
fragility, providing fertile ground for armed
groups, criminal gangs, organised crime
and drug trafficking. Guatemala currently
has high rates of crime, creating fear and
uncertainty in the general population.
Research undertaken in 2016 identified
a wide range of factors driving internal
displacement in Guatemala: violence,
extortion and threats; organised crime and
narco trafficking; the expansion of large-scale
business activities (such as the cultivation
of sugarcane and oil palm, cattle raising,
mining and hydroelectricity production); and
natural and climate-related events. Added
to these are other risk factors that trigger
forced migration, such as the deterioration
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and exacerbation of social inequality in access
to health, education, housing, livelihoods
and land (with the most affected being those
living in rural and marginalised areas), and
the predominance of the patriarchal system.
The expansion of large-scale business has
reduced areas for food crops, which has led to
the displacement of families and sometimes
entire communities in the northwest of the
country. This situation has in turn placed these
people at risk of disease and malnutrition,
with little or no access to livelihoods. Their
vulnerability is further exacerbated by violence,
intimidation and land grabbing by big business,
and by the environmental damage done to
the land, particularly to water sources by
contamination, overuse and diversion of rivers.
Such businesses benefit from a weak State,
from corruption and inefficiency, but also from
the close ties that some companies have with
mafias and State institutions. This situation
has left communities unprotected. Some resist
(such as those who protest against mining and
hydroelectric projects), while others choose
to sell up and look for somewhere else to
live – often leaving for their own survival.
Guatemala’s geography and location make
it vulnerable to climatic and natural events
(storms, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes)
that have led to forced displacement. This
situation is aggravated by the lack of land
use planning, deforestation, poor oversight
of housing, housing shortages and poor
prevention and preparedness measures.
The people most affected are those already
living in poverty. When such events occur,
affected populations receive emergency
care but no longer-term assistance.

From indifference to investment?

In sum, there are many reasons that promote
internal forced displacement in Guatemala,
yet there is little State recognition of the
underlying problems. Those displaced by
violence live in constant fear of being found by
the perpetrators of violence, and consequently
mistrust other people and public officials.
This scenario makes it extremely difficult to
secure data about displacement, while the
undercurrent of fear discourages people from
lodging complaints, which in turn hinders
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the investigation and punishment of criminal
acts and fails to stop them being repeated.
The government needs to demonstrate its
willingness to address the structural aspects
that are currently causing displacement. It
urgently needs to undertake a system-wide
evaluation (with the participation of civil
society) of public policies and of prevention
and care programmes targeting displaced
people; there needs to be greater investment in
improving the living conditions of the poorest
and most excluded populations – those located
in rural areas and precarious urban settlements
– with specific approaches for children
and adolescents, women and indigenous
peoples. A national development plan is
needed, one that benefits the more vulnerable
populations, seeking to eradicate poverty
and malnutrition, ensure access to the school
system and employment, and promote the
sustainable management of the land. This does
not require starting from scratch since there
already exist initiatives that can be revisited.4
The State also needs to develop procedures
to regulate expansionist and extractive
business activities, and in doing so should
focus on questions of legality, social conflict,
environmental impacts, repercussions on
food production, the role of public officials
and their relationship with business, and
the actions of local authorities that violate
communities’ right to be consulted. Above
all, the government should analyse whether
these business activities are appropriate for the
country in social, environmental and economic
terms, both in the short and the long term.
Sindy Hernández Bonilla
smhernandezb@url.edu.gt
Researcher, Institute of Research and Projection
on Global and Territorial Dynamics, Rafael
Landívar University, Guatemala
http://bit.ly/2wJnYIr
1. Conciliation Resources (1997) Negotiating rights: The Guatemala
peace process www.c-r.org/accord/guatemala
2. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported 6,200
new cases of internal displacement in 2016:
www.internal-displacement.org/countries/guatemala
3. www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Guatemala_
ResettlementAgreement.pdf
4. For example, the Peace Agreements, the ‘Plan para Activar y
Adecuar la Política Nacional de Desarrollo Rural Integral’ and
‘Mejoremos Guate’.
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Falling short of protection: Peru’s new migration
scheme for Venezuelans
Nicolas Parent
Peru’s introduction of a new work and study permit for Venezuelans fleeing violence in their
country is to be applauded – but it provides only a limited, temporary form of protection.
State repression, looting and civil violence
have left Venezuelans in a state of uneasiness
and fear, with the erosion of the country’s
socio-political stability further exacerbated
by shortages of food and medicine, crippling
inflation and a dramatic devaluation of the
Venezuelan currency. With each passing day,
as the situation deteriorates, the applicability
to Venezuelans of the international definition
of refugee becomes increasingly justifiable.
In addition to both the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, to which the
vast majority of Latin American countries are
signatories, the continent has demonstrated a
coordinated effort to strengthen its regional
framework for the forcibly displaced. The
Cartagena Declaration in 1984, the 1994
San José Declaration, the 2004 Mexico
Declaration and the 2014 Brazil Declaration
all serve as testaments to a commitment
to protecting those with well-founded
fear of persecution. The response to those
fleeing Venezuela, however, exemplifies
how much there remains to achieve,
particularly in terms of the implementation
of these instruments. For instance, despite
receiving 4,670 requests for asylum from
Venezuelans between 2012 and 2016, Brazil’s
Ministry of Justice has only assessed a
total of 89 applications.1 For those wanting
to flee to Colombia, a different challenge
arises, where regular border closures and
violence in its eastern region have impeded
Venezuelans from seeking asylum.

Protection options

Of all Latin American countries hosting
Venezuelans, Peru merits recognition for its
new temporary work/study permit scheme.
The Permiso Temporal de Permanencia
(PTP)2 is a work and study permit provided
exclusively to Venezuelan citizens for a period

of one year, with the possibility of renewal.
The new programme has been praised by
the international community, including by
the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights which has called it “an example
for the region of how States can protect
migrants who are in a vulnerable situation
by regularizing migration.”3 According to
Eduardo Sevilla Echevarría, Superintendent
of Migration, over 10,000 Venezuelans have
been approved for the PTP as of late July
2017.4
However, it appears that migration
officials may be promoting the PTP in
place of providing information about
other more durable and wider-ranging
protection pathways. This was the case
for José, a former business owner in
Venezuela. When passing through border
control at the airport in Lima, José notified
the migration officer that he wished to
apply for asylum but “they said I was only
eligible for the PTP.” Considering that Peru
has national asylum legislation dating
back to 2003,5 it is surprising that Lima’s
migration office failed to provide adequate
information about asylum procedures.
Testimonials from applicants and
beneficiaries around Lima suggest that José is
not the only Venezuelan being misinformed
on their right to seek asylum. When María
applied for the PTP, she noticed that it did not
explicitly guarantee access to certain rights
that would normally be accorded to refugees.
“I fled from an area with heavy violence in
Venezuela and I was aware that, with the
expanded refugee definition found in the
Cartagena Declaration, I would probably be
eligible for refugee status,” María explained,
adding that she did not necessarily want
to receive formal refugee status but rather
wanted to have a legal guarantee that she
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and her children would have access to health
facilities and basic assistance. However,
after multiple visits to the migration office
and numerous telephone conversations with
UNHCR staff members (who were unclear
about the overlap between the PTP and
Peru’s asylum legislation), she – like José –
had to accept the PTP as her only option.

Implementation falling behind
international standards

Latin America is widely recognised
for having developed some of the most
innovative protection mechanisms for
forced migrants. At the forefront has been
the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, setting the
stage for a multitude of regional dialogues
focused on international protection.
However, it is also critical to acknowledge
that these declarations, plans of action,
recommendations and conclusions are
largely non-binding, and that in Latin
America “most of the existing refugee status
determination bodies still lack the training,
efficiency, independence, and expertise
that are to be found in other parts of the
world.”6 Furthermore, since the end of the
1990s Latin American governments have
devised asylum legislation at the national
level but these instruments tend to “fall
short of international standards in terms
of duration and scope of protection [and]
lack important refugee rights such as the
right to access fair and efficient refugee
status determination procedures.”7
Peru is not exempt from these realities
and although the PTP has allowed many
Venezuelans to gain safety, there needs
to be a debate about whether or not it is
meeting its responsibilities towards those
Venezuelans whose cases should rather be
decided through a proper refugee status
determination process. Considering that
the 1984 Cartagena Declaration expands
the definition of what constitutes a refugee,
extending this status to those fleeing their
country due to “generalized violence,
foreign aggression, internal conflicts,
massive violation of human rights or
other circumstances which have seriously
disturbed public order”,8 the abundant
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evidence on Venezuela’s conflict shows
that those fleeing have a legitimate claim
to apply for international protection.
Having incorporated the expanded refugee
definition within its national legislation,
Peru has a formal responsibility towards
facilitating this process. In practice, the
PTP can contribute to Peru potentially
circumventing this responsibility as
Venezuelan migrants are likely to be
assessed on a prima facie basis, leaving
them misinformed about other protection
schemes available under Peruvian law.
While Peru receives praise for hosting
Venezuelans, it must be understood that
the PTP is not a protection instrument
guaranteeing a breadth of rights. On paper,
it is simply a residence permit allowing
Venezuelans to work and study for a period
of one year and, although this may be suitable
for some applicants, it is not appropriate for
those who have fled their country because
their lives, safety and freedom are threatened.
Peru’s PTP should therefore not be viewed
as the new standard for protecting those
fleeing crisis, conflict and violence within
Latin America as this would risk propagating
a discourse and practice based on generosity
and goodwill rather than one based on rights.
Nicolas Parent nik.parent@gmail.com
Researcher, Observatory for Human Rights and
Forced Migrants in Turkey https://ohrfmt.org;
currently teaching Geography in Lima, Peru
1. Human Rights Watch (2017) ‘Venezuela: Humanitarian crisis
spilling into Brazil’ http://bit.ly/HRW-Venez-18042017
2. Decreto Supremo Nº 002-2017-IN
www.refworld.org/docid/58da500c4.html
3. IACHR, 4th April 2017
www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2017/043.asp
4. ‘Gobierno evalúa ampliar plazo para entrega de PTP a
venezolanos’, El Comercio, 25th July 2017
http://bit.ly/ElComercio-25072017
5. Ley del Refugiado Nº 27891
www.migraciones.gob.pe/documentos/normalegal_8.pdf
6. Fischel De Andrade J (2014) ‘Forced migration in South
America’ in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh E, Loescher G, Long K and Sigona
N (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies,
Oxford University Press, pp651-663
7. Gottwald M (2003) ‘Protecting Colombian refugees in the
Andean region: the fight against invisibility’ UNHCR Working
Paper No 81 www.unhcr.org/3e71f2014.pdf
8. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
http://bit.ly/1984Cartagena-Sp-Fr-Eng

41

FMR 56

42

Latin America and the Caribbean
www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean

October 2017

Protection in the absence of legislation in Trinidad
and Tobago
Rochelle Nakhid and Andrew Welch
The Caribbean’s many small island States are grappling with increasingly complex mixed
migration flows, yet few have introduced refugee legislation. Trinidad and Tobago is in the
process of doing so.
The island state of Trinidad and Tobago
has seen increasing numbers of migrants
in the past decade and is both a transit and
destination point. Consistent with Caribbean
trends, refugees of various nationalities
are increasingly making it to Trinidad and
Tobago’s shores. 184 persons were registered
as asylum seekers in Trinidad and Tobago in
2014, 209 in 2015 and 314 in 2016.1 According
to UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, the
first few months of 2017 showed a doubling
of 2016’s figures, with 640 registered asylum
seekers, refugees and other persons of
concern as of May 2017. This rapid increase
is expected to continue as there remains
a backlog of persons to be registered; the
total for 2017 is projected to be about 1,800.
Asylum seekers and refugees in Trinidad
and Tobago come from six main countries –
Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Bangladesh, Jamaica,
Colombia and Nigeria – representing a mix
of both regional and extra-regional refugees.
Previously, the majority hailed from Cuba
and Syria but as of 2017 Venezuelans became
the second largest group of asylum seekers.
However, refugees and asylum seekers also
represent many other countries of origin
such as Pakistan, Congo, Mali, Sudan and
Uganda. More widely, according to UNHCR
statistics dated March 2017, the number
of refugees and asylum seekers in the
Caribbean region2 rose by 50% between 2015
and 2016. The top ten countries of origin
in descending order are El Salvador, Haiti,
Honduras, Guatemala, Cuba, Venezuela,
Colombia, Syria, Jamaica and Bangladesh.

Protection challenges and shortcomings
In the Independent Commonwealth
Caribbean,3 only Belize has legislation
for refugees, while Jamaica and Trinidad

and Tobago have a refugee policy but no
legislation. Trinidad and Tobago acceded
to the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
in November 2000. To date, these have
not been incorporated into domestic
legislation but the drafting process to do
so is now underway. This process is being
undertaken in a commendably participatory
way with the main stakeholders including
the International Affairs Unit and the
Immigration Division of the Ministry of
National Security, UNHCR and the NGO
Living Water Community (LWC).4
The good relationship among stakeholders
has resulted in the protection of hundreds
of refugees over the past three decades.
A refugee policy, approved in June 2014,5
outlines rights that refugees are entitled
to: a permit authorising their stay in the
country, the right to work, identity papers,
travel documents, public assistance (if
unable to work and in need), medical care,
freedom of movement, family reunification,
educational opportunities and recreational
activities, counselling for trauma or other
psychological issues, and the right not to be
expelled from the country (unless the refugee
poses a threat to national security or to public
order). It envisages a three-phased approach
to enabling the government to assume
responsibility for refugee protection and take
over refugee status determination. Despite an
overly ambitious timeline, capacity building
of government actors has been taking place
to enable them to assume this responsibility.
However, not all of the rights listed
in the policy are actually accorded to the
refugees. Other than freedom of movement,
medical care and the right not to be expelled,
in practice there is no right to work, no
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and peace. In Trinidad and Tobago, however,
as refugees cannot legally integrate into the
country or work, UNHCR depends heavily
on resettlement as the main possible solution
for most refugees (traditionally in the United
States). This can be lengthy and there is no
guarantee that the refugees will be accepted
by another country. With declining numbers
of available resettlement spaces worldwide,
local integration remains the de facto solution.
Additional protection concerns relate
to LGBTI6 persons, children and women, in
particular. Many LGBTI persons flee their
home countries seeking refuge in Trinidad
and Tobago. However, due to the country’s
cultural norms and Sexual Offences Act of
1986, they face many of the same protection
concerns in Trinidad and Tobago that
they had in their country of origin. Due to
restrictions imposed by the Immigration
Division, concerns over a lack of school
places and a preference for enrolling refugees
over asylum seekers, growing numbers of
children remain out of school. There is little
capacity for accommodating unaccompanied
or separated children; this is due in part to
a lack of bilingual personnel and in part to
a shortage of spaces in children’s homes.

UNHCR/Joshua Surtees

issuance of identity documents on handing
over of passports to receive an order of
supervision, no public assistance nor access to
culturally sensitive psychological treatment,
limited access to education for children,
and no easy route to family reunification.
Any refugee or asylum seeker who
wishes to claim protection in Trinidad
and Tobago is bound by the Immigration
Act and its regulations, and this makes it
difficult to implement effective protection
safeguards. Persons who enter or remain
in Trinidad and Tobago without correct
documentation may be treated as criminals
(imprisoned and/or fined) and are likely
to be detained in an administrative
detention centre pending deportation to
their countries of origin. The Act’s rulings
apply to asylum seekers and refugees as
well, especially if they are in possession of
false documents or are undocumented.
When asylum seekers register with
UNHCR through LWC, and in line with
procedures agreed in 2014, they are referred
to the Immigration Division which grants
them an order of supervision. This imposes
a reporting requirement and protects the
asylum seeker from refoulement or detention
so long as they comply with
the laws of the country. This
alternative to detention was
negotiated years ago with the
Immigration Division along
with the removal of the usual
requirement of paying a bond.
However, a recent case from
the High Court of Trinidad
and Tobago has indirectly
called into question the legality
of the current use of orders
of supervision for asylum
seekers and refugees. The
stakeholders are due to meet
to discuss the implications
of this decision and to look
at alternative solutions.
The refugee policy also
recognises the three durable
solutions promoted by
UNHCR to help refugees
rebuild their lives in dignity

In a classroom at the University of the West Indies in Trinidad, Professor of Linguistics Valerie
Youseff assists an eight-year-old refugee from Colombia with English language exercises.
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Meanwhile, with longstanding discrimination
towards Latina women in Trinbagonian
society, and entrenched misogyny, many
refugee women face harassment daily
and remain particularly vulnerable to
exploitation and abuse. This vulnerability is
exacerbated in the workplace where refugee
women (and all refugees, for that matter) are
forced to work in the informal economy.

Options in the face of limited resources
and capacity

LWC is the only civil society organisation
on the island that is dedicated to refugees.
A recent partnership with the University
of the West Indies, however, offers some
hope for expansion of services through
the provision of English language classes
(and in the future perhaps offer courses
on refugee studies). Another partnership
envisions the provision of legal aid in
collaboration with the local law school.
Arguably, like any other State, Trinidad
and Tobago should ensure that basic legal
obligations are met and access to asylum
facilitated, despite not yet having domestic
legislation in place. It should provide
humanitarian assistance to those in need
in a way that respects the dignity and
security of all persons. While putting its
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existing capacities and resources to use to
effectively and efficiently guarantee the
protection of refugees and all persons on its
territory, its own limitations as a Small Island
Developing State should be acknowledged,
including its ongoing recession. Where
Trinidad and Tobago falls short of being
able to provide protection for the growing
number of asylum seekers, the international
community should consider how to provide
appropriate, adequate support to ensure
that those protection needs are met. The
entire Caribbean could certainly benefit
from additional international support.
Rochelle Nakhid lwcunhcr@gmail.com
Regional Coordinator
Andrew Welch andrew.welch@live.com
Former Legal Officer
Living Water Community www.lwctt.org
1. This does not include persons who spontaneously depart or
refugees who are resettled to third countries.
2. This includes Belize.
3. This refers to English-speaking countries in the Caribbean
which gained full independence from the United Kingdom.
4. LWC has partnered with UNHCR since 1989; UNHCR
established a presence on the island in January 2016.
5. National Policy to Address Refugee and Asylum Matters in the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, adopted by Cabinet in June
2014 www.refworld.org/docid/571109654.html
6. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex

Eradicating statelessness in the Americas
Juan Ignacio Mondelli
Considerable progress has been made towards eradicating statelessness in Latin America
and the Caribbean since 2014 but there is still work to be done if it is to become the first
world region to eradicate statelessness.
With the adoption of the Brazil Declaration
and Plan of Action in 2014,1 28 countries
and three Latin American and Caribbean
territories committed themselves to eradicate
statelessness in the region following the
guidelines of the UN Refugee Agency
(UNHCR) Global Action Plan to End
Statelessness.2 To this end, countries agreed
that no new cases of statelessness must
originate in the region, all stateless persons
must acquire or regain their nationality, and

people at risk of statelessness need to be
enabled to surmount any legal or practical
barriers to prove that they are nationals of
a specific country. They also agreed that
until stateless persons are able to obtain a
nationality, they must be protected. Hence,
while the Brazil Plan of Action recognises
that the primary approach to ending
statelessness is one of solutions, it proposes
that States adopt measures in all three areas:
prevention, protection and resolution.
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Progress in the region since 2014
Prevention: With regard to preventing
statelessness, the Brazil Plan of Action
proposes that States accede to the
1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness,3 harmonise their domestic
nationality regulations with international
standards, and facilitate birth registration.
At present, out of the 35 Member States
of the Organization of American States, only
16 are States Parties to the 1961 Convention.
Three of these – Argentina, Belize and Peru
– have become parties to the Convention
since 2014, while Haiti has recently decided
to accede to the Convention (and will become
the 17th Member State). Meanwhile, Colombia
and Chile have introduced reforms to limit
the scope of constitutional exceptions to
the principle of jus solis,4 thus reducing
the possibility of cases of statelessness
occurring on their territories, and Panama
has changed its registration policy to
facilitate registration of births of children
born in Costa Rica to Panamanian parents.
Protection: To protect stateless persons, the
Brazil Plan of Action asks States to accede to
the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, adopt domestic protection
frameworks, and establish procedures for
determining statelessness. To date, 19 of the
35 member countries of the OAS are States
Parties to the 1954 Convention. Of these, after
2014, El Salvador acceded to the Convention,
and Mexico removed its reservation to Article
31 on the expulsion of stateless persons. Also,
the parliament in Haiti approved accession,
and President Bachelet in Chile promised to
move towards accession to both statelessness
conventions. Regarding the procedures
for determining statelessness, the InterAmerican Court issued an advisory opinion
stating that, in a migration context, States
must determine the nationality status or
statelessness of any child on their territory; to
this end, they should establish or strengthen
appropriate procedures, recognising the
varying needs of children and adolescents.
In 2016, Costa Rica adopted regulations
that allow for the comprehensive protection
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of stateless persons. Elsewhere, Ecuador’s
Organic Law of Human Mobility and
Brazil’s migration law – both adopted in
2017 – regulate the rights of stateless persons
and require statelessness determination
procedures to be established. In addition,
Argentina, El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay
and Uruguay are currently drawing up
regulations to address the issue, while
Colombia, Guatemala and Peru have
all expressed interest in doing so.
Resolution: In relation to confirmation of
nationality, Chile (through its ‘Chile reconoce’
project5), Costa Rica and Panama (through
the Chiriticos project6) have implemented
projects to verify or review people’s
birth registration and ensure appropriate
registration and access to documentation
proving nationality. Moreover, Bolivia, Brazil
and Ecuador have introduced regulations
to facilitate the naturalisation of stateless
persons, while Argentina, El Salvador
and Paraguay are drafting similar laws.

Lessons learned

The Cartagena +30 process – that led
to the Brazil Declaration and Plan of
Action – allowed States to recognise that
statelessness is a human rights issue not
just in the world at large but also in the
Americas, and that its eradication generally
requires the investment of few resources.
Cartagena+30 favoured States’ assumption
of ownership towards the goal of ending
statelessness and promoted the identification
of appropriate actions to achieve this goal.
Stateless persons can play a key role
in sensitising state officials and raising
awareness of the problem within society at
large. Following the adoption of the Brazil
Plan of Action, training courses and regional
meetings organised by UNHCR had a greater
impact when they included stateless persons
– such as Maha Mamo, a stateless refugee in
Brazil7 – who could explain the humanitarian
impact of statelessness and why solutions
such as naturalisation are needed. In addition,
given that statelessness is a relatively new
issue for many officials who had traditionally
focused only on asylum and refugee
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Maha Mamo, a refugee in Brazil, was born stateless in Lebanon and
is still without a nationality at the age of 28. Read her story at
www.unhcr.org/ibelong/maha-mamo/.

protection issues, the ‘novelty’ of statelessness
proved to be a useful point of entry for talking
about the subject and raising awareness.
Bi-national projects can bring about not
only a reduction in statelessness but also
a strengthening of cooperation between
countries. The traditionally cordial relations
between Costa Rica and Panama favoured the
implementation of the joint Chiriticos project
which sought to determine the nationality
of migrants temporarily residing in border
areas and of any of their descendants
born in Costa Rica. In implementing the
project, cooperation between the two States
increased, through exchange of information,
fieldwork and bilateral cooperation.
Improving access for stateless persons
to naturalisation contributed to a similar
improvement in access to this solution for
non-stateless refugees. Article 32 of the
1954 Convention and Article 34 of the 1951
Convention establish the same standard of
treatment for non-refugee stateless persons
as for non-stateless refugees as regards
naturalisation. States should endeavour
to facilitate naturalisation in both cases.
Although it has been easier for States to
understand and empathise with the idea
of facilitating

naturalisation for stateless
persons, countries such as Argentina and
Paraguay are developing dedicated protection
frameworks for stateless persons that also
include facilities for naturalisation of nonstateless refugees, while Bolivia has already

passed a regulation to that end. In this sense,
the goal of solving statelessness has had a
spillover effect that may benefit refugees.

Remaining challenges

Three years after the adoption of the Brazil
Plan of Action, significant progress has
been made towards the eradication of
statelessness. Likewise, important lessons
have emerged that will be useful in the
continuing implementation of the Brazil
Plan of Action at the national level.
In terms of challenges, however, it should
be noted that, despite Belize’s accession to the
1961 Convention and the recent approval of
accession to both statelessness conventions
by Haiti, the number of Caribbean countries
that are States Parties to the conventions
remains low. Similarly, in the Americas,
it is in the Caribbean that there are still
nationality laws that discriminate on the
basis of gender, where the largest number
of people are at risk of statelessness, and
where there are thousands of people who
have been arbitrarily deprived of their
nationality. In 2020 UNHCR will undertake
another evaluation of the implementation of
the Brazil Plan of Action. If the Americas is
to become the first world region to eradicate
statelessness – as UNHCR hopes8 – it will
be necessary to redouble efforts in these
Caribbean countries over the next three years.
Juan Ignacio Mondelli mondelli@unhcr.org
Senior Regional Protection Officer
(Statelessness), UNHCR Americas Bureau,
Regional Legal Unit, Costa Rica
www.acnur.org/costa-rica
1. www.refworld.org/docid/5487065b4.html
2. UNHCR (2014) Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014-2024
http://bit.ly/UNHCR-stateless2014-ActionPlan
3. www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39620.html
4. ‘Right of the soil’, commonly referred to as birthright
citizenship, meaning the right of anyone born in the territory of a
state to nationality or citizenship of that state.
5. ‘Chile recognises’ http://chilereconoce.cl
6. https://youtu.be/SwrQXGEwTBU
7. www.unhcr.org/ibelong/maha-mamo/
8. António Guterres, former High Commissioner for Refugees,
speaking at ‘Out of the Shadows: Ending Statelessness in the
Americas’, November 2014
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAf3MV8Hxf8
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Extra-regional refugee resettlement in South
America: the Palestinian experience
Marcia Vera Espinoza
South American countries have been increasingly opening their doors to resettle extraregional refugees. One of the most visible initiatives was the resettlement of Palestinian
refugees in Chile and Brazil during 2007 and 2008.
The Humanitarian Resettlement
Programme for extra-regional refugees
built on the Solidarity Resettlement
Programme that emerged from the 2004
Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action.
The Solidarity Resettlement Programme
was designed for refugees in need of
protection within the region, and the later
Humanitarian Resettlement Programme
reflected a desire to extend the scope of this
South-South cooperation and to enhance
the role of the region in international
refugee response and protection.
Chile and Brazil each received more
than 100 Palestinian refugees, who had been
living in protracted situations in refugee
camps on the border between Iraq and Syria
and in the Jordanian desert. Although the
number was small in comparison with the
intake of traditional resettlement countries,
the programme raised great interest and
significant funding, and triggered the
establishment of a network of civil society
organisations, local municipalities and
private actors that supported the initiative.
Research undertaken between 2012 and
2014 explored the refugees’ experiences
of integration in both countries.1

Managing expectations

One of the main dimensions affecting the
Palestinians’ resettlement experience in both
countries was the tension that developed
between refugees and the organisations
involved in resettlement, as a result of what
they identified as ‘unfulfilled expectations’.2
Expectations were created by refugees and
by the resettlement organisations alike.
Common expectations among Palestinian
refugees in both countries related to having
their immediate needs covered, socio-

economic stability, the learning and use of a
new language, better access to naturalisation,
and opportunities for family reunification.
Expectations were created from the moment
they received resettlement information,
whether they were in their first country of
asylum or in their refugee camp at the time. In
Brazil more than 70% of Palestinian refugees
surveyed stated that the country did not
meet their expectations, while in Chile over
50% of refugees had similar perceptions.
“They told me, ‘Look, there in Brazil you are going
to study Portuguese, you will find a house, you
will have a job, everything.’ And nothing [was
accomplished].” (Mahfoud, Brazil)3
“Here it is different from what I thought it would
be. I thought that in this country I would have a
good situation and that I could live well… that
you could work and have everything. But when we
arrived, finding a job was difficult and we worked
so much for very little money.” (Rahal, Chile)
Nacira, a Palestinian refugee in Brazil,
stressed that if the resettlement organisations
had provided accurate information from
the beginning the refugees could have
made a more informed decision. The
interview ‘missions’ (visits by officials from
the country offering resettlement) and the
information provided at the refugee camp
or at the first country of asylum are clearly
pivotal in this. In the case of Palestinians
who came to Brazil, there was no mission
and it was left to staff of UNHCR, the UN
Refugee Agency, in Jordan to provide the
information. In the case of Chile, a mission
with government officials, UNHCR and the
implementing NGO’s representatives went
to the Al-Tanf camp but they did not have
translators who knew both the language and
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the Chilean context, so accurate explanations
and descriptions proved difficult.
Both countries have since improved
their communication with refugees who are
considering resettlement, by translating some
key documents into different languages and
by providing written information about the
programme for use during the missions.
In 2014, UNHCR and its implementing
partners in Brazil published a booklet for
refugees in Brazil.4 This includes sections
in Portuguese, English, French, Spanish
and Arabic, providing basic information
about the rights and obligations of refugees,
how to obtain or renew documentation,
how to apply for permanent residence,
where to find answers to specific questions
and a list of useful contacts, including the
contact details of all organisations involved
in refugee reception. Chile had created a
similar booklet with practical information
about the country for Colombian refugees.
Both countries also held group events with
refugees in order to evaluate the programme.
Through interviews it became clear
that those administering the resettlement
programmes in both countries also
developed a set of expectations based on
the understanding of ‘self-sufficiency’ as
refugees’ capacity to reach economic stability
and independence, whereas the refugees
viewed self-sufficiency as a combination
of economic autonomy and agency over
their own resettlement process. When
refugees complained or raised the issue of
‘unfulfilled promises’, some members of
the organisations involved referred to them
as ‘ungrateful’5 and as having a ‘refugee
mentality’ from years of having been assisted.

Belonging here and there

Another cross-cutting theme emerging
from interviews with Palestinian refugees
was that their sense of belonging was
divided between two or more locations.
For instance, participants emphasised how
language was a key dimension affecting their
integration experience. The acquisition of
Spanish or Portuguese in the host country
represented the first form of ‘membership’
sought by most of the resettled refugees.

October 2017

At the same time, Palestinian refugees
highlighted that use of their language of
origin was important in order to preserve
their identity and as an element of intimacy
within the home or where communities
got together. It was also important in
maintaining relationships with family
members and friends displaced elsewhere.
“It is very important to speak Arabic inside the
house, so the children don’t lose it. We talk to our
children about the Qur’an and what it says. We also
teach them about our language and they learn little
by little.” (Zoheir, Chile)
In the country of resettlement, learning the
local language served different purposes. For
some refugees, learning the language allowed
them to make friends and build relationships,
while for others language was necessary for
finding jobs, accessing services and avoiding
marginalisation. Refugees criticised how
the language classes were delivered, the
poor quality of the material and the lack of a
methodology specific to the refugees’ needs.

Naturalisation and access to rights

In both countries, refugees’ experiences of
integration were framed by the legal status
that resettled refugees received upon arrival.
According to most of them, the immediate
regularisation of their status allowed them
and their children to access health and
education (primary and secondary) like any
other citizen in Chile and Brazil. However,
refugees also spoke of those rights which
they could not access because of their
temporary status or because their situation
was not known to local service providers.
Some of these restrictions included access
to pensions, housing and higher education
subsidies. Lack of access was particularly
acute in Brazil. In Chile, refugee status
granted to resettled individuals and their
families guarantees permanent residence;
in Brazil, however, refugees are granted a
two-year temporary visa, which can then
be renewed for another two years, before
they are eligible to apply for permanent
residence. Despite the initial difficulties, both
countries have since made improvements in
these areas. For instance, Chile has enabled
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all Palestinian refugees to obtain housing
subsidies without requiring five years of
permanent residence. In Brazil, meanwhile, a
recent decision of the Federal Supreme Court
states that foreigners are eligible to receive the
state pension even without naturalisation.
The question of naturalisation – as a form
of identity and to allow mobility – affects
Palestinian refugees in particular. According
to Palestinian refugees in both countries,
naturalisation was one of the promises made
when they received the offer of resettlement.
“For me it is a dream to have a nationality, because
now I am 50 years old and I have been a refugee all
my life. I don’t have a recognised nationality, no
passport. It is very difficult.” (Hafid, Chile)
In Chile, Palestinian refugees – with the
support of some politicians and civil society
– demanded that the government support
their request for naturalisation. By June 2015,
65 adult Palestinians had obtained Chilean
passports, and by a year later 45 children
and adolescents had received naturalisation.
Children born in Chile are automatically
recognised as nationals. Brazil, meanwhile,
has been less supportive of providing
naturalisation, with only one family in the
process of obtaining naturalisation when
interviewed back in 2014. Until recently,
refugees could apply for naturalisation after
four years of permanent residency in Brazil
(that is, after a total of eight years, when
temporary residence is taken into account).

Conclusion

There are clearly recommendations to
draw from the above: better information
provided in their own language of origin
for refugees considering resettlement,
improved language teaching provision in
the countries offering resettlement, and a
greater appreciation of the importance of
legal rights such as access to naturalisation.
Exploring refugees’ experiences enables
the limitations of the programme – and the
refugees’ desire for greater agency – to be
better understood and recognised, in order
to enable further policy development.
South America – and indeed the whole
of the Latin America and Caribbean region
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– is committed to demonstrating solidarity
with international humanitarian crises
through the implementation of resettlement,
as stated in the Brazil Declaration and
Plan of Action.6 The understanding of the
experiences of extra-regional resettlement
is key to success in this endeavour. While
Chile is getting ready to receive 60 Syrian
refugees from Lebanon at the end of 2017,
Brazil is discussing how to move forward
with their own resettlement programme to
support unaccompanied children affected
by the Syrian conflict. This programme
will complement the humanitarian visas
that Brazil has been granting to Syrian
refugees since 2013. Argentina has also
implemented humanitarian visas for Syrian
refugees since 2014 and is now developing
a private sponsorship resettlement
programme. Uruguay was the first country
to resettle Syrian refugees, facing several
challenges during its implementation.7 The
extra-regional efforts of the sub-region
are now mainly focused on supporting
Syrian refugees. Learning from previous
resettlement experiences, like the one of
Palestinian refugees in Chile and Brazil,
could contribute to the better planning
and implementation of resettlement.
Marcia Vera Espinoza
marcia.vera@sheffield.ac.uk
Postdoctoral Research Associate, Prospects for
International Migration Governance project,
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield
http://migrationgovernance.org
1. This comprised 80 interviews (including with refugees,
government officers, UNHCR and implementing agencies), 86
surveys and participant observation. The research, that included
Palestinian and Colombian refugees, was supported by CONICYT
and fieldwork grants from RGS-IBG Slawson Award, SLAS and
SIID.
2. See also: Vera Espinoza M (forthcoming 2018) ‘The Politics of
Resettlement: Expectations and unfulfilled promises in Chile and
Brazil’ in Garnier A, Lyra Jubilut L and Bergtora Sandvik K (Eds)
Refugee Resettlement: Power, Politics and Humanitarian Governance.
New York: Berghahn Books.
3. The names of all refugees interviewed have been changed.
4. UNHCR (2014) Booklet for Asylum Seekers in Brazil
http://bit.ly/ACNUR-Cartilha-Brasil
5. See Moulin C (2012) ‘Ungrateful subjects? Refugee protest and
the logic of gratitude’ in Nyers P and Rygiel K (Eds) Citizenship,
Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement, pp54-72.
6. www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2014/9865.pdf
7. See article in this issue by Raquel Rodríguez Camejo.
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Venezuelan displacement: a challenge to Brazil
Helisane Mahlke and Lilian Yamamoto
Brazil must strengthen its reception and integration of fleeing Venezuelans
Venezuela’s political, social and economic
crisis, accompanied by increasing crime
rates, has triggered widespread movement
of Venezuelans to the state of Roraima in
northern Brazil and elsewhere. Despite
Venezuelan citizens being entitled (under
a recent Resolution made for associate
MERCOSUR members) to temporary
residence in Brazil of up to two years,
most do not know about this possibility or
have been deterred by the financial cost
associated with it. They apply instead for
asylum, whether they are eligible for it
or not, since after making the application
they are permitted to access public
services and to receive a work permit.
Between January and June 2017, the
state of Roraima received a total of 5,787
asylum claims (including Venezuelans),
3,500 more than it received in the whole
of 2016, and Roraima authorities report
more than 30,000 people crossed the
border in the following three months. As
the crisis deepens, the number of people
fleeing Venezuela will only increase.
Brazil’s new Migration Law (Law No
13445) of 2017 takes a rights-based approach,
and there is hope that it will provide better
legal migration channels for those who do not
have the grounds to seek asylum in Brazil,
thus easing pressure on the country’s asylum
system. However, the country tends to react
to, rather than anticipate, waves of migration
and lacks a migration policy to respond
adequately to those migrants and refugees
who have already arrived. The Brazilian
government was slow to enact the normative
resolutions that were needed to provide
humanitarian visas to Haitians following
the 2010 earthquake (Resolution No 97, 2012),
and has been similarly slow in providing
temporary residence for Venezuelans (under
Resolution No 126, 2017), the latter resolution
only being issued after pressure from civil
society and public bodies. Although the

federal government has provided funds
to the states of Roraima and Amazonas to
provide social support and health care to
Venezuelans, these measures are far from
sufficient and, as these areas were already
suffering from shortcomings in Brazil’s
provision of public services, both migrant and
host populations are insufficiently supported.
As a State Party to the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, Brazil is
required to provide an effective structure
for refugees’ reception and integration –
but this is still absent. Brazil’s lack of an
effective migration policy and structure
is a political choice; the government opts
instead to adopt provisory solutions on
a case-by-case basis. This is contrary to
the law and spirit of the 1951 Convention,
and Brazil must strengthen reception and
integration for both Venezuelan migrants
and refugees. A more proactive long-term
approach will enable faster and more effective
protection of forced migrants, particularly
important at a time when displacement
from Venezuela shows no sign of abating.
Helisane Mahlke mahlke.helisane@gmail.com
Independent researcher
Lilian Yamamoto liukami2014@gmail.com
Researcher, South American Network for
Environmental Migrations (RESAMA)
www.resama.net

Members of the Warao indigenous community who have fled Venezuela
sleep in hammocks outside a shelter in Boa Vista, Roraima, Brazil.
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The future of the Brazilian resettlement programme
Thais Silva Menezes and Stylianos Kostas
Brazil’s resettlement programmes have been praised for demonstrating the country’s
commitment to refugee protection but the number resettled remains small compared with
international need. Brazil needs to address the financing of such programmes if it is to
ensure their sustainability and growth.

Human Rights Watch/César Muñoz Acebes 2017

In 2004, Brazil marked the occasion of the
20th anniversary of the Cartagena Declaration
by proposing a regional resettlement
programme. The Cartagena Declaration
of 1984 had encouraged the countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean to make
greater provision for the protection of
refugees; the Mexico Declaration and Plan
of Action of 2004 built on existing regional
cooperation by initiating a Solidarity
Resettlement Programme which would focus
on resettlement of refugees from the region,
particularly Colombia and the Northern
Triangle of Central America1. The Declaration
also widened the scope for all countries in
Latin America to be involved and for more
refugees to be included in the future.2
Brazil has resettled more refugees than
any country in the region and its resettlement
programme has not been suspended or
delayed for political and/or financial reasons,
as has happened in Argentina, Chile and
Paraguay. From 2002 (when the resettlement
programme was first implemented) to July
2017, Brazil resettled 715 refugees. Brazil’s
resettlement programme has been praised
for demonstrating the country’s commitment
to the international protection of refugees
– but why has
the Brazilian
programme been
unable to resettle
even larger numbers
of refugees? One
answer may lie in
the way in which the
task of financing was
assigned to just one
of the programme’s
stakeholders:
UNHCR, the UN
Refugee Agency.

The greatest asset of the Brazilian
Resettlement Programme is its tripartite
structure. The framework comprises the
National Committee for Refugees (CONARE),
an executive inter-ministerial committee
which provides the legal and bureaucratic
support that refugees need when they arrive;
UNHCR, which is able to identify people
at risk in their first country of asylum and
to advocate their resettlement in countries
where protection and local integration are
possible; and civil society institutions, which
have a long history of supporting refugees
in Brazil, which enables them to anticipate
the needs of newcomers, prepare for their
reception and monitor their integration.
UNHCR is responsible for implementing the
programme and also for financing it. This
structure is common among resettlement
programmes in the Latin American region.
While on the one hand UNHCR has an
ability to raise funds from the international
community that most countries do not have,
on the other hand a number of countries
to which UNHCR allocates funds might,
collectively, raise more funds than UNHCR
could on its own, thus facilitating the
resettlement of an overall greater number of
refugees. As UNHCR is in most cases the only
funder of the cost of refugees’ selection and
transportation to Brazil, the agency is crucial
not only to the successful implementation
of the resettlement programme but also to
its existence and continuity. This issue of
exclusive financing by UNHCR has raised
significant concerns about the future of the
programme since there are no guarantees that
UNHCR will be able to sustain this funding.
How then will Brazil be able to
maintain and develop a programme that
is totally dependent on external resources?
Competing demands on UNHCR’s limited

51

FMR 56

52

Latin America and the Caribbean
www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean

resources – including acute refugee crises
in other regions, such as in the Middle
East – might mean that hard choices
have to be made about priorities, perhaps
risking the loss of all the expertise built
around this protection tool in Brazil.
Twenty years after the first agreement
on the resettlement of refugees in the region
was signed, it may be time for Brazil to
strengthen support for its own national
resettlement programme. It is true that
Brazil has developed other protection
tools, such as the humanitarian visa for
individuals affected by the Syrian conflict
(which also extends to Palestinian refugees
who have been living in Syria).3 However,
in order to contribute more assertively to
the international protection of refugees, the
Brazilian government needs to take a leading
role in its national resettlement programme
while at the same time working closely
with UNHCR and civil society. To achieve
this Brazil needs to provide the primary
funding for its resettlement programmes, in
accordance with national commitments and
needs. The tripartite structure of the Brazilian
Resettlement Programme is its greatest
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asset but a move away from its exclusive
financing by UNHCR could help to reinforce
the programme and provide protection to
a greater number of refugees. It could also
lead to new possibilities for the design of a
national resettlement programme that is not
only sustainable and effective but which also
reflects to an even greater degree Brazil’s
commitment to international solidarity and
shared responsibility for protecting refugees.
Thais Silva Menezes
silvamenezesthais@gmail.com
University of Brasilia https://irel.unb.br/
Stylianos Kostas stylianoskostas@yahoo.gr
Researcher and advisor, CONARE
www.justica.gov.br/central-de-atendimento/
estrangeiros/refugio-1/refugio
1. Also now referred to as Northern Central America.
2. See also Barreto L P T F and Leão R Z R (2010) ‘Brazil and the
spirit of Cartagena’, Forced Migration Review issue 35
http://bit.ly/Barreto-Leao-Cartagena-2010
3. Once individuals declare that they want to apply for asylum
in Brazil they are issued with a tourist visa but are exempted
from the usual requirement to submit bank accounts, letters of
invitation, proof of employment and/or economic activity and
return tickets. See also article by Gilberto M A Rodrigues, José
Blanes Sala and Débora C de Siqueira in this issue.

Visas and qualifications: Syrian refugees in Brazil
Gilberto M A Rodrigues, José Blanes Sala and Débora Corrêa de Siqueira
Brazil’s humanitarian visa programme for Syrian refugees and its efforts to recognise their
qualifications could offer lessons for refugee protection and integration across the region.
Syrians fleeing conflict in their country began
arriving in Brazil in 2010 but it was only from
2012 onwards that Syrian asylum applications
increased in the country. This increase led
Brazil’s National Committee for Refugees
(CONARE) to approve Resolution 17/2013,1
which established a special humanitarian
visa to be granted to Syrians affected by the
conflict. The resolution allowed Brazilian
diplomatic missions to issue humanitarian
visas to Syrians before their entry into
Brazil,2 and afterwards permitted these
applicants to apply for asylum via a ‘fasttrack’ procedure. In 2015, CONARE renewed
the resolution for a further two years and

also signed a cooperation agreement with
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, to allow
it to support and facilitate identification and
visa procedures carried out by Brazilian
embassies in countries neighbouring
Syria.3 In September 2017 this resolution
was renewed again, for two further years.
Another important initiative was CONARE’s
agreement in February 2017 to resettle up
to 20 unaccompanied Syrian children, a
measure also approved by UNHCR.
There are now more than 2,000 Syrians
refugees living in Brazil and in 2016 Syrians
were the single largest national group to
be granted asylum by CONARE.4 This
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measure of granting humanitarian visas
has now been incorporated into Brazil’s new
migration law of 2017 (Law 13,445), and it
is hoped that the availability of this type of
visa will be incorporated into other Latin
American countries’ refugee policies as well.5
Although Syrian refugees can access the
Bolsa-Família Program, Brazil’s federal income
transfer programme, preliminary research
conducted with Syrian refugees in São Paulo
suggests that the principal – sometimes only –
help they receive is with documentation, and
that they are in need of wider assistance with
work, language, housing and the recognition
of qualifications.6 Most adult Syrian refugees
who have recently arrived in Brazil have had
a tertiary-level education, thanks to Syria’s
formerly strong education system. Although
some Syrians are working successfully as
entrepreneurs in small businesses, mainly
in the food sector, one of the challenges they
face is recognition of their qualifications and
the ability to exercise their professions. For
refugees with unrecognised qualifications,
the solution is, in many cases, to take jobs
that require fewer skills and are lower
paid than those they are qualified to do.
Brazil’s 1997 Refugee Act states that
universities and other educational institutions
should facilitate the recognition of refugees’
qualifications, and some universities –
such as those involved with the UNHCR
initiative Sérgio Vieira de Mello Academic
Chair – try to implement this policy. Even
in these institutions, however, there can
be opposition. This occurs partly because
Brazilian universities are unused to foreign
students, and partly due to an elitist mind-set
whereby only those qualifications obtained
from elite universities are recognised.
While progress is slow, the qualifications
of Syrians and other refugees are starting
to be recognised, although it remains
difficult to obtain authorisation to exercise
professions, particularly in fields such as law
and medicine. Universities and NGOs have
made efforts to support Syrian refugees in
their access to appropriate opportunities,
including offering free Portuguese courses
as insufficient grasp of the language is a
considerable obstacle to obtaining better
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jobs. The Brazilian government has taken
steps towards providing validation of
tertiary qualifications obtained outside
Brazil, and accepting partial documentation
and/or results from exams conducted
by Brazilian universities to certify level
of knowledge as proof of studies.
Brazil’s initiative in welcoming Syrian
refugees is partly related to its historical
and cultural links with Syria and Lebanon
and partly to the humanitarian role that
Brazil has played in Latin America since
the passing of its 1997 Refugee Act. The
country’s introduction of humanitarian
visas and its work on validating refugees’
qualifications have overall been positive
developments; it remains to be seen,
however, how the country will continue to
develop its policies as more refugees arrive,
and how its actions might advance policy
for refugees elsewhere in the region.
Gilberto M A Rodrigues
gilberto.rodrigues@ufabc.edu.br
Member
José Blanes Sala blanes@ufabc.edu.br
Member
Débora Corrêa de Siqueira
dheborah.siqueira@gmail.com
PhD candidate and voluntary aide
Sérgio Vieira de Mello Academic Chair, Federal
University of ABC (UFABC)
http://ufabc.edu.br/en/refugee-services/
1. National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities, Brazil (2013)
Normative Resolution No 17 of 20 September 2013
http://bit.ly/Brazil-Syria-visas-2013
2. Humanitarian visas have been issued by Brazilian missions
located in many countries but those located in the countries
hosting the greatest number of displaced Syrians – Jordan,
Lebanon and Turkey – have issued the majority.
3. UNHCR (2016) The 10-Point Plan in Action, 2016 Update.
www.refworld.org/docid/583714a44.html
4. Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública (2016) Refúgio em
Números (Refuge in Numbers). http://bit.ly/Brazil-Refuge-2016
5. See also Jubilut L L, Sombra Muiños de Andrade C and de Lima
Madureira A (2016) ‘Humanitarian visas: building on Brazil’s
experience’, Forced Migration Review issue 53
www.fmreview.org/community-protection/jubilut-andrademadureira
6. Calegari M and Justino L (2016) ‘Refugiados Sírios em São
Paulo: o direito à integração’
www.nepo.unicamp.br/publicacoes/anais/arquivos/9_MC.pdf
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Syrian refugees in Uruguay: an uncomfortable topic
Raquel Rodríguez Camejo
Only a year after Uruguay’s resettlement plan for Syrian refugees was established, the
resettled families said they wanted to leave. Expectations have not been met.
Uruguay was the first Latin American country
since the start of the Syrian war to resettle
Syrian refugees from Lebanon. However, what
was designed in 2014 as a gesture of solidarity
by a sympathetic, pioneering country has
become an uncomfortable issue for the current
government and the institutions that were
involved.
In 2006, Uruguay established a Refugees
Act and in 2007 joined the regional Solidarity
Resettlement Programme (PRS), in light of the
more than 400 refugees and asylum seekers it
was then hosting from different countries in
Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe. In 2014
the government told UNHCR, the UN Refugee
Agency, that it would be willing to resettle up to
120 Syrian refugees from Lebanon in response
to the Syrian refugee crisis. The duration of
the programme – known as the Syrian Refugee
Resettlement Programme (Programa de
Reasentamiento de Personas Sirias Refugiadas,
PRPSR) – was set at two years (2014-16), with
a budget of about US$2.5 million. The preselection of refugee families on Lebanese
territory was supported by UNHCR, following
the Uruguayan government’s stated preference
for families with a rural profile, with at least
one adult in each family able to work and with
at least 60% of each family to be minors. After
being interviewed by a Uruguayan delegation
in Beirut, five families were selected, with a
total of 42 members, of whom 33 were minors.
Although it is not the first time Uruguay
has offered refugee resettlement, it was
the first time with such a large group and
with characteristics so different from the
refugees of the Latin American region.
Because of this, it was considered particularly
important to inform the families – before
they were definitely selected – of the socioeconomic reality of the country and key
aspects such as the compulsory, secular
education system. The Department of
Social Anthropology of the University of

the Republic (UDELAR) collaborated with
PRPSR in preparing information material and
provided support in the selection process and,
with the Arab Language faculty, provided
language training for those involved in
implementing the resettlement programme.
From the time of their arrival in Uruguay
in October 2014, Syrian refugees received
accommodation, translation services, access to
the health system, inclusion in the education
system (with the support of translators), job
training and introduction to Uruguayan
culture and customs. For the two years of the
programme, they were assigned a home and a
monthly income (depending on the number of
children). The government provided identity
and travel documents in accordance with the
1951 Refugee Convention. The Syrian refugees
resettled in Uruguay have permanent residence
as well as legal and physical protection and
the same civil, economic, social and cultural
rights that all Uruguayan citizens hold.

Missed expectations

By September 2015, the five resettled families
were reporting difficulties in finding work,
insecurity (street thefts), the high cost of living
in the country, and economic problems (despite
the monetary subsidy received through the
programme). They held public protests, saying
they would not abandon the protest until the
government found a solution to their claims.
“We are going to die here or in Syria. Here we die
because we do not have money and in Syria we die
because of the war.”1
The PRPSR’s representative, Javier Miranda,
stated: “We believe that with this resettlement
plan they can lead a dignified life. The State
supports them for two years but cannot do
more. Uruguay is an expensive country, it is
true. And the job offers that they access are the
same as those accessed by most Uruguayans.”
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Testimonies of the five resettled families
reflect their concern and despair: “We escape
from death, from war, and we reach poverty.”
Another of the complaints referenced
“deception” on the part of the Uruguayan
authorities in the information provided in
Lebanon. “They promised us an easy life
but everything is expensive ... living poor is
worse than war.” They see the only way out
is to return to Lebanon or “to any country in
Europe” where they consider they will have a
better quality of life. One of the families tried
to travel to Europe but was detained at the
airport in Turkey and deported to Uruguay.
Even taking into account the difficulties
of integrating into a new and very different
country, with a different language and culture,
adaptation would usually be considered as
only a matter of time. The Syrian refugees came
from a country at war, so the difficulties they
might encounter in the host country would
surely be insignificant – it was argued – in
a context of being able to live in peace. But
what does peace really mean? Is it possible
to have peace in an environment where one
cannot earn enough to lead a decent life?
“What is in Uruguay is peace. Peace is what
everyone wants but if there is peace and yet you do
not have something to live for, it is not peace. …
There is no tranquility. You are always thinking,
thinking about the future, and this is very difficult,
more difficult than war.” (Ibrahim Alshebli, a
Syrian refugee resettled in Uruguay)

www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean

How to measure success or failure?

The PRPSR was planned in two stages – five
families at first, and then seven more families
– but the second stage was not implemented.
Government sources cited the difficulties
that the refugees had in adapting, getting
work and attaining economic self-sufficiency;
they also mentioned difficulties experienced
by the PRPSR in managing this pilot project
and the need to evaluate the results of the
programme before resettling more families.
Former President José Mujica, who had
publicly backed the PRPSR, pointed out the
benefits that would have come from receiving
peasant families with many children (which
would have helped resolve problems of an
aging population and shortage of rural labour).
His own words, that “I asked for peasants
and they brought me middle-class, relatively
comfortable refugees”, reflect the government’s
discontent with the choice of families and
the political expediency at play in selecting
those of a certain demographic profile.2
Hiram Ruiz points out that ‘success’
or ‘failure’ of resettlement programmes
must be considered from many angles: the
country that offers it, those who execute it
and those who, as beneficiaries, receive it.3
The Uruguayan programme was established
with the intention of supporting those
affected by the Syrian humanitarian crisis.
Even though some of the families wanted
to leave, the programme should not be
considered a failure, as it has provided free
education and considerable support for the
families’ integration. However, the lack of
employment opportunities and the limited
economic resources available to the Syrian
refugees reflect some of the PRSP’s weaknesses,
which should be taken into account for
any future resettlement programmes.

Most of the families had very different
living conditions before the war in Syria.
They had their own business, sufficient
income and a low cost of living – in a country
where it was possible to support a large
family on only one salary. In Uruguay the
reality is different. A high cost of living, low
Raquel Rodríguez Camejo, Journalist
wages and difficulties in getting work – the
miraro8@hotmail.com
reasons given by the refugees for wishing to
https://largocaminoaeuropa.blogspot.com.es/
leave – are experienced by local people on a
1. Personal quotations sourced from El Observador
daily basis, who both agree with, and resent,
www.elobservador.com.uy and El Universo www.eluniverso.com.
the refugees’ claims. In a statement, the
2. El Observador TV (2015) ‘Los sirios que se quieren ir y el Uruguay
government emphasised that: “whether you
imperfecto’ http://bit.ly/ElObs-sirios-2015
agree or disagree with the resettlement plan,
3. Hiram Ruiz (2015) Evaluación de Programas de Reasentamiento en
the families’ anguish is still legitimate and this Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay, UNHCR
www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2016/10252.pdf
situation must not promote discrimination […]”.
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Measuring local integration in Ecuador
Santiago Cordova and Peter Janssen
In 2014-15 UNHCR Ecuador developed an index to measure the degree to which refugees
are integrated in their host country, using three main dimensions of local integration: legal,
economic and socio-cultural.

Defining integration

UNHCR Ecuador commissioned an extensive
study of statistical information on the sociocultural, economic and legal situation of
Colombian refugees and asylum seekers.
The survey consisted of 130 questions on
specific issues such as migratory status,
documentation, work, education, health
care and economic conditions. The resulting

baseline data show that enjoyment of
rights and access to services are, in general,
available to refugees and asylum seekers in
Ecuador, while economic factors still present
challenges. While success of local integration
depends to a large extent on objective criteria
(such as legal status, freedom of movement,
adequate employment and access to basic
services), there is also a subjective element,
namely the perception of individuals. The LII
seeks to combine the objective and subjective
elements and thus calculate the level of
local integration across legal, economic
and socio-cultural dimensions.
Each respondent was read a
definition of local integration that
incorporated elements of various
definitions of local integration:
Local integration means forming part of a
society where you have access to education,
health, housing and employment, among
others, and where you are able to maintain
good relations with the people around you,
in your neighbourhood and civil society
organisations.
In order to determine people’s
subjective perception of integration,
respondents were asked whether they
felt integrated or not. The responses
were used to determine the extent to
which the different variables (such
as legal status, access to education,
health and income level) influenced
an individual’s perception of being
integrated. Depending on the degree
of its influence on the perception
of local integration, each variable
was given a certain weight.
The weighting of the variables is
an essential element of the LII and
relates to the specific context of the
operation in question. For example,

UNHCR Ecuador

Ecuador has the largest recognised refugee
population in Latin America. Of the more
than 230,000 refugees and asylum seekers in
the country, 60,500 are registered refugees,
90% of whom are from Colombia.1 Refugees
and asylum seekers have freedom of
movement within the country and access
to basic rights and services, according to
Ecuadorian law. Several studies have shown
that most Colombian refugees and asylum
seekers in Ecuador seek to become locally
integrated due to sharing a culture and
language with the host country. However,
they face obstacles such as discrimination,
lack of recognition of documentation, and
poor socio-economic conditions – all factors
that stand in the way of full integration.
In 2013, in line with the Ecuadorian
government’s National Plan for Good Living,
UNHCR Ecuador developed a Comprehensive
Solutions Initiative (CSI), complemented
in 2016 by a multi-year, multi-partner
solutions strategy (2016-18). The multi-year
strategy is implemented in coordination
with public institutions, civil society and
the private sector, and has distinct legal,
social and economic dimensions. In order to
assess the impact of the CSI and the multiyear strategy on local integration, UNHCR
Ecuador designed a Local Integration
Index (LII), which would also serve as a
tool to best identify and assist the most
vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers.
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in some countries persons of concern may
attach more importance (weight) to legal
status, while in others priority is given
to employment. We found that the sociocultural integration of Colombian refugees
and asylum seekers in Ecuador was greater
than their economic integration, which was
in turn greater than their legal integration.
One significant finding of the survey in
Ecuador was a correlation between a lack
of legal status and being below the poverty
line. When these weights were applied to the
baseline data the result was an LII of 61.1% for
Colombian refugees and asylum seekers in
Ecuador, the average level of legal integration
being 50.6%, socio-cultural integration
62.3%, and economic integration 59.5%.2
The versatility of the LII allows for
analysis at group and individual levels, which
in turn enables more precise interventions,
targeting persons at the lower end of the

integration index. This, for example, can be
through their inclusion in the Graduation
Model,3 which the Office in Ecuador has been
implementing since 2016 with promising
results, where participants are selected
are selected based on, among other things,
their household’s score on the LII. The
Graduation Model (or approach) comes from
the world of development assistance and is
aimed at ‘graduating’ people out of poverty.
The model consists of a sequenced set of
interventions that include consumption
support, skills training, mentoring, financial
training and inclusion in safety networks
within the community. Ecuador is one of few
countries applying the model in a refugee
situation. Families ‘graduate’ according
to their performance against four criteria,
which in Ecuador are: eating at least three
nutritious meals a day; having a family
income above the poverty line; having 5% of

Colombian refugees and Ecuadorians nationals in Santo Domingo participating in
an integration activity as part of a ‘Living Together in Solidarity’ campaign.
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income in savings in a bank; and belonging
to a community or social network such as
a church organisation. Of the 1,810 families
currently supported by UNHCR Ecuador,
59% have achieved all four graduation
criteria. In addition to use as a selection
tool, the LII can also be used to measure the
progress of those families participating in the
Graduation Model towards local integration.

Conclusions

In Ecuador, the LII shows that, based on
data collected in 2014, Colombian refugees
and asylum seekers achieved relatively
high levels of integration.4 At the same time,
there is progress to be made for a significant
proportion of the population. A mid-line
study is currently under way, which will
use the LII to measure the progress made
by UNHCR’s multi-year, multi-partner
solutions strategy. Given its versatility, the
LII is a tool to help design programmes

October 2017

aimed at improving the integration of a given
population, with respect to a certain type
of integration or for a specific sector of the
population. Regular calculations to update the
LII will show how local integration evolves
over time within a specific operation.
Santiago Cordova cordova.santiago@gmail.com
Former data management officer
Peter Janssen janssen@unhcr.org
Deputy Representative
UNHCR Ecuador www.acnur.org
1. Data from Ecuador’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Human
Mobility.
2. To go from the level of integration in each dimension to the
global LII, it is necessary to apply the specific weights calculated
for each dimension at an individual level and then calculate the
average for the whole population. For details of the methodology
and full results contact Santiago Cordova.
3. https://trickleup.org/graduation-approach/
4. ‘Relatively’ refers to the scale of the LII, with 0% representing no
integration, such as a closed refugee camp with 100% dependency
on humanitarian assistance in all sectors; and 100% representing
full integration, such as naturalization.

The RCM Guide: a novel protection tool for crossborder disaster-induced displacement in the Americas
Walter Kälin and David Cantor
States in the Americas confront complex challenges in the face of human mobility caused
by both sudden- and slow-onset disasters. A new regional guide presents practices and
measures to help address the protection needs of cross-border disaster-displaced persons.
In November 2016, in Honduras, the Regional
Conference on Migration (RCM)1 adopted the
Guide to Effective Practices for RCM Member
Countries: protection for persons moving across
borders in the context of disasters.2 Designed
to apply primarily to displacement deriving
from sudden-onset disaster events, the RCM
Guide has its roots in a 2013 Central America
Regional Consultation by the Nansen
Initiative, a global State-led process that
culminated in the Agenda for the Protection
of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the
Context of Disasters and Climate Change
(Protection Agenda) which was endorsed by
109 government delegations in October 2015.3
To support States in using the Protection
Agenda – a toolbox of practices collected from

across the world – the Platform on Disaster
Displacement was launched as a follow-up
in May 2016. The RCM Guide builds on the
Protection Agenda; however, the practices
and measures that it showcases are more
specific to the Americas and reflect the
collected experiences of States in this region.
The Guide provides direction to RCM
Member Countries on how existing law,
policy and practice in the Americas can be
used to address the needs of persons
displaced across borders in the context of
disasters. This would include those displaced
by the recent hurricanes in the Caribbean.
Examples of relevant measures include the
flexible application of existing migration
categories, the granting of temporary
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admission and stay through the issuance
of humanitarian visas, and the temporary
suspension of return to disaster-affected
countries. Its usefulness stems from the fact
that it strengthens and amplifies existing
immigration law and policy practices4 but
at the same time is non-binding and does
not create new obligations, extend existing
State obligations or require that new laws
be passed.
Since its adoption, the RCM Guide has
already proven valuable when developing
operational tools for preparedness and
response to disaster displacement. In
March 2017, authorities from Costa Rica
and Panama held a workshop on disaster
displacement to prepare a joint response
to situations where people have to flee
across their shared border as a disaster
hits. In this process, the RCM Guide provided
an important reference point, providing
advice and orientation to authorities
working on the ground on both sides of
the border, including immigration officers,
disaster risk management agencies, consular
officials and Red Cross responders. The
outcome of the workshop was a set of draft
Standard Operating Procedures on how
the two countries can concretely collaborate
to assist and protect persons displaced by
disasters. These procedures were tested and
validated in a bi-national simulation exercise
in August 2017 in the Coto Brus district of
Costa Rica’s Puntarenas Province which
borders Panama.
The RCM Guide has also informed and
supported response. For instance, Costa Rican
authorities drew on the preparatory work for
the Guide to ensure a better informed and
prepared response to displacement resulting
from Hurricane Otto in November 2016. To
increase awareness and use of the RCM
Guide, RCM Vice-Ministers agreed on a
training programme for government officials
and other RCM stakeholders from
international organisations and civil society.
This training, which started in August 2017,
aims to strengthen institutional capacity and
cross-border cooperation on how to apply
measures addressing disaster displacement,
based on the RCM Guide, the Protection
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Agenda and the Migrants in Countries in
Crisis Guidelines.5
Less than a year after the Guide’s
adoption, the South American Conference of
Migration (SACM)6 announced its intention to
work on developing a similar guide, thereby
demonstrating the importance of the RCM
Guide far beyond the RCM sub-region.

Future steps: slow-onset disasters and
climate change

Looking to the future, there is a variety
of ways in which the protection and
migration-related measures that the Guide
describes can be further implemented and
developed by RCM Member Countries or
other States in the Americas. For instance,
its approach to disaster displacement could
be specifically developed by building on
the framework of reciprocity and legal
obligations in the well-established parallel
field of disaster response law. Yet this is
not the only area in which the RCM Guide
might prove an inspiration in the future.
Alongside sudden-onset disasters, the
Americas as a region is equally affected
by slow-onset disaster events associated,
for instance, with the adverse effects of
climate change. The latter can have an
impact on the risk of displacement in two
ways: firstly, by altering the frequency
and severity of certain hazards (such as
drought, flooding and heatwaves) and,
secondly, by increasing the vulnerability
of persons and communities. Hazards
linked to climate change will continue to
have an impact on human mobility in the
Americas, even if it remains unclear exactly
how many people will be affected.7
This lack of data means that the
displacement impact of slow-onset events
and the protection needs of those who
move in response are less evident than for
dramatic sudden-onset events. There is a
lack of systematic collection and monitoring
of data on disaster displacement in general,
and even more markedly so in cases of
displacement linked to slow-onset events.
Existing global estimates suggest around 25.4
million people are displaced in the context of
sudden-onset disasters every year, and the
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750,000 people in Haiti needed urgent humanitarian aid after Hurricane Matthew hit the country in October 2016.

number for Latin America and the Caribbean
in 2016 is estimated to have been 1.8 million.8
However, these numbers do not account for
people moving due to slowly developing
processes that have affected them over a
long period of time. These forms of human
mobility are hard to identify definitively
and the lack of standardised data collection
tools and vocabulary does not help either.
Indeed, although the relationship between
the adverse effects of climate change and
different types of human mobility (migration,
displacement and planned relocation) is
increasingly recognised, it is complex in
character. As a driver for mobility, the
impact of slow-onset events such as land
and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity
and desertification is often compounded
by, and difficult to disentangle from, other
pre-existing vulnerabilities stemming from
weak governance, population growth, poor
urban planning or rural underdevelopment.
Moreover, disaster displacement is often
a result of the impact of both slow- and
rapid-onset disasters. This can be observed
in ongoing displacement from rural and
coastal areas in Honduras, Haiti and
Panama, where resilience to sudden-onset

hazards was already weak due to aridity,
land degradation and coastal erosion.
Due in part to such complexity, there
appears – even in the Americas – to be little
State practice on the protection needs of
persons displaced by slow-onset events, as
compared with those displaced by suddenonset events. At the same time, this is an
issue that cuts across traditional policy
areas, from humanitarian assistance, refugee
protection, migration management and
human rights to climate change action,
disaster risk reduction and development.
Addressing disaster displacement due to
slow-onset events, especially in the context
of the adverse effects of climate change,
would thus require a whole-of-government
approach, robust development solutions
and the integration of climate change
action, disaster risk reduction and the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Overall, then, challenges remain in
addressing human mobility in the context of
disasters and climate change. Nonetheless,
building on the approach and measures
outlined in the RCM Guide for displacement
due to sudden-onset events may offer a
way forward for policy development on
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mobility due to slow-onset disasters in the
context of climate change. For instance,
States could build on existing bilateral
and regional migration agreements in the
Americas, adopting national quotas or
seasonal worker programmes and providing
training and education to potential migrants,
as a means of promoting migration as
adaptation to the adverse effects of climate
change, environmental change and natural
hazards. Further discussion on migration
as adaptation could also take place at a
regional level within the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change. Factoring
in such forms of mobility to sub-regional
freedom of movement frameworks such
as in MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del
Sur – Southern Common Market) or SICA
(Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana
– Central American Integration System)
would also be a possibility.
One additional challenge in the
Americas is that, across the region as a
whole, the integration of different (sub-)
regional frameworks and processes is not
as comprehensive as in other regions, for
example, the European Union. The work
relevant to disaster displacement of the
different regional entities, for example,
MERCOSUR and the South American
Conference on Migration or the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the
RCM is not integrated enough to amount
to a strong regional migration regime.9
This creates barriers to the implementation
and enhanced application of the different
measures proposed in instruments such
as the Protection Agenda and the RCM
Guide. Ways to bridge the silos and to
coordinate effectively within and across
a multitude of parallel mechanisms
and processes, at regional, sub-regional
and domestic levels, are needed.

Conclusions

All things considered, the adoption and
dissemination of the RCM Guide is a major
step in strengthening the protection of
people displaced across borders in the
Americas in the context of disasters. Where
challenges remain in securing a robust
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response for persons on the move in relation
to situations of disasters and in addressing
the adverse effects of climate change in the
region, the RCM Guide may also provide
a template and platform from which to
promote policy development. As a first step,
better and more systematic data are needed
in order to ensure that any such efforts
at the regional or sub-regional levels are
built upon a firm empirical understanding
of human mobility in this context.
Walter Kälin Envoy@disasterdisplacement.org
Envoy of the Chair of the Platform on Disaster
Displacement www.disasterdisplacement.org
David James Cantor David.Cantor@london.ac.uk
Director, Refugee Law Initiative, School of
Advanced Study, University of London
https://rli.sas.ac.uk
1. RCM or the Puebla Process is a Regional Consultative Process
on Migration. RCM Member Countries are: Belize, Canada, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, United States, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama and Dominican Republic. RCM also includes
observer members: Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and
Peru. www.rcmvs.org
2. Regional Conference on Migration (2016) A Guide to Effective
Practices for RCM Member Countries: protection for persons moving
across borders in the context of disasters, drafted by the Nansen
Initiative for RCM Member Countries
http://bit.ly/RCM-Guide-2016
3. Nansen Initiative (2015) Agenda for the protection of cross-border
displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change Volume I
http://bit.ly/Nansen-ProtectionAgendaVol1
See also Forced Migration Review issue 49 (2015) on ‘Disasters and
displacement in a changing climate’
www.fmreview.org/climatechange-disasters
4. Nansen Initiative and Cantor D J (2015) Law, Policy and Practice
Concerning the Humanitarian Protection of Aliens on a Temporary Basis
in the Context of Disasters, Background Paper, States of the Regional
Conference on Migration and Others in the Americas, Regional
Workshop on Temporary Protection Status and/or Humanitarian
Visas in Situations of Disaster, San José, Costa Rica, 10-11 February
2015 http://bit.ly/Nansen-Cantor-2015
5. MICIC (2016) Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries
experiencing Conflict or Natural Disasters
http://bit.ly/MICIC-Guidelines-2016
6. http://csm-osumi.org
7. Nansen Initiative and Rodríguez Serna N (2015) Human Mobility
in the Context of Natural Hazard‑Related Disasters in South America,
Background Paper, Nansen Initiative/Refugee Law Initiative South
America Consultation, Quito, Ecuador, 15-16 July 2015
http://bit.ly/Nansen-RSerna-2015
8. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2017) Global Report on
Internal Displacement, Part 1
http://bit.ly/IDMC-GRID2017-Part1
9. Lavenex S ‘Regional migration governance’ in Börzel T and
Risse T (Eds) (2016) Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism,
Oxford: Oxford University Press
https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:93574
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Disaster-induced displacement in the Caribbean and
the Pacific
Mo Hamza, Ida Koch and Malte Plewa
People in Small Island Developing States are particularly vulnerable to displacement by
disaster. Governments in the Caribbean and the Pacific need urgently to do more risk
management and planning, rather than focusing almost exclusively on response and relocation.
Relative to their population size, five of
the 20 countries most affected by disaster
displacement are Small Island Developing
States (SIDS).1 Today a person living in
one of these States is three times more
likely to be displaced by a disaster than a
person living elsewhere.2 However, little
analysis has been done of displacement
risk in SIDS, as the total number of people
affected in a single case is often relatively
small and therefore overshadowed by larger
countries’ more headline-grabbing events.
The SIDS in the Caribbean and the Pacific
belong to the most hazard-prone regions of the
world – as demonstrated only too vividly by
recent hurricanes in the Caribbean. According
to the International Monetary Fund, SIDS
lose approximately 2% of their annual GDP
on average as a result of natural hazards,
four times the global average.3 Yet there is
a lack of literature on disaster displacement
with a focus on SIDS, and especially with a
regional focus on the Caribbean. There are
no appropriate data collection methods to
register situations of protracted displacement
or the effects of displacement on livelihoods
over time. Labels and categories such as
homeless, evacuee and displaced are often
used interchangeably and merged in statistics
on disaster displacement, regardless of
duration and distance of movement, or the
influence of the movement on livelihoods.4
Many cases of displacement, including some
of a protracted nature, remain unnoticed.

Displacement drivers

Our research set out to identify how disasterinduced displacement is reflected in national
and regional disaster risk reduction (DRR)
and climate change adaptation (CCA) policy
mechanisms in SIDS in the Caribbean and

the Pacific.5 The results of the interviews
conducted for the research project show
that, overall, the drivers of displacement are
similar in both regions. The informal nature
of settlement development and the lack of
safe land for settlements, poverty, lack of
insurance schemes and social safety nets,
environmental degradation and the erosion of
traditionally strong social bonds all interact
with political factors in a complex manner to
shape displacement risk. Several respondents
mentioned how land tenure systems lead to
disputes over proving ownership of land after
a disaster. According to several respondents,
this was one of the factors delaying
reconstruction and prolonging displacement
after Hurricane Ivan hit Grenada in 2004: “So
you lose documents on ownership, [...] and
you are now recovering – [then] comes the
quarrel or the struggle over who owns what.”
Not only are informal settlements built
in unsafe locations but they are built using
unsafe and substandard materials and
methods of construction and thus offer no
protection from hazards. This is not limited to
informal settlements. Formally built areas do
not follow or apply building codes as these are
either not adequately enforced or the general
public do not have the means to apply them
to their dwellings. One respondent describes
how: “Some households cannot afford to obey
the laws and regulations of Tonga’s building
codes to build houses to be resilient up to a
category 5 […] they cannot afford to build
houses up to these standards, and during
a disaster they will be the first to move.”
Displacement drivers are not limited to
sudden-onset hazards. Following the drought
in 2013 a group of farmers in the Dominican
Republic were forced to take out a bank loan,
providing their land and houses as collateral
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guarantee. In 2016, many of these farmers were
displaced because they could not repay the loan
on time and the banks seized the assets they
had put up as security. Such indirect effects
of slow-onset hazards are not registered as
disaster-related displacement. This underlines
the gap in the current data on displacement
and the complexity of factors involved.
During the interviews, it became evident
that most governments avoid discussing
displacement, especially when it is internal.
One respondent from the Pacific commented:
“An interesting point in our region to notice
is that our countries are globally leading the
debate and discussion on this issue. Regionally,
it’s not getting a mention.” Governments
tend to equate displacement with failure
and thus it becomes politically sensitive and
damaging to even broach the subject. As a
result, displacement is rarely acknowledged.
One respondent in the Caribbean stated:
“Displacement is not accepted, because it
implies that the government is not in control.
So according to the governments, there
are legal procedures, resettlements, and
internal migration. So the reaction to talking
about displacement is blunt, there is no
consciousness about the issue. This is a reality
which is not accepted by most governments.”
This constrains any open discussion and
stifles attempts to develop solutions.
Displacement situations in SIDS across the
Caribbean and the Pacific often go unnoticed
by the international humanitarian community,
as humanitarian actors tend to prioritise their
actions based on the total number of people
affected, rather than on the affected ratio
of the population. One respondent stated:
“As a humanitarian, we are supposed to go
according to needs, the highest number of
people affected. So that is why a lot of the
humanitarian attention is on South Sudan
[where] you have tens of thousands, hundreds
of thousands of people displaced. Or Somalia.
But then people in the Caribbean would argue:
But it is 10% of our population [affected].”
Interviewees stated that they could
not provide any hard data on the overall
displacement trends or current displacement
figures in either region. Nevertheless,
almost every interviewee was able to give
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at least one example of a displacement
situation, many of which were currently
ongoing and of a protracted nature.

Policy neglect of disaster displacement

The review of 30 key policy documents, both
regional and national, showed a general neglect
of any kind of human mobility consideration.
Most Caribbean countries lack any form of
DRR and CCA plans and policies, while the
most often mentioned risk reduction activities
in relation to human mobility in both regions
are evacuations, relocation and resettlement.
Yet preventive relocation of communities in
high-risk zones can be problematic, as these
affect the livelihoods of those affected and
can increase the risk of impoverishment.
The potentially negative effects of relocation
are discussed in very few of the reviewed
documents, and not in great detail. One of the
respondents stated with regards to Vanuatu:
“What is mentioned now is one line about
evacuation centres [...]. Other than this, there
is no specific policy documents to protect
the rights of those who are displaced.” Fiji is
currently developing relocation guidelines, and
Kiribati’s vision on ‘migration with dignity’
outlines a long-term relocation strategy not only
within the country but also to neighbouring
island states. With regards to the Caribbean,
several respondents mentioned that relocation
takes place on a regular basis but that there are
no appropriate policies and plans in place.
While Pacific policies address disasterrelated human mobility to a greater extent
than those of the Caribbean, displacement
management in both regions is reactive, and
preventive measures are limited to relocation.
The policies which do include displacement
considerations do so only from a protection
perspective. St Vincent and the Grenadines’
National Disaster Plan, for example, foresees
allowances for friends and relatives who
shelter displaced people and includes
procedures for the identification of safe
locations for displaced persons in case they
cannot return to their old place of residence.
Durable solutions for those displaced are
not included in the policies we reviewed,
nor are the effects of relocation. None of
the reviewed documents seem to have been
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informed by the Agenda for the Protection
of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the
Context of Disasters and Climate Change
(the Protection Agenda)6 or the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement7.
On a relatively positive note, early signs
in current developments in the legislative
frameworks on disasters and climate change
in both regions point to more attention being
paid to risk management and adaptation
approaches. Community involvement, early
warning, awareness building and education,
livelihood-based approaches and hazard-zone
mapping are emphasised in the policies in both
regions. Such activities can all help reduce
displacement risk but the extent to which the
policies will go is still unclear and untested.
Current developments in the Pacific
indicate an increasing awareness of
displacement and a careful shift in attitude.
In Vanuatu, a Displacement Policy Project
is underway, aiming to build an overview
of national internal displacement and
forced migration patterns, while identifying
challenges and gaps that need to be addressed
in order to strengthen the country’s ability
to manage displacement and to ensure
sensitive and protective durable solutions.

Closing the gaps

Not only do national governments need to
have a shift of mindset but the wider debate
on climate change and SIDS needs to better
reflect the nuances and complexity that exist.
Our research findings point to a number of
issues to be considered by policymakers, the
international community and researchers:
Governments need to accept disasterinduced displacement as a real, complex
phenomen and develop appropriate
actions and durable solutions. Addressing
displacement will require governments
to develop, firstly, risk reduction activities
directly targeting displacement risk
and, secondly, a human rights-based
framework to protect people’s livelihoods
and ‘rights of place’ – that is, their right
to settle without the threat of eviction.
Caribbean countries need to strengthen
their overall DRR and CCA policies. These
policies, in both the Caribbean and Pacific
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region, should include displacement
considerations from a risk reduction and
protection perspective, as recommended in the
Protection Agenda.
Current systems relating to land tenure
rights need modernisation to avoid problems
concerning property rights in the recovery
phase and to reduce the risk of protracted
displacement.
The implementation of the displacement
policy currently developed by Vanuatu
should be observed closely, identifying its
successes and failures in order to be able to
develop best practices for both regions.
Regional approaches to displacement and
human mobility issues should be developed
to protect the rights of cross-border displaced
people. The Pacific has already started
negotiations on such an approach, from
which the Caribbean could perhaps learn.
And, finally, work needs to be done to
develop new and improved displacement
measures and systems for tracking people’s
movements in order to determine the
scope of the issue; such measures could
helpfully include indicators on affected
livelihoods and the perceptions of the
affected populations themselves.
Mo Hamza mo.hamza@risk.lth.se
Professor, Risk Management and Societal Safety
Ida Koch ikg91@hotmail.com
Researcher
Malte Plewa mltplewa@gmail.com
Researcher
Division of Risk Management and Societal Safety,
Lund University www.risk.lth.se
1. IDMC (2015) Global Estimates: People displaced by disasters
http://bit.ly/IDMC-2015-GlobalEstimates
2. Ginetti J (2015) Disaster-related Displacement Risk: Measuring the
Risk and Addressing its Drivers http://bit.ly/Ginetti-2015-risk-drivers
3. International Monetary Fund (2016) Small states‘ resilience to
natural disasters and climate change – Role for the IMF
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/110416.pdf
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‘Migration, immobility and displacement outcomes following
extreme events’, Environmental Science and Policy, 27
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and reviewed 30 DRR, CCA and development policies, both
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7. http://bit.ly/GuidingPrinciplesInternalDisplacement
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Towards a regional agreement on environmental
displacement?
Erika Pires Ramos, Fernanda de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville, Lilian Yamamoto and
Diogo Andreola Serraglio
Efforts towards a regional agreement on migration in South America should be extended to
recognise and protect those displaced for environmental reasons.
The effects of climate change influence the
frequency and intensity of disasters and
slow-onset environmental degradation
processes, exacerbating pre-existing risks
and vulnerabilities.1 Between 2000 and the
middle of 2015 an estimated eight million
people were displaced or evacuated in the
context of disasters in South America.2
Having made progress in recent years in
the area of migration, existing regional
forums are in a position to contribute to a
dialogue on human mobility in the context
of climate change and disasters, potentially
leading to the harmonization of national
initiatives, a better understanding and longterm management of displacement, and the
recognition and protection of environmentally
displaced persons throughout the region.

Existing forums and initiatives

The sub-regional bloc the Common Market
of the South (MERCOSUR) has a Foro
Especializado Migratorio (Migratory
Specialised Forum) (FEM) that is responsible for
studying the impacts of migration with the aim
of developing draft regulations and agreements.
Its 2002 MERCOSUR Residence Agreement on
the free movement of persons does not refer
specifically to environmentally displaced
persons but could be adapted to facilitate their
movement to other countries in the region, as
suggested in the European Union’s Strategy on
adaptation to climate change.3 Members of FEM
have recognised a gap in provision for those
displaced by disasters, and in 2012 MERCOSUR
and Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) Member States were called upon
to recognise the phenomenon of migration
caused by natural hazards (‘environmental’
migration) and to create a protocol aimed at
those who migrate for environmental reasons.

One of the objectives of the
intergovernmental regional organisation
UNASUR is cooperation on disaster prevention
and climate change, as well as on migration.
It is working towards the establishment of a
South American citizenship that – in addition
to guaranteeing access to a wide range of
rights – could facilitate the management of
intra-regional cross-border movements in
the context of climate change and disasters.
High-level representatives from both
MERCOSUR and UNASUR have taken part
in interregional dialogues including the
2016 UNASUR-MERCOSUR Dialogue on
Human Rights of Migrants and Humanitarian
Cooperation and the MERCOSUR Dialogue
on Human Rights of Migrants: Humanitarian
Crisis and Food Security of the same year.
As a result of these dialogues, it was agreed
that the development and implementation
of instruments for risk management and
humanitarian cooperation to safeguard
the human rights of migrants must be
taken forward at a regional level.4
The Conferencia Suramericana sobre
Migraciones (South American Conference on
Migration) (CSM) works on developing policies
on international migration and its relationship
with regional integration and development.
In 2015 the CSM extended its mandate to
include ‘migration, environment and climate
change’. The CSM can therefore now provide
an important space for coordination between
regional and subregional organisations to
promote the issue of environmental migration
and the adoption of an agreement in the
region and harmonisation of existing national
initiatives. In 2016, based on conclusions of a
report presented by the Red Sudamericana para
las Migraciones Ambientales (South American
Network for Environmental Migrations)
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(RESAMA) to the Technical Secretary5, CSM
agreed to undertake a study on the links
between climate change, environment and
migration, and to carry out joint regional
training workshops on the theme.6
Finally, the regional solidarity
resettlement programme and other strategies
that were put forward in the Mexico Plan
of Action of 2004 offer durable solutions to
displacement, through humanitarian visas
and resettlement quotas – strategies that
could equally be applied to crises caused
by climate change and disasters. The
Brazil Plan of Action of 2014 recommends
that the protection measures provided for
in migration and asylum legislation are
evaluated for their relevance to response
to cross-border movements caused by
climate change and natural disasters.
In view of the vacuum in international
law relating to environmental displacement, it
is necessary to establish minimum standards
of protection at the regional and national
level. A regional agreement on environmental
displacement would enable better
coordination between migration, disaster
risk reduction and climate change policies
in the region and allow the coordination of
different initiatives and instruments around
a single recognition and protection system.
The construction of such an agreement
must be participatory, however, particularly
for those communities and people who
are displaced or at risk of displacement.

Challenges and future prospects

There are positive indications that
environmental displacement is being
discussed in the region and its forums, both
through ongoing national initiatives and
in regional forums capable of launching a
regional negotiation process, such as the
CSM. Some difficulties still hamper progress,
however. These include the absence of
comprehensive and detailed information on
mobility in the context of climate change and
disasters, the need to identify communities
already displaced or at risk of displacement,
the reluctance of States to accept new
obligations related to migration, and the sheer
number of different forums, whose initiatives,
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although positive, can be difficult to turn into
coordinated action and consensus.
South American citizenship could make
an important contribution to this issue
in terms of free movement in the region,
which would facilitate the reception of
people displaced for environmental reasons.
However, it would not provide comprehensive
protection for displaced persons. Proposals
for a general regional agreement could
incorporate the issue of environmental
migration but there would certainly be limits
to the in-depth regulation of the issue in a
general migration agreement. The adoption
of a regional agreement on environmental
migration or a specific protocol within the
framework of a regional convention on
migration could be an effective solution.
Such an agreement or protocol must not
be restricted to the issue of reception but
must also address the protection of people
displaced for environmental reasons, their
integration and their return in conditions
of safety and dignity, presenting durable
solutions rather than short-term responses.
Erika Pires Ramos erikaprs@gmail.com
Founder and researcher
Fernanda de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville cavedon.
capdeville@gmail.com
Independent consultant and researcher
Lilian Yamamoto liukami2014@gmail.com
Researcher
Diogo Andreola Serraglio
diogoaserraglio@gmail.com
Researcher
South American Network for Environmental
Migrations (RESAMA) www.resama.net
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Could Latin American citizenship be a fourth durable
solution?
Valeria Llamas
Proposals for a regional South American citizenship put forward by the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR) offer the possibility of alternative solutions for the protection of
internally displaced persons and refugees in the region.
One of the goals of the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR), established in
2008, is to establish a single South American
citizenship. This would be a huge and
innovative step, reflecting the political will
and spirit underlying a number of significant
initiatives which have been introduced
in the region over previous decades.
The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees,
adopted in 1984, established the legal
foundation for refugees in the region,
based on a broader version of the 1951
Convention refugee definition, considering
refugees to be “persons who have fled
their country because their lives, security
or freedom have been threatened by
generalized violence, foreign aggression,
internal conflicts, massive violation of
human rights or other circumstances which
have seriously disturbed public order.”1
In 2002 countries of the Common Market
of the South – MERCOSUR – signed an
agreement granting freedom of circulation
and residence for all their citizens.2 Then in
2012 the countries of the (by then enlarged)
MERCOSUR bloc signed the MERCOSUR
Declaration of Principles on the International
Protection of Refugees, pledging to identify
asylum needs in mixed migratory flows (with
special attention paid to gender and age)
and avoid non-refoulement.3 The Declaration
also sought to guarantee that refugees could
exercise the same rights as other foreigners,
promoted family reunification of refugees
and established mechanisms for cooperation
between the different countries’ asylum
institutions. In addition, it created a regional
resettlement programme to highlight
the importance of harmonising national
legislations and of working collectively to
protect refugees arriving in the region.

In 2004, the 20 countries of the Latin
American and Caribbean region and UNHCR,
the UN Refugee Agency, developed the
Mexico Plan of Action, reflecting concerns
about the threat posed to the region’s
stability by the Colombian conflict and the
large number of refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs). The Plan of
Action emphasised the importance of
cooperation, international solidarity and
shared responsibility, aiming to strengthen
the framework of international protection in
order to achieve durable solutions for refugees
in the region. The Plan considered that the
quality of asylum was fundamental to finding
durable solutions to refugee problems – that
is, if protection is effective, a refugee will
not need to go to a third country by means
of secondary or irregular movements.
In 2014, international organisations
and representatives of civil society
organisations throughout the region
adopted the Declaration and Plan of
Action of Brazil. This regional tool to
strengthen international protection in Latin
America focuses on durable solutions and
highlights good practices, promoting SouthSouth cooperation and support from the
international community for two specific
ongoing displacement situations – growing
numbers of refugees who have settled in the
large urban centres of Latin America and
the large number of vulnerable Colombian
citizens in the country’s border areas
with Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela.

Latin American political will

The establishment of the regional
bodies and instruments outlined above
exemplify the political will existing in
the region and illustrate why the Latin
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American approach – avoiding restrictive
policies, allowing the regularisation of
migration, and implementing measures
to identify those in need of international
protection – has differed from much of
what happens in other parts of the world.
UNASUR was established as a space of
convergence with other initiatives but with
the aim of going a step further: “to build a
South American identity and citizenship.”4 In
this context, the South American citizenship
that it proposes constitutes the most
comprehensive, innovative and potentially
durable solution to the humanitarian
crisis in the region. It also represents a
redefinition of the relationship between
the South American countries, based on a
common vision and a regional identity.

Concepts of citizenship

Among its specific objectives, UNASUR seeks
to consolidate a South American identity
through the progressive recognition of rights
for nationals of a Member State residing in
any of the other Member States, in order
to allow South American citizenship and
access to social security and health services
throughout the region; through cooperation
in the field of migration, it aims to promote
region-wide recognition of human and labour
rights in order to regularise and harmonise
migration policies. The agreement on the
exemption of visas and passports signed by
the Foreign Ministers of the South American
Community of Nations (predecessor to
UNASUR) in November 2006 was the first
step toward freedom of movement and
contributed to laying the groundwork
for a South American citizenship.
UNASUR was innovative in presenting
the concept of citizenship based on the notion
of the legal principle of jus domicile – right of
residence. This comes from understanding
citizenship as membership on different
political levels, from local to regional. And
it is at the intergovernmental regional level
that UNASUR acknowledges the need to
‘transnationalise’ citizenship rights for all
citizens and non-national citizens residing in
their countries – that is, to recognise a form of
belonging by virtue of the place of residence.
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While South American citizenship
could be considered as an alternative
durable solution, it is also complementary
to the needs of international protection
for refugees and national protection for
IDPs. UNASUR has strengthened SouthSouth cooperation, developing a regional
agenda in the face of shared problems which
increasingly transcend national boundaries.
It is important to note that Resolution
No 14/2014 of the Council of Chancellors of
UNASUR in 2014 approved the conceptual
report on South American citizenship.
Similarly, sub-regional bodies (CAN –
Comunidad Andina/Andean Community
– and MERCOSUR), the South American
Conference on Migration and the Working
Group on South American Citizenship (GTCS)
continue to work on a rights-based, dynamic
and integrated approach; progress made
on this issue was presented at UNASUR’s
meeting in November 2015 in Montevideo.
Since that time, the GTCS has continued to
work on the issue. For UNASUR’s Secretary
General, the goal of a South American
citizenship embodies the organisation’s
institutional and integrationist aspirations.
Valeria Llamas llamasva@gmail.com
Executive Secretary, REDLAIDH (Red
Latinoamericana e Interdisciplinaria de
Derechos Humanos) www.redlaidh.org
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People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence in
Latin America www.refworld.org/docid/51c801934.html
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3. www.refworld.org/docid/5301ebba4.html
4. UNASUR comprises 12 countries of the South American region:
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Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.
www.unasursg.org
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Turning the Comprehensive Refugee Response
Framework into reality
Manisha Thomas
As they work towards the adoption of a Global Compact on Refugees, States are
implementing the CRRF. How can those involved in its implementation, including new
actors, best achieve this collective approach to large movements of refugees?
The Comprehensive Refugee Response
Framework (CRRF), one of two annexes to the
2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants (New York Declaration), outlines
a comprehensive response to large-scale
movements of refugees, based on a collective
approach engaging different actors and
approaches. Its objective is “to ease pressures
on the host countries involved, to enhance
refugee self-reliance, to expand access to
third-country solutions and to support
conditions in countries of origin for return
in safety and dignity.”1 Fundamentally, the
CRRF is about changing cultures, mind-sets
and the ways we do business. It is about
engaging a greater range of stakeholders,
and thinking in more creative ways to enable
refugees to be more self-sufficient, while better
supporting the communities that host them.
States are working towards the adoption of
the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) based
on learning from how the CRRF is applied.
Several countries including Uganda
and Tanzania have stepped forward to
implement the framework. Plan International
Tanzania and Plan International Uganda
have supported the work of a consultant to
work with the broader community to look
at what needs to be achieved, and what
challenges addressed, if the implementation
of the CRRF is to be successful. Many of
the observations and recommendations
in this article draw on meetings held with
non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
government officials and UNHCR in Tanzania
and Uganda in May and June of 2017, as well
as on subsequent discussions in Geneva.2

Learning from previous attempts

The unanimous adoption by the General
Assembly of the United Nations (UN) of the

New York Declaration in September 2016 was
historic – never before had so many States
committed to responding better to refugees
and migrants. The New York Declaration
commits States to developing two compacts
by 2018: the GCR and a Global Compact for
Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. While
the lack of attention to internally displaced
people (IDPs) is significant, this opportunity
to improve our collective response to refugees
and migrants should not be overlooked.
However, the CRRF and the impending
GCR have been met with limited enthusiasm.
It is not the first time that many of these
concepts, ideas and approaches have been
put forward. Many of the concepts have
been tried out before, not necessarily
successfully. For example, the attempt to
engage a broader range of stakeholders in
refugee responses – what is being termed
a ‘whole of society’ approach – has been
made before under numerous different
names. Engaging development actors in
refugee responses from the beginning is
also not new. For the CRRF to succeed, it is
important to learn from past attempts – and
failures – to ensure that the same mistakes
are not repeated, and that learning is
incorporated early on. There are a number
of challenges that must be tackled if the
CRRF’s implementation is to be successful.
Simple, practical language: Negotiated
in New York, the language of the New
York Declaration and CRRF does not
easily translate into practical terms. At
the time of writing there is still no clear,
concise or consistent description of what
the CRRF means in concrete terms.
Even the acronym itself means little to
many people. It even prompted the High
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Commissioner at the UNHCR Annual
NGO Consultations in 2017 to suggest
(half-jokingly) a re-naming competition.
The CRRF is meant to lead to a change
in the way business is done, both by those
stakeholders who are currently involved and
by those that should be. Simply relabelling
ongoing efforts and programmes or
resurrecting old ideas will not be sufficient
to achieve the step-change required. There
is a pressing need for communication
and practical guidance showing clearly
what is new and different, which can then
be contextualised in each of the CRRF
countries. Otherwise the risk is that differing
interpretations of the CRRF simply lead
to a repackaging of ongoing activities.
Engaging local, district and regional
authorities: States agreed the New York
Declaration but it is unclear how much
consultation there was with local, district
and regional authorities – those who
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respond to refugees on a daily basis. These
stakeholders also need to be brought into
the implementation process early on, to
ensure not only that their input is heard but
also that they are given the support needed
to lead this different way of responding.
Refugees often fall under the purview
of a Refugee Commissioner or a particular
ministry. The CRRF, however, foresees
delivering services for both refugees
and host communities. This shift would
require the engagement of the ministries
responsible for those services (for example,
health, education, water and sanitation).
Engaging these ministries will be essential
in order to change the way that responses
are planned, designed, budgeted and
delivered. Without the authorities’ early
engagement and commitment, it will be
difficult to ensure that refugees are included
in local or district development plans, as
well as national ones. It will also be at
these local and regional planning levels, in

UNHCR/Jordi Matas
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particular, that gender, age and diversity
issues can be incorporated and addressed.
Hearing refugee and host community voices:
Finding ways to listen to the priorities and
ideas of refugees – especially refugee women
and girls – and to involve them in decision
making as much as possible will be essential
for the CRRF’s successful implementation.
Including refugee and host community
youth will also be important. As with many
such processes, the challenge is to find a
way to engage people in a meaningful way
that does not raise expectations unduly.
Consultation fatigue is already happening
in Tanzania, with the CRRF yet to really
start being implemented. A coordinated
approach to engaging communities needs
to be developed for use in participating
countries if the views of refugees and host
communities are to be incorporated.
Breaking down silos: For decades there
have been initiatives to get humanitarian
and development actors working better
together and to ensure a smoother transition
from emergency to development responses.
The terminology has changed over the
years – from ‘divide’ to ‘gap’ to ‘nexus’ –
and improvements have been made but the
goal remains elusive. The CRRF presents
another chance to achieve this ambition.
Humanitarians and development actors
have distinct backgrounds and different
approaches, their coordination mechanisms
are different, they engage with different parts
of government, and they often have different
donors. Many of these donors have their own
silos, although some donors are working
to provide more flexible financing and
streamlined approaches. After many years,
the World Bank and other development banks
are finally findings ways to better engage with
displacement responses but they also come
with their own cultures and ways of working.
Donor commitments to aid effectiveness need
to be a part of the CRRF’s implementation.
Currently, there is no coordination forum
to bring together a broadly representative
group of humanitarian and development
actors and other whole-of-society stake-
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holders, including government, donors,
private sector actors and development banks.
The challenge will be to create representative
– yet not inefficient – coordination
mechanisms that bring them together to
collectively agree outcomes. Any such forum
must not, however, compromise the speed
of humanitarian response or principles.
Shifting mind-sets: For the CRRF to work
there will need to be a shift in the mind-sets of
those actors traditionally involved in refugee
responses. Humanitarian organisations
should look to hand over to other actors much
more quickly than they would normally do.
Development actors should examine how
they can become more flexible and responsive
to the needs of refugee-hosting areas and
communities. These shifts are, of course,
easier to describe than implement. The
CRRF secretariats and steering committees
being set up in several countries can play
an important role in pushing for these
changes. Organisations that provide both
humanitarian and development responses,
such as NGOs, may be able to help navigate
between these two operating cultures.
Previous attempts to change mind-sets
have not had the necessary time, space or
clear incentives, with institutional ‘turf’
battles often resulting in good ideas not
being implemented. Institutions rely on
their profile and ability to attract funding in
order to operate. The CRRF – if implemented
properly – will mean that many organisations,
particularly humanitarian organisations,
could see a reduction in the amount of work
that they need to do as other actors enter the
arena. That will be a fundamental challenge
to their usual ways of working, to their
financing and, potentially, to the number or
types of staff they employ. These existential
threats to organisations will probably meet
with resistance but must be openly addressed.
Setting realistic timeframes: While shortterm advances are necessary to maintain
momentum, a longer-term perspective is
necessary to bring about the hoped-for
changes. In some countries, bringing refugees
into national development plans will mean
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waiting until the next plan is developed.
A more realistic timeframe of five to eight
years would allow the time necessary for
systemic changes to be put in place.

important objectives is to address root
causes. In the New York Declaration, States
have committed not only to tackle the root
causes of violence and armed conflict but
also to work towards political solutions and
the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to
assist in reconstruction. If States take these
commitments seriously, the numbers of
people fleeing will decrease and the potential
for durable solutions becomes more likely.

Responsibility sharing: The GCR presents
the opportunity to put global responsibility
sharing into much more concrete terms but it
will take a great deal of political will to really
examine how the responsibility to provide
protection and assistance to refugees can be
shared more equitably. Without this global
approach those countries hosting the world’s
largest numbers of refugees may be unable
to cope – especially when the resources
required to support even the most basic
needs of refugees are not being provided.
Many refugee responses in CRRF countries
are already struggling. With insufficient
funds to respond to basic needs, how will the
CRRF be implemented there and elsewhere?
Addressing root causes: While the CRRF
rightly focuses on the various elements
and phases of displacement, one of its most

Manisha Thomas manishathomas@gmail.com
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1. UN General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19
September 2016, A/RES/71/1, 3 October 2016
http://bit.ly/UN-NewYorkDeclaration-2016
2. The full report on which this article is based is available at
http://bit.ly/PlanInternational-CRRF-2017

CRRF coordination structures: involving new actors
Tanzania’s CRRF Secretariat is co-chaired by the
Ministry of Home Affairs and the President’s Office,
Regional Administration and Local Government
(PO-RALG). Its members include government line
ministries, regional authorities, UN agencies, civil
society (including humanitarian and development
NGOs), the World Bank and actors from the private
sector and academia. Several of those government
offices involved in the Secretariat’s work have not
been involved in refugee issues before; this new
approach facilitates the inclusion of refugees in
national development plans and budgets. The
Tanzanian Secretariat and similar forums under
government leadership in other roll-out countries
are tasked with developing clear strategies to
engage local, district and regional authorities in
the implementation of the CRRF, and establish
mechanisms for sustainable and predictable
engagement with refugee responders.
In Somalia, at a regional level, Member States of the
Inter-governmental Authority on Development signed
the Nairobi Declaration in March 2017, committing
to pursue together a comprehensive approach
to finding durable solutions for Somali refugees,
and agreeing to a set of commitments. Refugee

policies in neighbouring host countries will be
connected to Somalia’s national development plan,
with a view to fostering conditions for sustainable
return. Inside Somalia, the CRRF seeks to support
the government in its State-building and peacebuilding efforts. Importantly, the CRRF contributes
to existing frameworks, including the Durable
Solutions Initiative, the Comprehensive Approach
to Security, and the Fiscal Reform Agenda. Efforts
underway under the CRRF include the organisation
of a national forum on refugees and IDP solutions by
the Government of Somalia, and a regional roadmap
with national action plans of countries in the region
hosting Somali refugees to support the principles of
the CRRF and facilitate the reintegration of Somali
refugees. Among these initiatives are the EU-funded
RE-INTEG projects, designed to support sustainable
reintegration of refugee returnees and the local
integration of IDPs. With the EU’s support, UNHCR,
UN-HABITAT, UNDP and IOM are implementing a
range of multi-sector community-based initiatives in
Kismayo and Mogadishu.
For information on all participating countries, see the
CRRF Global Digital Portal http://crrf.unhcr.org/en
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Towards a development approach to displacement
Xavier Devictor
To better respond to displacement, we need to adopt a medium- to long-term perspective
rooted in development as well as humanitarian principles.
There is general consensus that displacement
requires not just a humanitarian response
but also a development response. There
is less consensus, however, on what a
development response actually is, and how
it differs from a humanitarian one. The
need to resolve this uncertainty is pressing,
with some 66 million people currently
displaced by conflict and persecution,
most of whom are hosted in a relatively
small number of developing countries.
For development institutions,
displacement poses significant challenges
to achieving the Sustainable Development
Goals. In some regions, as pressures
increase to close borders, the consensus
on the benefits of free movement of people
and goods that has underpinned global
growth is being challenged. In others, the
size of the refugee populations creates
risks that could undermine stability in
and beyond the region. In a number of
situations, displaced people are uprooted for
extended periods of time, making traditional
humanitarian responses insufficient.

A development approach

Development actors need to focus on the
medium-term socio-economic dimensions
of a crisis. As part of a broad international
effort that also includes humanitarian,
security and diplomatic elements,
development actors need to focus on what
they can do best, not replacing others’
agendas but complementing them. They can
provide medium-term resources and foster
economic opportunities. They can support
governments, and leverage the private sector
and civil society. They can help strengthen
policies and institutions in host countries.
The development framework is one of poverty
reduction, with a focus on both the displaced
and their hosts. But this plays out very
differently across countries. Development

actors need to identify the medium-term
goals that can be achieved in a given context
and to adjust their specific objectives and
their programmes to each situation.
Displaced people are of particular concern
to the development community because of
the specific vulnerabilities arising from their
situation. They have lost their assets. They
have undergone traumatic ordeals. They often
have fewer rights and less ability to exercise
them. Most live in places where opportunities
are limited. The uncertainty of their situation
makes it difficult to plan or invest. These
vulnerabilities affect their ability to seize
economic opportunities, and often trap them
in poverty. It is because this combination of
vulnerabilities is specific to displaced people
that traditional poverty reduction efforts may
not suffice, meaning special interventions are
needed. The development response hence
aims to help mitigate, or even eliminate, these
vulnerabilities, in order to restore displaced
people’s socio-economic capabilities.
Host countries and host communities
also require support. The arrival of large
numbers of people creates both risks and
opportunities – in terms of national security,
jobs, services and social cohesion. Some
impacts are positive, some negative, and
some members of the host community benefit
while others lose out. In most situations
this transforms the environment in which
poverty reduction efforts are being designed
and implemented. Development actors
can help host countries and communities
to deal with these circumstances and to
continue to make development progress in
a transformed context, while providing an
accepting environment for the displaced.

Supporting change

The World Bank Group has recently
established two facilities to support
programmes for refugees and host
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communities. The Global Concessional
Financing Facility (GCFF) uses a mechanism
to make traditional development loans for
middle-income host countries, such as Jordan
and Lebanon, significantly cheaper. Over the
next five years, the GCFF plans to raise US$1.5
billion in grants and to provide $6 billion in
concessional financing. A dedicated $2 billion,
made available through the International
Development Assocation (IDA), the World
Bank’s arm for low-income countries, will
provide host countries such as Ethiopia
and Pakistan with additional resources.
These resources will be disbursed through
traditional development mechanisms,
typically government entities, with a focus
on supporting policy and institutional
changes to improve management of a crisis.
The significant uptake of such financing
to date suggests there is a window of
opportunity to support change in several
host countries. Country-level programmes
have been designed in coordination
with humanitarian and other actors, and
development actors can contribute to
supporting this change in a number of ways:
Data and evidence: Improving the evidence
base necessary to design successful
programmes is critical. Reliable data are
scarce, and empirical analytical evidence
on what works is even scarcer. Yet this is
needed to inform policy recommendations,
develop sound interventions, and enable
effective synergies between all actors.
Preparedness: Most displacement can
be forecast, and for many host countries
refugee flows are a recurring phenomenon.
There is often an opportunity to shift from
a crisis response to a preparedness agenda
and this could have a significant impact.
Warning systems, contingency plans
and institutional readiness are critical to
mitigating negative impacts on development,
for both displaced people and their hosts.
Early response: Decisions made in the
first weeks of a crisis tend to have a lasting
impact, for example on the location of refugee
settlements or on the sort of agreement
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struck with the authorities. Integrating a
medium-term socio-economic perspective
in these discussions is critical for the
overall sustainability of the effort. Early
development interventions can also help
reduce humanitarian costs, for example
reducing the need for trucking water by
reinforcing water supply systems.
Jobs: Self-reliance is both an economic
necessity and a key element in human
dignity. To facilitate this, development actors
need to engage with host governments
on issues such as the right to work or
freedom of movement, address longstanding development issues (most
host economies have a poor business
environment), and work with the private
sector – as is currently happening in
Jordan under the Jordan Compact.
Education: Over half of displaced people are
children. Their education is of paramount
importance not only for them but also
in order to build a new generation that
can contribute to lasting peace in their
country of origin – and to avoid the largescale disenfranchisement that can breed
further violence. Development actors
can help strengthen country systems
and design education solutions adapted
for these children, with a particular
focus on building portable skills.
Less-developed regions: Most refugees are
hosted in remote parts of countries that are
typically among the poorest. Development
actors can help strengthen infrastructure
and service delivery in these areas to
improve development prospects for both
refugees and their host communities.
Solutions: Development actors need to focus
on achieving solutions to displacement –
whether return, integration or resettlement
– that are fully sustainable from a socioeconomic perspective. This could be achieved
by helping to manage the long-lasting
socio-economic impacts of displacement
through economic opportunities. People
who continue to struggle after years
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of exile in camps and other temporary
environments may need particular support.

Beyond the humanitarian-development
nexus

The activities of humanitarian and
development actors have long been seen
as sequential, with an initial humanitarian
response followed by a development effort
when the situation becomes protracted. In
many cases, however, the two approaches
can be complementary throughout the entire
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period of displacement. What is needed,
therefore, is a crisis response that is rooted
in a medium- to long-term perspective – one
that necessarily includes development.
Xavier Devictor xdevictor@worldbank.org
Program Manager, Global Program on Forced
Displacement, World Bank www.worldbank.org
This article draws on the World Bank Group’s
report Forcibly Displaced: Towards a
Development Approach Supporting Refugees,
the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts
www.worldbank.org/forciblydisplaced

ASEAN’s role in the Rohingya refugee crisis
Richa Shivakoti
The Rohingya refugee crisis has become a regional crisis. Members of the Association of
Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) must enhance regional cooperation in order to improve
protection for the region’s refugees.
Myanmar’s estimated one million Rohingya,
a Muslim minority group from Rakhine State,
are not recognised by the Government of
Myanmar as one of the country’s 135 ethnic
groups, have no legal documentation and are
therefore stateless. With large-scale violence
against them in 2012 and 2015 by other groups
in Rakhine State as well as by the government,
many Rohingya have been forced into IDP
camps or to neighbouring countries where
they live in dire conditions. In 2016 UNHCR,
the UN Refugee Agency, estimated that over
168,000 Rohingya had fled Myanmar since
2012,1 and since violence erupted again in
August 2017 further hundreds of thousands
have crossed the border to Bangladesh.
Although international responses to
the violence have previously been mixed,
with governments focused on supporting
Myanmar’s fragile democratic reform,
there has also been ample criticism from
different quarters about the Government
of Myanmar doing too little to protect the
Rohingya population. A report by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights stated in 2016 that violations of the
human rights of the Rohingya Muslims may
suggest “the possible commission of crimes
against humanity, if established by a court

of law”2, and a very critical report by the
International State Crime Initiative of the
previous year concluded that “the Rohingya
face the final stages of genocide”3. More
recently, Myanmar’s de facto leader, Aung
San Suu Kyi, has been widely criticised by the
international community for not sufficiently
condemning the renewed violence.

A regional crisis

The first responsibility to protect the
rights of the Rohingya Muslim population
lies with the Government of Myanmar.
Avoidance of the issue or insistence that
the term ‘Rohingya’ is not used because it
is controversial is not tenable. Firstly, the
government needs to resolve the protracted
statelessness of the Rohingya population,
since their lack of citizenship has left them
vulnerable to discrimination and abuse. As a
newly recognised democratic state, Myanmar
must respect the different ethnicities and
religions within the country, without
systematically discriminating against any
one group. Years of conflict and violence
in Rakhine State, which has attracted press
coverage despite tight governmental control
of the region, have sapped international
goodwill. As Rohingya Muslims have fled
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to neighbouring countries, Myanmar can
no longer insist that this is an internal issue
and instead must work with Bangladesh and
members of ASEAN to address the situation.
The Rohingya crisis has become, in five
years, a full-blown humanitarian crisis
that has regional consequences. It poses a
critical test for the 10-member ASEAN4 and
its institutions, highlighting ASEAN’s lack
of a political and legal framework to deal
with issues related to refugees. Among the
ASEAN nations, only two (the Philippines
and Cambodia) are parties to either the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The 2007
ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers
only focuses on migrant workers and does
not mention refugees or asylum seekers.
The plight of the Rohingya has been
compounded by the response of several
Southeast Asian nations who in 2015 turned
away boats carrying thousands of desperate
Rohingya. Intensified international pressure
and media scrutiny over their refusal to help
the boat refugees finally resulted in Indonesia
and Malaysia permitting people to land
on a temporary basis. It also led to several
crackdowns on the human traffickers engaged
in transporting Rohingya. In May 2015,
both Thai and Malaysian authorities found
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mass graves, believed to be of Rohingya, at
abandoned human trafficking camps along
their shared border. This led members of the
Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking
in Persons and Related Transnational Crime
(which has 45 state members) to acknowledge
the need for an urgent and collective
response on such issues. They agreed to
have a mechanism that would grant the cochairs Indonesia and Australia the authority
“to consult, and if necessary, convene
future meetings to discuss urgent irregular
migration issues with affected and interested
countries in response to current regional
issues or future emergency situations”.5
A distinctive principle of the ASEAN
Charter is that of “non-interference in the
internal affairs of ASEAN Member States”.6
Despite this principle, due to increased
tensions in the region following the 2015
Rohingya refugee crisis some Muslimmajority countries, such as Malaysia and
Indonesia, began to take a stronger stance
on the protection of the Rohingya Muslims.
Although Indonesia had stated that the
Rohingya crisis is a regional problem, it has
followed the non-intervention principle,
emphasising that it would pursue its policy
of ‘constructive engagement’ rather than put
pressure on Myanmar. Malaysia, on the other
hand, was vocal in condemning Myanmar’s

UN Migration Agency (IOM)
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Rohingya refugees from Myanmar arriving in Cox’s Bazar district, Bangladesh, September 2017.
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treatment of the Rohingya: its Prime Minister
Najib Razak told a rally in Kuala Lumpur in
2016 that the “world cannot sit by and watch
genocide taking place”.7 The Organization of
Islamic Cooperation also held an emergency
ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur in
January 2017 to discuss the situation, at the
request of the Government of Malaysia.
Malaysia has emphasised that the plight of
the Rohingya Muslims is a regional concern
and has called for ASEAN to coordinate
humanitarian aid and to investigate alleged
atrocities committed against them.
This increased regional and international
criticism resulted in the Government of
Myanmar taking some steps to try to ease
concerns. At Malaysia’s request, Aung San
Suu Kyi called a special informal meeting
with ASEAN foreign ministers in Yangon
in December 2016 to discuss international
concerns over the situation. Suu Kyi said that
Myanmar would provide regular updates
on the crisis to fellow ASEAN members
and possibly work with them to coordinate
aid efforts. The Government of Myanmar
also allowed several pre-approved media
members to visit Maungdaw, one of the main
sites of the conflict. Suu Kyi also established
an Advisory Commission on Rakhine State,
chaired by Kofi Annan and including six
national and three international members. In
its final report, published in August 2017, the
Advisory Commission recommended several
ways in which to improve accountability and
find long-term solutions to the protracted
statelessness of the Muslim community
in Rakhine State. It also suggested that
Myanmar could improve bilateral relations
with Bangladesh and that both nations should
facilitate the voluntary return of refugees
from Bangladesh to Myanmar through
joint verification. It also recommended
Myanmar’s continued engagement with its
ASEAN neighbours, briefing them regularly
on the broader dimensions and regional
implications of the situation in Rakhine State.9

Conclusion

The continuing Rohingya crisis has shown
how ill-prepared the region is to deal with
such a movement of refugees from one
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member state to others. The meetings that
have taken place between ASEAN Member
States to discuss the crisis are a good start but
the situation needs close monitoring if better
regional cooperation is to lead to improved
protection for its refugees. Member States
must develop a refugee and asylum policy
that includes guidance for action to be taken
when a Member State’s internal issues cause
people to flee to neighbouring states. Such
a policy – agreed by all ASEAN Member
States – would furthermore help to ease
both the escalation of opposition and any
future ethnic or religious tensions between
States. Any future conflicts can be addressed
through the ASEAN Intergovernmental
Commission on Human Rights but this
body must be strengthened, lacking as it
does the mandate to protect and investigate.
ASEAN as yet lacks a Human Rights Court
to interpret and enforce the ASEAN Human
Rights Declaration, a further factor that
must be remedied if the region’s refugees –
including Rohingya – are to be protected.
Richa Shivakoti rshivakoti@gmail.com
PhD candidate, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy, National University of Singapore
https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/
1. UNHCR (2016) Mixed Movements in South-East Asia 2016.
www.refworld.org/pdfid/590b18a14.pdf
2. Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities
in Myanmar, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, 29 June 2016
http://bit.ly/OHCHR-Rohingya-2016
3. Green P, Macmanus T and de la Cour Venning A (2015)
Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar, International State
Crime Initiative http://bit.ly/ISCI-Countdown-Myanmar-2015
4. ASEAN Member States are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
5. Co-Chairs’ Statement BRMC VI. Sixth Ministerial Conference of
the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and
Related Transnational Crime, 23 March 2016
http://bit.ly/BaliProcess-2016
6. ASEAN (2007) The Asean Charter
http://bit.ly/ASEAN-Charter-2007
7. ‘Malaysia PM urges world to act against “genocide” of
Myanmar’s Rohingya’, The Guardian, 4 December 2016
http://bit.ly/MalaysiaPM-Rohingya-Dec14
8. Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (2017) ‘Towards a
Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine:
Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State’.
http://bit.ly/RakhineCommission-FinalReport-2017
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Refugees in towns: experiences of integration
Karen Jacobsen
In countries of first asylum, transit and destination it is increasingly towns and cities that are
absorbing refugees. We must look at what is happening at a local level to better understand
urban integration as a process shared by refugees and host communities alike.
Towns – especially border towns in countries
of first asylum – are at the frontline of
refugee displacement and are often where
refugees settle or spend long periods of
time. When refugees move into a town
they change the fabric of social, political,
cultural and economic relations, which
in turn influences the refugees’ own
experiences. The Refugees in Towns (RIT)
project at the Feinstein International Center,
Tufts University, is a new initiative that
seeks to deepen understanding of urban
refugee integration through highlighting
the dual experience of refugees and the
towns where they have settled. Academic
and policy research tends to focus on the
national or global level, seldom bringing
a local lens to the story. The RIT project
explores integration as it happens in towns,
which is an important dimension missing
from our understanding both of refugee
integration and of urban development.
The RIT project draws on a range of
methods to develop case-studies of towns
and cities that have received refugees.1
Using qualitative research approaches it
focuses on the ‘ground-up’ experience of
host towns and refugee neighbourhoods
within large cities. Research is conducted
by people who live or work there, and
each case-study presents a different angle
depending on the perspective and interests
of the researcher. The case-studies document
the experiences of both refugees and hosts,
and the impact an urban refugee population
has on local services, on the governance
of cities, and on social cohesion. The RIT
project’s scope is global and case-studies
are already underway in North American
towns where refugees have been resettled,
in transit countries (Mexico and Greece)
and countries of first asylum (including
South Africa, Lebanon and Turkey).

Academically, the findings from the casestudies will strengthen theory building about
refugee integration through documentation
and analysis of the ways in which urban
refugee and host communities evolve side
by side. Practically, the project supports
urban policy at the local level by providing
guidance and information to community
leaders, NGOs and town officials. Our aim
is to help shape towns as immigrant- and
refugee-friendly urban spaces that take full
advantage of the benefits brought by refugees
and to identify what practices work well in
addressing the challenges of integration.

Why this project now?

In January 2017, the new Trump
administration began to try to shift
United States (US) refugee policy through
introducing travel bans and suspending
parts of the refugee programme. Towns
across the US responded in different ways,
some declaring themselves ‘sanctuary cities’
and offering other forms of resistance, while
others supported Trump’s efforts. These
political developments at the federal and
local levels are bound to affect the integration
experience of both newly arrived and longstanding refugees and asylum seekers.
Globally, the same political dynamics are
at work. In countries of first asylum such as
Jordan and Libya, in transit countries such
as Greece and Mexico, and in destination
countries such as Germany and Sweden, it is
towns and cities that are absorbing refugees
and migrants. It is crucial that we understand
this experience and find ways to support
towns where, in many cases, refugees will
remain for long periods. The case-studies will:
Map the refugee population: By quantifying
the distribution and size of different refugee
populations by nationality in the town
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each case-study will create a map showing
whether and where refugees are clustered
in particular areas and how this distribution
has changed over time. It will show, for
example, where refugees have relocated
from other parts of the country to join an
‘anchor community’, as with Somalis coming
from elsewhere in the US to join a longstanding community in Lewiston, Maine.
Document refugees’ experiences: The
case-studies will document economic and
financial aspects: how refugees pursue
livelihoods, their sources of income and
support (both local and transnational) and
their financial obligations (such as debts
to smugglers and repayment of IOM travel
loans). Furthermore, they will examine
whether refugees have become politically
active, exploring forms of mobilisation and
the kinds of local and transnational social
and political networks that have emerged.
They will also investigate refugees’ own
understanding of integration, and explore
refugees’ attitudes towards the future.
Explore urban impact: Each case-study will
explore the economic impacts of the refugees
on the town, including on employment,
business creation, trade links and the
housing/rental market, as well as their impact
on services, such as health and education, and
on infrastructure, including transportation
and water. Each case-study will examine
how residents and urban authorities
experience and interpret these impacts,
and how they have responded socially and
politically. The project will also identify
how the municipal authorities and mayors
have responded to refugee arrivals, and
how they have sought to manage relations
with the national or state government.
While these three broad investigative
areas are intended as guidance for casestudies, we encourage other themes or
avenues of investigation.
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we can pair you with a graduate student
from Tufts University or elsewhere, who
can help you with the different aspects. We
also welcome submissions of independently
conducted case-studies. Our goal is to hear
different voices and local perspectives
on how urban integration happens and
we encourage case-studies that reflect
diverse political viewpoints and voices.
Case-studies will be reviewed and
added to the RIT database and be publicly
available through the project’s website.
Each profiled town will have its own web
page, initially ‘owned’ by the original
researcher who can invite others to add to
the case-study materials. We seek to use a
variety of research approaches, including
visual media such as documentary, theatre
and dance, and we encourage creative
approaches by artists of all kinds.
Karen Jacobsen Karen.jacobsen@tufts.edu
Henry J Leir Professor of Global Migration,
Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy,
Tufts University http://fic.tufts.edu/researchitem/refugees-in-towns
For more information contact the author, RIT
project lead, or the RIT project manager
Charles.simpson@tufts.edu
1. A more detailed explanation of our research methods is
available at http://fic.tufts.edu/research-item/refugees-in-towns/
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Contributing case-studies

If you are a refugee, aid worker or resident
in a town hosting refugees, we encourage
you to write a case-study. Where appropriate

Football team SV Babelsberg 03 of Potsdam, Germany, formed a
‘Welcome United’ team for refugee footballers, who are now fully
integrated members of the club, with the same rights and obligations.
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Canada’s Guideline 9: improving SOGIE claims
assessment?
Moira Dustin and Nuno Ferreira
Asylum seekers making claims relating to their sexual orientation and gender identity often
face unfair refusal. New guidance from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada takes
admirable steps towards improving claims assessment, and offers a model for practitioners
elsewhere.
The Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada’s ‘Guideline 9: Proceedings before
the IRB Involving Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity and Expression’ (SOGIE
Guideline) has been in effect since May
2017. It addresses a number of the recurring
concerns about asylum claims based on
sexual orientation and gender identity and
expression1 (SOGIE) that have arisen in case
law, statutory instruments and guidance
around the world.2 These concerns, which
have been common reasons for refusing
SOGIE-based asylum claims in Europe, relate
to: qualification as a member of a particular
social group for the purposes of the 1951
Refugee Convention; whether applicants
can return to live ‘discreetly’ without risk;
whether laws criminalising homosexuality
in the applicant’s country of origin constitute
persecution in themselves; the use of gender
and sexual stereotypes to inform asylum
decision making; whether sexually explicit
evidence is asked for or expected in asylum
cases; and late disclosure as the basis for
refusal of international protection. These were
the subject of Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) rulings in 2013 and 2014.3
The Guideline makes many good
provisions. Citing a 1993 decision4 the
Guideline is clear that individuals presenting
asylum and migration SOGIE-based claims
are “characterized as a particular social
group”. It also recognises that the fears of
SOGIE asylum seekers’ family members
may also warrant consideration under
the same Refugee Convention ground,
which is welcome, if not particularly
new to European audiences.
On the issue of discretion, the Guideline
asserts that claimants should not be expected

to be “discreet” about their SOGIE in order
to avoid persecution. It thereby avoids the
line of questioning – as in, for example, UK
guidance – about the possibility of living
discreetly in the country of origin.5
The Guideline is robust on the need to
avoid decision making based on stereotypes,
offering a good range of examples of potential
pitfalls, such as making assumptions
that SOGIE applicants will participate in
LGBTIQ+6 culture in Canada. This seems to
go beyond the 2014 CJEU decision, which
precludes decision making that is based on
stereotypes but still leaves room for questions
based on them, provided these questions are
part of an overall balanced line of questioning.
The Guideline positively acknowledges
that instances of late disclosure are
acceptable and can be justified under certain
circumstances. The statement that an
individual “may reasonably delay making a
claim for refugee protection based on SOGIE”
in a number of situations goes further than
any other guidance we have seen. Moreover,
the Guideline rightly alerts decision makers
to the need to consider very carefully any
negative weight attached to inconsistencies,
including those arising from late disclosure,
which may be due to “cultural, psychological
or other barriers”. The Guideline could
have gone further, however, by requiring
decision makers to offer asylum claimants
the opportunity to clarify any (perceived)
inconsistencies or issues affecting their
credibility before a decision is issued.
The Guideline furthermore acknowledges
that it is unreasonable to expect SOGIE
asylum claimants to approach public
authorities – in their countries of origin
– for protection, especially when laws
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criminalising non-conforming SOGIE are in
place and enforced. The Guideline rightly
focuses on the “operational level”, rather
than what is enshrined in the statutory
framework of the country of origin. Moreover,
it gives unprecedented attention to the
importance of decision makers accepting
sur place claims and being sensitive towards
the slow processes of self-acceptance many
SOGIE asylum seekers experience.
The quality and relevance of country
of origin information (COI) has been
a recurrent theme in asylum studies,
particularly in relation to SOGIE individuals.6
The Guideline acknowledges the problematic
use of COI in these cases by recalling
that under-reporting of discriminatory
or persecutory practices in countries of
origin may reflect local attitudes towards,
rather than the absence of, such practices.
However, on the notion of persecution
the Guideline’s reasoning is disappointingly
conservative. It refuses to equate
criminalisation of same-sex conduct and
other SOGIE-related repressive norms
with persecution. Instead, it simply states
that “being compelled to conceal one’s
SOGIE constitutes a serious interference
with fundamental human rights that may
therefore amount to persecution”. In this and
elsewhere it leaves too much leeway for denial
of asylum to people living under repressive
and discriminatory legal frameworks. This
is at odds with its recognition of the impact
of cumulative discrimination elsewhere.

Unexpected additions

In addition to these elements of welcome
progress, the Guideline takes other, less
expected, steps. Its approach to terminology
is unusual, with its inclusion of the term
“expressions”: sexual orientations and
gender identities and expressions. This is
a positive development, as the focus is on
individuals’ characteristics rather than
their overall LGBTIQ+ identities. Decision
makers should thereby be encouraged
to show more sensitivity to individuals’
range of characteristics and how these
intersect. This is in line with the emphasis on
intersectionality throughout the Guideline
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and makes the exclusion of individuals with
particular identities who do not identify
as LGBTIQ+ less likely. A further step
would be to include sexual characteristics,
making the acronym ‘SOGIESC’.
This positive choice of terminology
is allied with an equally positive
acknowledgment that gender is not binary
but instead sits on a spectrum. Interestingly,
heterosexual individuals also fall within
the scope of these Guidelines where they
do not – or do not appear to – conform to
socially accepted SOGIE norms. Moreover,
the Guideline acknowledges the lack of
“standard terminology” to capture the
complexity of understandings of SOGIE
across different cultures and societies,
with the aim of averting culturally
and socially inappropriate notions and
expectations in migration and asylum
adjudication procedures. Finally, it
directs authorities and interpreters to
address individuals respectfully using
their chosen name, terminology and
pronouns. The Guideline should be
praised for its positive language and fluid
approach to definitions and identifiers.
Also to be applauded is its consistent
reference to how SOGIE intersects
with other characteristics, such as race,
ethnicity, religion, faith or belief system,
age, disability, health status, social class
and education. Moreover, it makes excellent
use of intersectionality to highlight that
this range of characteristics may affect all
aspects of migration and asylum procedures,
including individuals’ testimonies,
relationships with authorities, and different
stakeholders’ notions of persecution.
Crucially, the Guideline hints at the
restrictive traditional application of the 1951
Refugee Convention grounds. While decision
makers generally expect asylum seekers
to lodge their claims on the basis of one
particular Refugee Convention ground, the
Guideline highlights that SOGIE individuals
may reasonably lodge a claim on the basis of
a combination of any of the five Convention
grounds. In this way, the Guideline moves
away from defining individuals on the basis
of their SOGIE alone. As we note below,
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however, this is somewhat at odds with the
Guideline’s own term “diverse SOGIE”.
The Guideline is to be applauded for
recognising that many SOGIE individuals
should be classed as “vulnerable” to be
protected under any provisions that might
be applicable; it also rightly alerts officials
to the need to adopt additional safeguards
for the protection of sensitive information.
In an unexpected and groundbreaking
move, the Guideline refers explicitly
to SOGIE children and alerts decision
makers to their particular vulnerability.
Its reference to the principle of the best
interests of the child again reflects the
principle of intersectionality – making
connections beyond the field of refugee law.
Finally, the Guideline adopts a respectful
approach towards SOGIE individuals’ family
rights and acknowledges the difficulties they
may face in proving their spousal or conjugal
relationships. In highlighting the importance
of avoiding preconceived notions about
such relationships the Guideline also calls
on decision makers to consider the “unique
circumstances” that SOGIE individuals face.
These circumstances ought to be taken into
consideration, it suggests, in the assessment
of humanitarian and compassionate
grounds in sponsorship appeals.

Shortcomings

In a rather surprising shortfall in relation to
evidentiary standards, the Guideline simply
states that individuals are not “expected (…)
[to] establish their SOGIE through the use of
sexually explicit photographs, videos or other
visual material”. This feeble phrasing leaves
excessive room for individuals to feel under
pressure to submit this sort of evidence to
strengthen their cases. The CJEU has gone
beyond this, by completely precluding the
use of sexualised evidence in SOGIE asylum
cases, thus more effectively protecting
the dignity of asylum claimants, and it is
regrettable the Guideline did not adopt a
similar approach. Only the elimination of
any scope for using sexualised evidence
in asylum and migration procedures
will remove the pressure on applicants
and their legal representatives to make
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use of this possibility as a last, desperate
resort to prove their sexual orientation.
Despite the merit in using characteristics
(SOGIE) rather than identities (LGBTIQ+) as
its terminology, the Guideline’s use of the
SOGIE acronym is troubling. The text not
only refers to “claims based on SOGIE”, but
also repeatedly refers to individuals “with
diverse SOGIE”. “Diverse” in relation to
what? The answer would appear to be, in
relation to the heterosexual majority. While
that difference is undoubtedly the source of
the persecution, stigma and discrimination
suffered by individuals who claim asylum
on the basis of their SOGIE, in using
“diverse SOGIE” the Guideline inadvertently
reinforces a perceived divide between
‘standard’ heterosexuality and ‘deviant’
non-heterosexuality. Referring either to
“individuals who claim asylum on the basis
of their SOGIE” or, for the sake of linguistic
simplicity, “SOGIE asylum seekers” would
be greatly preferable. Unfortunate phrasing
is also used elsewhere. The Guideline refers
to forced medical treatments, stating that
“[i]ndividuals with diverse SOGIE may
be forced to undergo medical treatment
including ‘corrective sexual violence’” and
other non-consensual procedures. This
wording implies that these practices are
“medical treatments”, when in fact they
are closer to torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment,
under Article 7 of the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Conclusion

We welcome and largely endorse this
Guideline. The Guideline responds to asylum
seekers’ needs and experiences in a number
of ways that are absent from most officially
approved asylum guidance instruments,
covering scenarios such as joint claims,
persecution by association, SOGIE minors and
the need for additional safeguards to limit
public dissemination of sensitive material.
While bearing in mind the gap that often
exists between guidance and practice, the
Canadian Guideline breaks new ground
and in many areas provides a model of good
practice for other authorities and jurisdictions.
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